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ARTICLES

STANDING AND GLOBAL WARMING:
IS INJURY TO ALL INJURY TO NONE?
By
BRADFORD

C. MANKo

Since global wanning potentially affects everyone in the world,
does any individual have standing to sue the United States
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) or other federal agencies to
force them to address climate change issues? Suits addressing global
wanning raise difficult standing questions because some United States
Supreme Court decisions have stated or implied that courts should not
allow standing for plaintiffs who file suits alleging general iJ1juries to
the public at large because the political branches of govemmentCongress and the executive branch-are better equipped to resolve
such issues. There is a better argument, however, for courts to
recognize standing for plaintiffs who suffer "concrete" mass iJ1juries,
including any physical harms that are more likely than not caused by
global wanning. Under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
(NEPA), courts should use a "reasonable possibility" standard to
determine whether a federal agency must discuss the possible impact
ofits actions on global wanning. In 2003, EPA concluded that the Clean
Air Act does not give the agency authority to regulate carbon dioxide,
although several states are challenging that conclusion. Even if EPA
cannot regulate carbon dioxide directly, there is a strong argument that
the agency must consider carbon dioxide emissions when new power
plants apply for a pennit under the new source review process. Under
• © Bradford C. Mank, 2005. Janles B. Hehner, Jr. Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati.
J.D. 1987, Yale Law School; B.A. 1983, Harvard University. Professor Mank now teaches
Environmental Law, International Environmental Law, and Administrative Law. Formerly, he
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the Administrative Procedure Act and general standing principles, a
plaintiff who suffers small, but tangible iIUuzies should have standing
under the Clean Air Act
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I. INTRODUCTION

There is growing scientific evidence that human activities producing
greenhouse gases (GHGS),l most notably carbon dioxide (C02 ) from burning
fossil fuels, are causing global warming both in the United States and
throughout the world. 2 There is evidence that global warming has already
caused the average global sea level to rise between four and eight inches
during the last 100 years and that the seas are now rising at one tenth of an
inch per year. 3 Many scientists believe that global warming will cause
serious environmental and human health impacts if the world continues to
burn large quantities of fossil fuels, increasing GHG levels. 4

1 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change defines greenhouse gases
as "those gaseous constituents of the atmosphere, both natural and anthropogenic, that absorb
and re-emit infrared radiation," including CO" methane, and nitrous oxide. United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, S TREATY Doc. NO. 102-38, 1771
U.N.T.S. 107, 31 I.L.M. 849 (1992) (entered into force as law March 1994) [hereinafter
Framework Convention).
2 WORKING GROUP I, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CUMATE CHANGE (IPCC), CUMATE
CHANGE 2001: THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS 61 (2001) [hereinafter CUMATE CHANGE 2001: THE SCIENTIFIC
BASIS) ("In the light of new evidence and taking into account the remaining uncertainties, most
of the observed warming over the last 50 years is likely to have been due to the increase in
greenhouse gas concentrations. "), available at
http://www.gridano/climate/ipcc_tar/wg1/index.htm.
3 Id. at 4 (reporting that average global sea level rose between 0.1 and 0.2 meters (3.9 and
7.8 inches) during the 20th century).
4 WORKING GROUP II, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CUMATE CHANGE, CUMATE CHANGE
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The United States is a major contributor of GHGs, especially from coalburning power plants. 5 In 1998, the United States produced approximately 24
percent of the world's emissions of CO2 , more than any other country.6 The
Energy Information Administration (ElA) estimates that between 1990 and
2001, the United States' GHG emissions grew by 12 percent, with between 81
and 84 percent of the total U.S. GHG emissions as CO2 , 7
Nevertheless, because coal remains cheaper than other sources of
energy, the Bush Administration has rejected any mandatory reductions in
GHGs and has instead supported further research and voluntary efforts at
promoting energy efficiency.s The United States has refused to sign the 1997
Kyoto Protocol, which requires developed countries to reduce GHG
emissions five to eight percent below their 1990 levels by 2008-2012.9 No
federal statute explicitly requires reductions in GHGs by either federal
agencies or private industry,1O although there is significant encouragement of
voluntary private sector reductions and further research.lI Even assuming
2001: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABIUTY 4-5, 11 (2001) [hereinafter CUMATE CHANGE
2001: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABIUTY] (reporting "an increase in the number of people
exposed to vector-borne (e.g., malaria) and water-borne diseases (e.g., cholera)," and the
"potential for significant disruption of ecosystems under climate change"), available at
http://www.grida.no/clirnate/ipcc_tar/wg2Jindex.htrn.
5 See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., EMISSIONS OF GREENHOUSE GASES IN THE UNITED STATES 2001, at
28-29 (showing that CO, emissions from burning coal are rivaled only by CO2 emissions from
transportation-related fossil fuel burning), available at http://www.eiadoe.gov/oiafll605/
gg02rpt/pdf/ 05730 l.pdf.
6 The American share is projected by the United States Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) to diminish slowly to 21% in 2020. See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Global WarmingEmissions: Projections, at http://yosemite.epagov/oar/globalwarrning.nsficontentlEmissions
InternationaiProjections.htrnl (last visited Feb. 20, 2005) (presenting chart with global carbon
emissions for several countries in 1998 and second chart with estimated emissions for same
countries in 2020).
7 In 1990, U.S. GHG emissions were 6169.2 million metric tons carbon dioxide equivalent
(rnrntcde), with CO, alone representing 5002.8 rnrntcde or 81% of the total. In 2001, total U.S.
GHGs were 6905.9 rnrntcde, with CO2 representing 5788.5 rnrntcde or 84% of the total. ENERGY
INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 2002, at 320 tb1.l2.1, available at
http://tonto.eia.doe.govIFTPROOT/multlfueV038402.pdf.

S See U.S. Dep't of State, Fact Sheet· Us. Climate Change Policy (Sept. 22, 2004), at
http://www.state.gov/g/oeslrlslfsl2004l36425.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2005) (discussing federal

climate change policies and measures).
9 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec.
10, 1997, art. 3.1, 37 I.L.M. 22, 33 (1998) (entered into force Feb. 16, 2005) [hereinafter Kyoto
Protocol], (requiring industrialized nations in Annex I to reduce emissions by at least 5% below
1990 levels); see also id Annex B, 37 LL.M. at 42 (listing reduction commitments of Annex I
countries as percentage reductions from the base year 1990); DAVID HUNTER ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAw AND POUCY 626-30 (2d ed. 2002) (discussing Kyoto
Protocol).
10 See J. Kevin Healy & Jeffrey M. Tapick, ClJnate Change: It's Not Just a Policy Issue for
Corporate Counsel-It's a Legal Problem, 29 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 89, 96 (2004) ("At present, the
federal government does not have a mandatory regulatory regime for reducing GHG emissions.
In August 2003, the EPA issued a memorandum stating that it did not have the authority under
the Clean Air Act to regulate CO2 or other GHGs."). This Article will focus on litigation seeking
to force EPA to regulate GHGs.
11 See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, U.S. CUMATE ACTION REPORT 2002, at 5Q-.ti1 [hereinafter CUMATE
ACTION REPORT 2002] (discussing federal pOlicies encouraging private sector to reduce GHGs);
HeinOnline -- 35 Envtl. L. 4 2005
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private industry voluntarily adopts many cost-effective strategies to reduce
GHGs, the EIA projects that by 2025, U.s. CO2 emissions will reach 8,142
million metric tons (mmts), which is 63 percent higher than the
approximately 4,988 mmts in 1990. 12
Growing scientific evidence is forcing the Bush Administration's
scientific experts to concede that increasing CO2 levels from fossil fuels is
the most important cause of global warming. In its Climate Action Report
2002 to the United Nations, the Bush Administration grudgingly admitted the
risks from global warming and projected that total U.S. GHG emissions
would rise about 43 percent between 2000 and 2020 if current policies
remain in place. 13 Most recently, in July 2004 the Bush Administration
submitted to Congress a report on the U.S. Climate Change Science
Program. The report, which was accompanied by a letter signed by the
Secretaries of Commerce and Energy as well as the Administration's science
advisor, is mandated by the Global Change Research Act of 1990. 14 It
acknowledged for the first time that increasing levels of carbon dioxide from
human sources is the most likely explanation for global warming since
1950. 15 The Bush Administration, however, has suggested that it will not
change its approach of delaying any mandatory actions to reduce GHGs until
there is more conclusive research about global warming. 16
id at 62-69 (discussing private sector initiatives, some in partnership with federal goverrunent,

to reduce GHGs). Several states have developed voluntary or mandatory initiatives to reduce
GHGs. See id at 61-62 (summarizing state and local efforts to reduce GHGs); id at 70-80
(projecting increased U.S. GHG emissions by 2020); Healy & Tapick, supra note 10, at 98-100
(discussing voluntary and mandatory GHG programs in several states and cities); Laura Kosloff
& Mark Trexler, State Climate Change Initiatives: Think Locally, Act Globally, 18 NAT. RES. &
ENV'T 46,47-50 (2004) (same), available at
http://www.climateservices.com/pdfslNR&E.jan2004_as....Publlshed.pdf; Robert B. McKinstry,
Jr., Laboratories for Local Solutions for Global Problems: State, Local and Private Leadership in
Developing Strategies to Mitigate the Causes and Effects of Climate Change, 12 PENN. ST. ENVTL.
L. REV. 15,26-58,64--73 (2004) (same).
12 ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2004 WITH PROJECTIONS TO 2025, at 103
fig.115, available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaflarchive/aeo04lpdf/trend_5.pdf.
13 CUMATE ACTION REPORT 2002, supra note 11, at 2-7 (summarizing report); id at 70-80
(projecting increased U.S. GHG emissions by 2020); Andrew C. Revkin, White House Shifts Its
Focus on Climate, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2004, at A18 (reporting that President Bush distanced
himself from the Climate Action Report 2002 by stating that the report was "put out by the
bureaucracy" and suggesting that the report did not reflect the views of his Administration).
14 Pub. L. No. 101-606, 104 Stat. 3096 (1990) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2921, 2931-2938, 29512953,2961 (2000)).
15 CUMATE CHANGE SCIENCE PROGRAM, OUR CHANGING PLANET: THE U.S. CUMATE CHANGE
SCIENCE PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEARS 2004 AND 2005, at 47 (2004), available at
http://www.usgcrp.gov/ usgcrplLibrary/ocp2004-5/ocp2004-5.pdf; see also Letter of Transmittal
from Secretary of Commerce Donald L. Evans, Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham, and
Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy John H. Marburger ill, Ph.D. to
Members of Congress (July 2004), available at http://www.usgcrp.gov/usgcrplLibrary/ocp20045/ocp2004-5-letter.htm; Revkin, supra note 13, at A18. See generally u.s. Climate Change
Science Program, at http://www.climatescience.gov (last visited Feb. 20, 2005).
16 See supra note 8 and accompanying text. When reporters asked him whether the Climate
Change Science Program for Fiscal Years 2004 and 2005 represented a change in his
Administration's policies toward global warming, President Bush appeared to be unfamiliar
with the report and replied, "Ah, we did? I don't think so." David E. Sanger & Elisabeth
HeinOnline -- 35 Envtl. L. 5 2005
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Since global warming potentially affects everyone in the world, does
any individual have standing l7 to sue the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) or other federal agencies to force them to address climate
change issues? Suits addressing global warming raise difficult standing
questions because some Supreme Court decisions have stated or implied
that courts should not allow standing for plaintiffs who file suits alleging
general ir\iuries to the public at large because the political branches of
government-Congress and the executive branch-are better equipped to
resolve such issues. IS Other decisions, however, have allowed suits involving
"concrete" mass ir\iuries. 19 Suits involving global warming raise complex
causation and redressability issues because any single polluter is likely to
produce only a tiny proportion of the GHGs, and, thus, any judicial remedy is
likely to have a small and perhaps negligible impact on solving this global
problem.
A concurring opinion in a recent decision involving chemicals that
cause global destruction of stratospheric ozone addressed the difficult issue
of whether a plaintiff may have standing to sue those who contribute in
small ways to global pollution problems. In Covington v. Jefferson County,20
the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs, property owners who lived across
the street from a county landfill, had standing to bring citizen suits21 under
both the Clean Air Act (CAA)22 and the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act (RCRA)23 for local ir\iuries allegedly caused by the defendants, a county
and a district health department, from the improper disposal of ozone
destroying chemicals at a landfill owned by Jefferson County and operated
by the district health department. 24 In a concurring opinion, Judge Gould
Bwniller, Bush Dismisses Idea That Keny Lied on Vietnam, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 27, 2004, at AI.
President Bush's Press Secretary, Scott McClellan, later clarified his answer by explaining that
the Bush Administration was not changing its position on global warming, and that its policies
would be infonned by continuing research at the National Academy of Sciences. Id
17 To sue in an Article ill federal court, a plaintiff must show 1) an "iI\iury in fact" that is
"concrete and particularized" and "actual and imminent" as opposed to being "hypothetical" or
"coI\iectural," 2) "a causal connection between the iI\iury and the conduct complained of," and
3) a likelihood that judicial intelVention may redress the iI\iury. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife
(Defenders), 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (internal quotations omitted).
IS See infra notes 124-29 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 130-33, 164-67 and accompanying text.
20 358 F.3d 626 (9th Cir. 2004).
21 Id at 640-4I.
22 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2000). CAA citizen suits are authorized by CAA
§ 304(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1) (generally authorizing citizen suits against violators of the
CAA) and CAA § 304(f)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(f)(3) (explicitly authorizing citizen suits against
violators of the CAA's subchapter VI ozone protection requirements). CAA's subchapter VI,
which provides for stratospheric ozone protection through regulation, reduction, and
elimination of substances destroying such ozone, includes CAA §§ 601-618, 42 U.S.C. §§ 76717671q.
23 Resource ConselVation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (2000)
(amending Solid Waste Disposal Act, Pub. L. No. 89-272, 79 Stat. 992). RCRA citizen suits are
authorized by RCRA § 7002, 42 U.S.C. § 6972.
24 Covington, 358 F.3d at 640-41 (discussing CAA's requirements for disposal of CFCs); id
at 647--49 (discussing RCRA's prohibition against the placement of bulk or noncontainerized
liquid hazardous waste in landfills).
HeinOnline -- 35 Envtl. L. 6 2005
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concluded that the plaintiffs had standing to sue based on the global impacts
on stratospheric ozone resulting from the defendants' alleged mishandling of
CFCS.25 Reviewing standing precedent, he obseIVed that some courts,
especially in taxpayer suits, had suggested that a plaintiff may not assert
standing if an alleged injury harms all persons equally, or in other words,
'''that injury to all is injury to none. '"26 On the whole, however, Judge Gould
determined that the Supreme Court's most recent standing cases have
allowed a plaintiff to achieve standing resulting from general injury if the
injury to the plaintiff is sufficiently concrete. 27 Judge Gould concluded that
the risk to the plaintiffs of skin cancer, cataracts, and suppressed immune
systems was sufficiently concrete to justify Article ill standing even though
the defendants' allegedly improper treatment of CFCs only contributed a
small amount to a global problem. 28 Although skeptical that allowing
standing for global pollution injuries would trigger an avalanche of litigation,
even Judge Gould acknowledged that if so many global pollution suits were
flled that it became burdensome for courts to decide them all, a court might
for prudential reasons limit suits alleging such harms to cases where the
plaintiffs, like the Covingtons, have suffered relatively direct injuries. 29
Judge Gould's concurring opinion has important implications for
whether plaintiffs have standing to sue for another type of global pollution
problem that may prove to be even more important than ozone
destruction-global warming. This Article concludes that at least some
plaintiffs with concrete injuries, such as Alaska Natives, have standing to flle
global warming suits under either the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969 (NEPA?O or the CAA.31 Today, the strongest case for standing by
climate change plaintiffs is under NEPA. To date, the few federal court
decisions that have addressed global warming and standing have involved
NEPA, which is a procedural statute that requires federal agencies
undertaking "major" federal projects to assess their environmental
impacts. 32 There is currently a split in the circuits regarding the test for
25 Id at 653 (Gould, J., concurring) (observing that Congress specifically authorized citizen
suits for release of ozone destroying substances).
26 Under some precedents, the existence of a widely shared injury may be thought to
compel a conclusion that the "injury was not 'concrete and particularized.' This theory may be
summed, at least by detractors, as 'injury to all is injury to none' for standing purposes." Id 65051 (Gould, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
27 If the injury is not concrete, there is no injury in fact even if the injury is particularized;
and if the injury is "concrete and particularized, there is injury in fact even if the injury is
widespread. Concreteness of injury, so long as it is particularized, appears to be the touchstone
for the injury in fact element of standing." Id at 651-52 (Gould, J., concurring) (footnote
omitted); see also infra Part IV.B.
28 Covington, 358 F.3d at 652 (Gould, J., concurring).
29 See Id at 655 (Gould, J., concurring) (acknowledging that a court may limit standing for
prudential reasons, but arguing that the COvingtons' injuries were concrete enough to justify
standing).
30 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f (2000).
31 See infra Part VI.D.2.
32 Matthew William Nelson, Comment, NEPA and Sf<mding: Halting the Spread of "Slashand-Bum" Jurisprudence, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 253, 255-56 (1997); see also infra notes 239-45,
389-91 and accompanying text (discussing procedural nature and liberal standing test for
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standing under NEPA.33 Because it is a purely procedural statute,34 a number
of courts apply a more relaxed approach to standing. 35 Building upon
precedent in the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, this Article proposes a liberal
approach to standing in NEPA cases that could allow at least some plaintiffs
to raise global warming issues under the statute. 36
No court has yet addressed whether plaintiffs have standing under the
CAA to raise climate change issues. 37 In deciding whether a plaintiff has
standing under the CAA to sue concerning global warming, a crucial issue is
whether EPA has the authority to regulate GHGs under the CAA. Whether a
plaintiff has standing to sue depends in part on whether courts decide that
Congress intended a statute to give an agency the authority to regulate
certain actions. 38
During the Clinton Administration, two different EPA general counsel
and EPA Administrator Carol Browner suggested that the agency had some
authority to regulate CO 2 or other GHGs under the CAA even if the United
States did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol, although EPA took no actual action
at that time to regulate GHGS.39 In 2003, however, the Bush Administration
EPA concluded that the agency has no authority to regulate CO 2 or other
GHGS.40 In October 2003, 12 states, with Massachusetts as lead petitioner,
joined 14 environmental groups and five governmental entities in filing eight
separate but now consolidated petitions41 in the District of Columbia (D.C.)
NEPA).

33

See Nelson, supnmote 32, at 257, 270-76, 282 (describing Circuit split); see also infra Part

V.
34 See Nelson, supra note
35 See infra Part V.D.

32, at 256; see also infra note 322 and accompanying text.

36 See infra Part V.E.
37 There are several CAA suits involving global warming that are currently being litigated,
although it is not clear to what extent they will address standing issues. See infra notes 41-46
and accompanying text
38 See infra notes Part VI.D.l.
39 See Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Global Warming, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. lnst.) 10,253, 10,257
n.82, 10,258-59 (2001) (discussing memorandum and congressional testimony by two Clintonera EPA general counsel, Jonathan Z. Cannon and his successor Gary S. Guzy, indicating that
EPA has the authority to regulate CO2 under the CAA); see also infra notes 448-52 and
accompanying text.
40 See Control of Emissions From New Highway Vehicles and Engines; 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922
(Sept. 8, 2003) (denying petition to regulate CO2 because EPA does not have the authority under
the CAA to regulate it); Memorandum from EPA General Counsel Robert E. Fabricant to Acting
EPA Administrator Marianne L. Horinko, EPA's Authority to Impose Mandatory Controls to
Address Global Climate Change Under the Clean Air Act (August 28, 2003) [hereinafter
Fabricant Memorandum) (concluding EPA does not have authority under CAA to regulate CO2),
available at http://www.epa.gov/airiinkslco2Jleneral_counsel_opinion.pdf; see also infra notes
458-77 and accompanying text.
41 Petitions 03-1361 through 03-1365 challenge EPA's September 8,2003 denial of a petition
to regulate CO, from vehicle emissions. See Certificate As To Parties, Rulings, and Related
Cases, Brief for Petitioners in Consolidated Case, Massachusetts v. EPA, Nos. 03-1361 to 031368 (D.C. Cir. June 22, 2004) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioners), available at
http://www.earthjustice.org/newsldocuments/6-04/globalwarmingbrief.pdf;
Control
of
Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922. Petitions 03-1365
through 03-1368 challenge the Fabricant Memorandum. Brief for Petitioners, supra, at ii.
Petitioners in 03-1361 and 03-1365 include the Commonwealth of Massachusetts; the States of
HeinOnline -- 35 Envtl. L. 8 2005
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Circuit challenging EPA's denial of a petition to regulate GHGs from vehicle
emissions42 and an EPA general counsel memorandum concluding that EPA
lacks authority under the CAA to regulate GHGS.43 The D.C. Circuit has
scheduled oral argument for April 8, 2005. 44
Additionally, in July 2004, eight states and New York City filed a public
nuisance suit in federal district court in Manhattan against five large utilities,
which operate 174 power plants that emit 646 million tons of CO2-ten
percent of the national total-demanding that they reduce CO2 emissions by
a specified percentage each year for at least ten years. 45 To establish that
Connecticut, Illinois, Maine, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island,
Vermont, and Washington; the American Samoa Government; and the District of Columbia The
Petitioner in 03-1362 and 03-1366 is the State of California Petitioners in 03-1363 and 03-1367
include the International Center for Technology Assessment and 13 environmental groups.
Petitioners in 03-1364 and 03-1368 include the City of New York and the Mayor and City Council
of Baltimore. Brief for Petitioners, supra, at i; see also Questions & AnsweIS on the Legal
Challenges Filed by the Attomeys General of American Samoa, Connecticut, Illinois, Maine,
Massachusetts, New JeISey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vennont and
Washington, at http://www.ago.state.mausisp.cfm?pageid=1617 (last visited Feb. 20, 2005)
(discussing lawsuit and plaintiffs); Peter Glaser, 'Greenhouse Gas' Debate EnteIS the
Courthouse, 24 ANDREWS ENVTL.lITIG. REP. 11 (Dec. 5, 2003) (discussing the cases), available at

http://www.wlf.org/upload/giaserloLwt_ll_13_03.pdf; Press Release, Office of New York State
Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, States, Cities, Environmental Groups Sue Bush Administration
on Global Warming, Challenge EPA's Refusal to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Pollution (Oct. 23,
2003) (same), http://www.oag.state.ny.usipresS/2003/0ctloct23a_03.html.
42 One petition states,
Pursuant to Section 307(b) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7607(b), the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06, and Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure, the petitioners listed above hereby petition the Court to review a final action
of the United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"). That final agency action,
which was issued on August 28, 2003, and subsequently published at 68 Fed. Reg. 52922
(Sept. 8, 2003), denied a petition for rulemaking that had sought the regulation of
emissions of greenhouse gases (including carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and
hydrofluorocarbons) from new motor vehicles and engines pursuant to Section 202 of
the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 752l.
Amended Petition at 2, Massachusetts v. EPA, No. 03-1361 (D.C. Cir. Oct 30, 2003), available at
http://www.ago.state.ma.usisp.cfm?pageid=1614; see Control of Emissions from New Highway
Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922.
43 Another petition states,
Pursuant to Section 307(b) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7607(b), the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06, and Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure, the petitioners listed above hereby petition the Court to review a final action
of the United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"). That [mal agency action
was issued by EPA on August 28, 2003, in the form of a memorandum from EPA General
Counsel Robert E. Fabricant to EPA Acting Administrator Marianne L. Horinko.
Amended Petition at 2, Massachusetts v. EPA, No. 03-1365 (D.C. Cir. Oct.30, 2003), available at
http://www.ago.state.ma.usisp.cfm?pageid=1615; see Fabricant Memorandum, supra note 40.
44 Brief for Petitioners, supra note 41, at coverpage, l.
45 The states are California, Connecticut, Iowa, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island,
Vermont, and Wisconsin; the utilities are American Electric Power, Cinergy, the Southern
Company, the Tennessee Valley Authority, and Xcel Energy. The suit is based on either the
federal common law of nuisance or, in the alternative, state public nuisance law. Complaint
n 1, 6, Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., No. 04-CV-05669, 2004 WL 1685122 (S.D.N.Y. July
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CO2 emissions are causing substantial harms to the citizens of the eight
states and New York City, the complaint alleges that global warming is
already causing significant increases in temperature and reduced snow pack,
especially in the northern continental 48 states, that these harms will
significantly worsen in the near future, and that the defendants can partially
minimize these harms by reducing their CO2 emissions by a specified
percentage for at least a decade. 46 In both suits, the states and other
plaintiffs will have to meet standing requirements. 47
The utility industry has argued that the suit is an inappropriate way to
solve a global problem that requires international efforts. 48 Yet, perhaps not
coincidently, on August 31, 2004, co-defendant American Electric Power
(AEP) , the largest utility in the United States, issued· a massive 120-page
report detailing its plans to spend $3.5 billion by 2010 and $5 billion by 2020
to reduce GHG emissions through the use of alternative energy sources such
as wind power and more efficient coal-burning technology.49 For example,
by 2010, AEP plans to build one or more advanced 1,000-megawatt
commercial coal-burning plants at a cost of $1.3 to $1.6 billion each. The
plants will use integrated gasification combined cycle (lGCC) technology,
which can remove CO2 , mercury, and 99 percent of sulfur from coal in the
21, 2004), available at http://www.ag.cagov/newsalertsl2004l04-076.pdf; see also Mark Clayton,
In Hot Pursuit of Polluters, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 19, 2004, at 15, available at
http://www.csmonitor.com!2004l0819/pI5s02-sten.htm; Pamela Najor et al., Eight States File
Public Nuisance Lawsuit Against Utilities for Carbon Dioxide Gases, 35 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1565
(July 23, 2004); Leonard Post, Power Plants Feel the Heat· Eight States and NYC Sue Power
Companies over Global Warming, 26 NAT'L L.J., Aug. 2, 2004, at 4. The Complaint does not
specify the amount of reduction in CO2 emissions sought by the plaintiffs, but attorneys for the
plaintiffs have told reporters that they seek at least 3% reductions each year. Julia Preston &
Andrew C. Revkin, City Joins Suit Against 5 Power Companies, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2004, at B2.
46 See Complaint, Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co, supra note 45, at n 3-4, 79-150
(presenting factual allegations); Clayton, supra note 45, at 15 (discussing evidence of harms
from global warming discussed in public nuisance complaint by eight states and New York
City).
47 See generally Defenders, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992); supra note 17 and accompanying
text.
48 Najor et al., supra note 45, at 1565 (detailing utility industry leaders' criticisms of the
public nuisance suit and arguments that policy makers need to address global warming by
encouraging development of technologies that can reduce greenhouse gases and ensuring their
use on a global basis); see also Clayton, supra note 45, at 15 ("'Climate change is a global issue
that can't be addressed by any individual company or small group of companies,' says Melissa
McHenry, a spokeswoman for [American Electric Power Co.]. 'Addressing climate change
requires coordinated, meaningful international action. We believe the claims are without
merit.'").
49 News Release, American Electric Power, AEP Releases Emissions Assessment Report of
Board
Subcommittee
(Aug.
31,
2004)
[hereinafter
AEP
News
Release],
http://www.aep.com!newsroorn!newsreleasesldefaultasp?dbcommand=displayrelease&lD= 1144;
see AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER, AN AsSESSMENT OF AEP's ACTIONS TO MITIGATE THE ECONOMIC
IMPACTS OF EMISSIONS POIJCIES 9-11 (2004) [hereinafter AEP REPORT], available at
http://www.aep.com!environmentallperformance/emissionsassessmentldefault.htm; see also
Cinergy Report Outlines Plan to Reduce GreenhollSe Gas, Air Pollution Emissions, 35 Env't Rep.
(BNA) 2526 (Dec. 10, 2004) (reporting that Cinergy Corp., a Cincinnati-based electric utility, will
reduce its GHG emissions between 2010 and 2012 by 5% below 2000 levels-to 70 million tons
of CO2 equivalent per year for 2010-2012 compared with 74 million tons per year in 2000).
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process of converting it to synthetic gas ("syngas"), while improving the
energy operational efficiency of a coal plant from 33 to 40 percent. 50
Even if it does not have direct authority to regulate carbon dioxide,
EPA may have indirect authority to consider otherwise unregulated
pollutants such as GHGs when it decides whether to approve permits for
new power plants. A recent article by Gregory Foote, Assistant General
Counsel in EPA's Air and Radiation Law Office, presenting his personal
views, argues that the CAA's new source review (NSR) process requires EPA
to consider both regulated and unregulated pollutants-such as carbon
dioxide-in determining what is the best available control technology for the
plant. 51 The Foote article does not address who would have standing to bring
such a challenge. Assuming that the Foote article is correct that EPA has a
duty at least to consider unregulated pollutants, including GHGs, pursuant to
the NSR permit review process, this Article will make the case that at least
some plaintiffs would have standing to argue that EPA must consider
technology that would reduce unregulated pollutants such as CO 2 •
This Article concludes that at least some plaintiffs have standing under
either NEPA or the CAA to challenge federal agency decisions that affect the
release of GHGs. Nevertheless, the case for standing under present statutes
is somewhat uncertain. Congress could explicitly authorize climate change
suits by enacting a statute establishing both a regulatory regime and citizen
enforcement mechanism similar to the existing scheme for CFCs. Because
research increasingly demonstrates that GHGs are a primary cause of
climate change,52 it is time for Congress to take action. As it has for other
environmental citizen suits, Congress could define when a citizen may sue
50 See AEP REPORT, supra note 49, at 52-57 (discussing AEP's commitment to !GCC
deployment); Jeffrey Ball & Rebecca Smith, AEP Plans Biggest Power Plant Using Clean-Coal
Technology, WALL ST. J., Aug. 31, 2004, at A2 (citing company estimates of the cost of new !GCC
plants). An IGCC plant would gasify coal and process it to remove acidic and particulate matter,
including 90-95% of all metals including mercury. Gregory B. Foote, Considering Alternatives:
The Case for Limiting CO2 Emissions from New Power Plants Through New Source Review, 34
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L Inst.) 10,642, 10,659-60 (July 2004) (discussing !GCC technology);
Yekaterina Korostash, EPA'S New ReguiatolY Policy: Two Steps Back, 5 N.C. J.L. & TEcH. 295,
325 (2004) (stating IGCC technology can remove 99% of sulfur, "while imprOving operational
efficiency from thirty-three to forty percent. "). Similar to burning natural gas, the IGCC plant
would burn the "syngas" in a combustion turbine. Foote, supra, at 10,659-60; Korostash, supra,
at 325. Technologies already exist that could separate CO2 from the remaining gas, and then a
utility could store or "sequester" the CO.. perhaps in an abandoned mine shaft or oil well. Foote,
supra, at 10,660; Korostash, supra, at 325. Two experimental IGCC plants are in operation,
"Tampa Electric's plant in Florida and Psi Energy's 260 megawatt Wabash River Generating
Station at Terre Haute in Indiana, a 1950s power plant which was retrofitted With a gasification
process at a cost of $430 [million)," but the cost is too high for high-output commercial
operation. Korostash, supra, at 325 n.195; Coal: IGCC Leads Clean Technologies, But Will It Pass
Utility Muster?, GREENWlRE, Aug. 11,2004 (discussing two experimental !GCC plants in Indiana
and Florida). Other utilities-Cinergy, Michigan Public Power Agency, and FirstEnergy, jointly
with Consol Energy Inc.-are seriously considering building !GCC plants, especially if the
federal government provides fmancial incentives. Utilities Favor IGCe, but Not Those Who
Need Capacity Now or Want to Save $, PLATTS COAL OUTLOOK, Sept. 6, 2004, at 1.
51 Foote, supra note 50, at 10,643, 10,662-68; see infra Part VIC.
52 See infra notes 61-89 and accompanying text (noting multiple studies documenting the
role of GHGs in climate change since the 1850s).
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either EPA or private industry. 53 If in the future Congress decides to regulate
sources of GHGs and authorizes citizen suits against EPA or individual
violators, it is likely that the Supreme Court would recognize that such suits
meet standing requirements even if a plaintiff suffers injuries that are similar
to the injuries of many others. 54 Congress has considerable discretion in
defining which types of injuries should give rise to standing, although there
are some constitutional limits, including separation-of-powers concerns,
which are discussed in Parts III and IV. 55
II. THE GROWING EVIDENCE FOR GLOBAL WARMING

A. Scientific Evidence
Because extensive discussions of climate change are readily available
elsewhere,56 this Article will only briefly summarize the scientific evidence
for global warming. In 1896, the Swedish chemist Svante Arrhenius first
proposed the theory that carbon emissions from the burning of coal and
other fossil fuels could create a "greenhouse effect" by trapping solar heat in
the atmosphere, leading to global warming. 57 Since the late 19th century,
global temperatures have risen approximately 1 degree Fahrenheit (F)
(about 0.6 degrees Celsius (C)), with greater increases of about 1.4 degrees F
(about 0.8 degrees C) in the Northern latitudes. 58 Because global warming
reduces ice and snow cover, which previously reflected solar radiation back
into space, and increases the amount of bare soil, which absorbs more
radiation and heat, the most dramatic increases have occurred in the
northern polar areas-increases ranging from 3.6 to 5.4 degrees F (2 to 3
degrees C) in approximately one century. 59 Furthermore, polar winter-

53 See infra Part VI.D.1 (discussing pmdential standing).
54 See Covington, 358 F.3d 626, 655 (9th Cir. 2004) (Gould, J., concurring) (acknowledging
that a court may limit standing for pmdential reasons, but arguing that the Covingtons' injuries
were concrete enough to justify standing); infra notes 286-88 and accompanying text.
55 See infra Part III.B.2.d (discussing the interface between Article ill and pmdential
standing requirements).
56 See generally Pew Center on Global Climate Change, Global Wanning Basics, at
http://www.pewclimate.org/global-warming-basicsl (last visited Feb. 20, 2005); United States
EPA, Global Wanning-Climate, at http://yosemite.epagov/oar/globalwarming.nsf/contenti
climate.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2005); CWMATE CHANGE 2001: THE SCIENTIF1C BASIS, supra note
2, CWMATE CHANGE 2001: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABIlITY, supra note 4.
57 HUNTER ET AL., supra note 9, at 590; Reitze, supra note 39, at 10,253.
58 See CWMATE CHANGE 2001: THE SCIENTlF1C BASIS, supra note 2, at 2--3 (documenting
temperature change); HUNTER ET AL., supra note 9, at 593; Ann E. Carlson, Federalism,
Preemption, and Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 37 V.C. DAVIS L. REV. 281, 286 (2003); David R.
Hodas, State Law Responses to Global Wanning: Is it Constitutional to Think Globally and Act
Locally, 21 PACE ENVTL. L REV. 53, 61 (2003) (stating that estimated warming during the last
century ranges from 0.7 to 1.4 degrees F).
59 See Alister Doyle, First Arctic Thaw Portends Global Wanning, REUTERS, May 24, 2004
(reporting that scientists have found more rapid warming in polar areas as snow melts and is
replaced by dark, heat-absorbing soil); David A Grossman, Wanning Up to a Not-So-Radical
Idea: Tort-Based Climate Change Litigation, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L 1, 12-32 (2003) (same); Bill
Sherwonit, Alaskan Meltdown: On the Frontlines of Climate Change, NAT'L PARKS, June 22, 2004,
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season temperatures have risen even faster, with increases ranging from 7 to
9 degrees F (3.9 to 5 degrees C) higher in some areas of the Arctic between
1954 and 2004. 60
There is evidence that global warming is accelerating, with the most
rapid increases occurring since 1976. The decade of the 1990s was the
warmest decade since meteorologists began the first systematic effort to
keep formal worldwide temperature records in the 1860s, and probably the
warmest decade in the last thousand years in the Northern Hemisphere. The
year 1998 was the warmest year ever recorded, and the years 2002 and 2003
are tied as the second warmest years. 61
Although many questions about global warming remain, most scientists
are convinced that human emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) are the
primary cause of such warming. 62 Since 1850, human activities have
substantially increased GHG concentrations for the three major types of
such gases: 1) carbon dioxide (C0 2 ) ; 2) methane (CH4 ) ; and 3) nitrous oxide
(NP).63 Although both natural and man-made factors can cause fluctuations
in GHG levels and, in tum, influence global climate patterns, the evidence
strongly suggests that human factors are the most important influence
despite some continuing scientific uncertainties about both the causes and
the impacts of global warming. 64
In 1988, the United Nations Environmental Programme and the World
Meteorological Organization jointly established the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC) "to assess scientific, technical and socioeconomic information relevant for the understanding of climate change, its
potential impacts and options for adaptation and mitigation," with the goal
of producing a new assessment approximately every five years. 65 IPCC

at 24, available at http://www.npca.org/magazineJ2004/sununer/globalwanning.asp.
60 J.R. Pegg, The Earth is Melting, Arctic Native Leader Warns, ENV'T NEWS SERVICE, Sept.
16, 2004 (reporting that Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA), an international team of
scientists, has found that in "Alaska and western Canada, the average winter temperatures have
increased by as much as 3 to 4 degrees Celsius over the past 60 years"), 2004 WL 63721104;
Sherwonit, supra note 59, at 24.
61 CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: THE SClENTIF1C BASIS, supra note 2, at 2-3; Carlson, supra note 58,
at 286.
62 See CUMATE CHANGE 2001: THE SCIENTIF1C BASIS, supra note 2, at 7-10 (reporting that
concentrations of atmospheric greenhouse gases have increased due to human activities and
that this increase contributes to warming trends); Carlson, supra note 58, at 286; Grossman,
supra note 59, at 2-3, 10-16 (stating that scientific evidence increasingly supports the theory
that increasing concentrations of manmade greenhouse gases cause global warming).
63 See CUMATE CHANGE 2001: THE SCIENTIF1C BASIS, supra note 2, at 6--7 (providing graphic
representations of the increase in the three major types of greenhouse gases); Hodas, supra
note 58, at 60-61; Reitze, supra note 39, at 10,254.
64 CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: THE SCIENTIF1C BASIS, supra note 2, at 7-10 (concluding that
human factors have greatest impact on climate change, although acknowledging some
uncertainties); Carlson, supra note 58, at 287 (same); David R. Hodas, Standing and Climate
Change: Can Anyone Complain About the Weather?, 15 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 451, 452, 456--58
(2000) (same).
65 See IPCC, About IPCC, at http://www.ipcc.ch/aboutJabout.htm Oast visited Feb. 20, 2005)
(describing the IPCC mandate and organizational structure); HUNTER ET AL., supra note 9, at
590; Grossman, supra note 59, at 2.
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issued its First Assessment Report of climate change in 1990 and its Second
Assessment Report in 1995. 6& Each assessment has found stronger evidence
that human activities significantly contribute to global warming, and has led
to increased international efforts to establish treaties to regulate GHGS.67Jn
2001, IPCC issued its Third Assessment Report (Report), which concluded
that "there is new and stronger evidence that most of the warming observed
over the last 50 years is attributable to human activities. "68 The Report found
that the increasing concentration of CO2 is the single most important factor
in this warming. 69 Carbon dioxide is the most abundant of the GHGs and can
remain in the atmosphere from decades to centuries. 7o Scientists have found
that concentrations of CO2 in the atmosphere have risen from 280 parts per
million (ppm) prior to the start of the Industrial Revolution in approximately
1750, to 360 ppm by 2000.71 By 2004, the level of CO 2 was between 370 to 380
ppm.72 These levels have not been exceeded in at least 420,000 years and
may be equal to the highest CO 2 concentrations for the last 20 million
years. 73 The Report found that approximately three quarters of the
anthropogenic emissions of CO2 into the atmosphere during the past 20
years result from fossil fuel burning of oil and coal. 74 Most of the remaining
increase in CO2 concentrations is caused by human land-use changes,

66 See HUNTER ET AL., supra note

9, at 590 (discussing IPCC assessment history).
Id at 590-91, 593.
68 ClJMATE CHANGE 2001: THE SCIENTIF1C BASIS, supra note 2, at 10 ("The wanning over the
last 50 years due to anthropogenic greenhouse gases can be identified despite uncertainties in
forcing due to anthropogenic sulphate aerosol and natural factors (volcanoes and solar
irradiance)."). The IPCC's 2001 Third Assessment Report presents far stronger evidence of
human influence on global wanning than the IPCC's Second Assessment Report in 1995, which
found that "the balance of evidence suggests a discemable human influence on global climate."
WORKING GROUP 1, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 1995: THE
SCIENCE OF CLIMATE CHANGE 5 (1996) [hereinafter ClJMATE CHANGE 1995: THE SCIENCE OF
CLIMATE CHANGE); HUNTER ET AL., supra note 9, at 593; Grossman, supra note 59, at 2.
69 See CUMATE CHANGE 2001: THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS, supra note 2, at 39 (noting
unprecedented increase in CO, concentration over the last century); HUNTER ET AL., supra note
9, at 592-93 (correlating release of CO, with burning of fossil fuels and rising temperature over
the last century); Grossman, supra note 59, at 2-3 (citing increased CO, concentration as largest
factor in global wanning over the past 50 years).
70 HUNTER ET AL., supra note 9, at 591-93.
71 ClJMATE CHANGE 2001: THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS, supra note 2, at 6; J.R. Pegg, Gore:
Hollywood, and Bush, Engage in Climate Change Fiction, ENV'T NEWS SERVICE, May 12, 2004
(reporting information provided by Harvard University paleoclimatologist Dan Schrag), http://
www.ens-newswire.com/ensimay2004l2004-05-12-11.asp.
72 John Carey et al., Global Wanning, Bus. WEEK., Aug. 16, 2004, at 60-63 (reporting that
2004 CO, levels exceed 370 ppm); Maggie Fox, Climate Change Experts Despair Over Us.
Attitude, REUTERS, June 15, 2004.
73 ClJMATE CHANGE 2001: THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS, supra note 2, at 7; Carey et al., supra note 72,
at 62-63 (reporting highest CO, levels in 450,000 years); Grossman, supra note 59, at 2-3; see
also Pegg, supra note 71.
74 ClJMATE CHANGE 2001: THE SCIENTIF1C BASIS, supra note 2, at 7; Grossman, supra note 59,
at 3; see also Pegg, supra note 71 (reporting the expert opinion of Harvard University
paleoclimatologist Dan Schrag that the burning of fossil fuels is the primary cause of global
wanning).
67
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especially deforestation caused by human activities including excessive
logging, slash-and-bum agriculture, and urbanization. 75
If human emissions of GHGs continue to grow at the same rate as the
last several years, by 2100, concentrations of CO 2 in the atmosphere will
likely reach 540 to 970 ppm, which would represent the highest
concentrations in the last 30 to 50 million years. 76 If concentrations of CO2 in
the atmosphere rise to 540 to 970 ppm, the overwhelming majority of
climatologists conclude that there is a strong probability that surface
temperatures on Earth will rise between 2.5 and 10.4 degrees F (1.4 and 5.8
degrees C) by 2100. 77 Such increased temperatures would likely cause at
least partial melting of the polar ice caps. The melting of large amounts of
polar ice would result in rising sea levels that would threaten many island
and coastal inhabitants as well as harm those living in arctic regions. 78
Global warming would also likely produce erratic and severe weather
patterns that would increase both the duration and intensity of droughts,
and the intensity and frequency of flooding. 79 A new model generated by
government supercomputers predicts that global warming during the next 80
years will increase the intensity and rainfall of hurricanes. 80 The
combination of warmer and more extreme weather could increase waterand insect-borne diseases such as typhoid, dengue, and malaria. 81
Global warming is already causing significant environmental harm in
Alaska from melting permafrost and rising coastal waters. 82 The General
Accounting Office has reported to Congress that coastal flooding worsened
by global warming will require substantial expenditure for either expanding
sea walls or relocating entire towns-costing perhaps hundreds of millions

75

CUMATE CHANGE 2001: THE SCIENTIF1C BASIS, supra note 2, at 7; Grossman, supra note 59,

at 3.
CUMATE CHANGE 2001: THE SCIENTIF1C BASIS, supra note 2, at 12; Pegg, supra note 71.
CUMATE CHANGE 2001: THE SCIENTIF1C BASIS, supra note 2, at 13; HUNTER ET AL., supra
note 9, at 593; see also Pegg, supra note 71 (reporting the expert opinion of Harvard University
paleoclimatologist Dan Schrag that surface temperatures will rise between 1.7 and 4.9 degrees
76

77

C).
78 See CUMATE CHANGE 2001: THE SCIENTIF1C BASIS, supra note 2, at 15-17 (discussing the
potential impacts of global warming on environment, weather, and disease); HUNTER ET AL.,
supra note 9, at 589 (same); Carey et al., supra note 72, at 6~ (same).
79 See CUMATE CHANGE 2001: THE SCIENTIF1C BASIS, supra note 2, at 15-16; HUNTER ET AL.,
supra note 9, at 589; Hodas, supra note 58, at 61.
80 Robert Tuleya & Thomas R. Knutson, Impact of CO.-Induced Wanning on Simulated
Hurricane Intensity and Precipitation, 17 J. CUMATE 3477 (2004); Andrew C. Revkin, Global
Warming is Expected to Increase Hurricane Intensity, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2004, at A20
(reporting a study that used simulations on U.S. Commerce Department supercomputers to
predict increasing hurricane frequency and intensity as global warming increases temperatures
from now until the 2080s).
81 HUNTER ET AL., supra note 9, at 589.
82 Doyle, supra note 59; Yereth Rosen, Alaska's Not-So-PeITllanent Frost, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Oct. 7, 2003, at 1 (reporting that melting permafrost has destroyed two villages,
harmed roads, and increased coastal erosion); Sherwonit, supra note 59, at 24 ("Glaciers and
sea ice are rapidly melting, boreal forests are being transformed by unprecedented insect
outbreaks, permafrost is diminishing, lakes are drying up, Arctic tundra is giving way to
woodlands, and coastal areas are being eaten away by fierce storms. ").
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of dollars for each village. 83 Of the 213 Alaska Native villages, 184 face
flooding and erosion problems, with very serious problems in about
twenty.84
The public nuisance suit filed by eight states and New York City alleges
that global warming is already causing significant increases in temperature,
sea level changes, reduced snow pack, and less winter ice, especially in the
northern continental 48 states. 85 For example, on Lake Mendota, Wisconsin,
the average duration of winter ice cover decreased from four months in the
mid-1800s to three months in the 1990s.86 Critics of the suit, however, argue
that computer models of global warming are currently incapable of proving
harm at a state or local level, even assuming they are accurate enough to
show global or regional changes.87
Although there is disagreement regarding the extent to which global
warming will harm the continental United States in the next few years, two
recent Pew Center studies have found that there will likely be significant
negative consequences from global warming by 2100, including the drying of
agricultural plains and the flooding of coastal regions. The largest economic
impacts of climate change are likely to be on the agricultural, livestock,
forestry, and fisheries industries, which are more vulnerable to climate and
precipitation changes than non-farm industries or services. By 2100, large
temperature increases are likely to have substantial negative economic
impacts on the American economy by making the climate drier.88 There is

83 Yereth Rosen, Alaska Natives Say Warming Trend Imperils Villages, REUTERS, July 1,
2004, (reporting GAO has found that of 213 Alaska Native villages, 184 face flooding and erosion
problems, with very serious problems in about 20).
84 /d
85 The Complaint alleges that since 1900 temperatures in the western United States,
including California, have risen 2 to 5 degrees F, that temperatures in the northern portion of
the Midwest, including the upper Great Lakes, are 4 degrees higher, and that between 1953 and
1998, snow cover in New England states decreased by seven days. See Complaint
~~ 104-05, Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., No. 04-CV-05669 (S.D.N.Y. flIed July 21, 2004),
available athttp://www.ag.cagov/newsalertsl2004J04-076.pdf;Clayton.supranote45.atI5.
86 See Complaint ~ 105, Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., No. 04-CV-05669; Clayton,
supra note 45, at 15.
87 For example, Patricia Braddock, a partner with Fulbright & Jaworski, LLP, a Houston
fIrm that often represents the power industry in environmentailitigation, has said,
The computer models are relatively good for large areas, say, Northern or Southern
Europe. But they're not so good for predicting effects in smaller areas. If [the attorneys
general] say: "This had an adverse effect on my staten-this is where there's a
disconnect. The science isn't there for them; this is where they're going to have trouble.
Clayton, supra note 45, at 15.
88 See DALE JORGENSON ET AL., U.S. MARKET CONSEQUENCES OF GWBAL CUMATE CHANGE, at
iii-ix, 31-38, 39-40 (Apr. 2004) (discussing potential economic impacts of global warming on
United States economy during 21st century using optimistic and pessimistic scenarios),
available at http://www.pewclimate.orgtdocUploadslMarket%5FConsequences%2Dreport%2Epdf;
JOEL SMITH, A SYNTHESIS OF POTENTIAL CUMATE CHANGE IMPACTS ON THE UNITED STATES iii-vi,
18--19,34-36 (Apr. 2004) (discussing potential national and regional impacts of global warming
on different regions of the United States during 21st century), available at
http://www.pewclimate.orgtdocUploadsiPew%2DSynthesis%2Epdf.
HeinOnline -- 35 Envtl. L. 16 2005

2005J

STANDING AND GLOBAL WARMING

17

already some evidence that com yields in the Midwest have declined by
about ten percent. 89

B. Intemational Treaties to Address Global Warming: The United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol
Modem international environmental treaties are often negotiated in
stages, starting with a framework treaty that can achieve international
consensus and then addressing the more difficult problem of enforceable
standards. 90 Thus, the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the
Ozone Layer9 1 led to the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete
the Ozone Layer. 92 In 1990, as a result of growing concerns about global
warming, the United Nations authorized an Intergovernmental Negotiating
Committee on Climate, and set the goal of reaching an agreement in time for
the June 1992 Rio Earth Summit. The climate change negotiations revealed
some major differences among various groups of nations. 93 The "Group of
77" developing nations, which actually included 128 countries by the Rio
Summit, called on already industrialized nations to bear most of the
reductions because they had caused most of the increase in GHGs, and
demanded that industrialized nations provide financial and technological
assistance if they expected developing nations to reduce the rate of
greenhouse gas emissions. The Group of 77 opposed any enforceable targets
that would hinder their economic growth. 94 In response to a proposal by
several European nations that industrialized nations should reduce their CO2
emissions to 1990 levels by 2000, the United States opposed setting
enforceable targets before more research addressed the causes and extent
of global warming and also opposed a treaty that would regulate only CO2
rather than all GHGS.95 To reach an agreement by the Rio Summit, the
negotiators avoided setting any enforceable limits in the 1992 United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (Framework Convention).96
The Framework Convention established the general principle that
parties limit "greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level
89 See Carey et al., supra note 72, at 62 (quoting ecologist Christopher B. Field of the
Carnegie Institute); see also Post, supra note 45, at 4 ("Iowa Attorney General Tom Miller
asserted that global wanning has already cost Iowa com and soybean fanners about $1
billion. ").
90 See generally HUNTER ET AL., supra note 9, at 291--302 (discussing typical stages in
negotiating international environmental treaty using example of negotiations leading to 1987
Montreal Protocol of Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer).
91 Vierma Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar 22, 1985, T.I.AS. No.
11,097, 1513 V.N.T.S. 293, 26I.L.M. 1529 (1987).
92 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, S. TREATY
Doc. No. lOO-lO, 1522 V.N.T.S. 3, 261.L.M. 1541, 1550 (1987).
93 See HUNTER ET AL., supra note 9, at 616-18 (discussing negotiations leading to 1992
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Framework Convention)).
94 See jd at 188--90, 617 (discussing predominant views among developing nations during
negotiations leading to the 1992 Framework Convention and at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit).
95 See jd at 616-18.
96 Framework Convention, supra note 1.
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that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate
system, "97 but it did not require participating nations to limit such gases. 98
Rather, Article 4(1)(t) allows parties to consider costs in determining
appropriate reductions in GHGs, stating that all parties should "[t]ake
climate change considerations into account, to the extent feasible . .. with a
view to minimizing adverse effects on the economy."99 The most
controversial feature of the Framework Convention is its division of nations
into three overlapping categories with different responsibilities for climate
change: 1) all parties; 2) all industrialized country parties (Annex I); and 3)
all industrialized country parties except members of the former Soviet Union
that were struggling with economic transition issues (Annex 11).100 All parties
share basic information collection duties in Article 4(1). Article 4(2)(a)
places a heavier, but undefined, burden on Annex I developed country
parties to limit anthropogenic emissions of GHGs and to protect and
enhance GHG sinks and reservoirs such as forests, and Article 4(2)(b) states
that industrialized nations should "aim" to reduce emissions to 1990 levels,
but no provision requires actual reductions in such gases. 10l By March 1994,
enough countries signed the Framework Convention for it to enter into force
as law. 102 The United States signed the Framework Convention, but has not
yet set any enforceable limits on GHG emissions. 103
In 1995, IPCC released its Second Assessment Report, which found that
"the balance of evidence suggests a discernable human influence on global
climate."104 Largely because of this Second Assessment Report and growing
public concern about climate change,105 the major parties to the Framework
Convention, including the United States, agreed to include enforceable
targets in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the Convention. 106 The Protocol
requires developed countries to reduce GHG emissions five to eight percent
below their 1990 levels by 2008-2012. 107
97 Id

art. 2, 31 I.L.M. at 854; See HUNTER ET AL., supra note 9, at 618-19 (discussing Article

2).

98 See HUNTER ET AL., supra note 9, at 589, 618-19 (discussing the lack of enforceable targets
in the Framework Convention); Hodas, supra note 58, at 58.
99 Framework Convention, supra note 1, at art. 4(1)(f), 31 I.L.M. at 855-59 (emphasis
added); see HUNTER ET AL, supra note 9, at 621 (discussing Articles 4(2)(d) and 7(2)(a),
requiring the parties to periodically evaluate implementation of the Convention).
100 See HUNTER ET AL., supra note 9, at 619 (detailing the classification of nations under the
Framework Convention).
101 Framework Convention, supra note 1, at art. 4(2)(a)-(b), 31 1.L.M at 855-59 (emphasis
added); see HUNTER ET AL., supra note 9, at 618-19, 622 (discussing Article 4(2)'s additional
burdens on Annex I nations).
102 Framework Convention, supra note 1.
103 Hodas, supra note 58, at 58.
104 CUMATE CHANGE 1995: THE SCIENCE OF CUMATE CHANGE, supra note 68, at 5; HUNTER ET
AL., supra note 9, at 626; Grossman, supra note 59, at 2.
105 HUNTER ET AL., supra note 9, at 626.
106 See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 9, art. 3.1, 37I.L.M. at 33 (providing targets); id art. 17,37
I.L.M. at 40 (providing for enforcement); HUNTER ET AL., supra note 9, at 626-30 (discussing
negotiations leading to Kyoto Protocol).
107 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 9, art. 3.1,37 I.L.M. at 33 (requiring industrialized nations in
Annex I to reduce emissions by at least 5 per cent below 1990 levels); id Annex B, 37I.L.M. at
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To enter into force, the Protocol required participation by nations
representing 55 percent of industrialized-world emissions of CO 2, a target
that pre-2004 signatories from primarily European countries and Japan could
not meet on their own. lOB Both the United States and Australia rejected the
Protocol. 109 After extended negotiations in which it extracted trade
concessions from European nations, including membership in the World
Trade Organization, Russia, which represents approximately 17 percent of
industrialized-world emissions of CO 2-second to the United States' 24
percent-signed the Protocol, permitting it to enter into force. 110
It is unlikely that the United States will ratify the Kyoto Protocol.
President Clinton supported the Protocol and sought to build public support
in the United States for it. lll Industry, however, mounted a strong countercampaign, arguing that the Protocol was fundamentally unfair to the United
States because it exempted all developing countries from GHG reductions,
including major GHG-producing nations such as India and China. 1l2 In 1998,
China and the developing world produced 38 percent of global carbon
emissions, but EPA projects that China and the developing world's share will
rise to 50 percent by 2020. 113 Utilities also argued that costs would be too
high for the United States' economy because of our strong reliance on
domestic coal for power piantsY4 In addition, there is a plausible argument
that the Protocol is unfair to the United States because it ignores the fact
that, partly due to substantial immigration, our nation has had a much faster
population growth rate than most other developed nations, as well as a

43 (listing reduction commitments of Annex I countries as percentage from Base Year 1990);
see also HUNTER ET AL., supra note 9, at 630 (discussing enforceable GHG reductions in 1997
Kyoto Protocol).
lOB Hodas, supra note 58, at 58.
109 See ROBERT N. STAVlNS, CAN AN EFFECTIVE GLOBAL CUMATE TREATY BE BASED UPON SOUND
SCIENCE, RATIONAL ECONOMICS, AND PRAGMATIC POUTICS? 1-2 (John F. Kennedy School of Gov't
Faculty Research, Working Papers Series, May 2004) (stating Australia has rejected Kyoto
Protocol), available at http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edulResearchlwpaper.nsf/rwpIRWP04-020/$File/
rwp04_020_Stavins_on.pdf; see also infra notes 117-23 and accompanying text (describing the
failure of the United States to ratify).
110 Steven Lee Myers, Putin Ratifies Kyoto Protocol on Emissions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2004,
at A10; Erin E. Arvedlund, Europe Backs Russian Entry Into w.T.o., N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2004, at
C1 (reporting that Russia has agreed to ratify Kyoto Protocol in exchange for the European
Union's support for Russia's entry into the World Trade Organization).
HI HUNTER ET AL., supra note 9, at 626-29; Veronique Bugnion & David M. Reiner, A Game of

Climate Chicken: Can EPA Regulate Greenhouse Gases Before the u.s. Senate Ratifies the
Kyoto Protocol?, 30 ENVrL. L. 491,496 (2000); Hodas, supra note 58, at 58.
H2 See HUNTER ET AL, supra note 9, at 627 (noting that the United States' opposition to the

Kyoto Protocol results from alleged unfairness of excluding developing countries from emission
reductions and that costs would be too high for the United States' economy); STAVINS, supra
note 109, at 3-5 (noting that the Kyoto Protocol is widely criticized for not requiring reductions
by developing nations).
113 U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Global Warming: Projections, at http://yosemite.epagov/oar/
globaiwarming.nsf/contentlEmissionsIntemationaiProjections.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2005)
(presenting one chart with global carbon emissions for several countries in 1998 and a second
chart with estimated emissions for several countries in 2020).
H4 See HUNTER ET AL., supra note 9, at 627; STAVINS, supra note 109, at 3-5.
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faster economic growth rate than most European nations since 1990. 115
Thus, it would be more difficult for the United States to reduce its GHG
emissions below 1990 levels than for other nations. 116
On July 25, 1997, during the negotiations in Kyoto, the Senate passed
the non-binding Byrd-Hagel Resolution, Senate Resolution 98, by a
unanimous 95 votes. The Resolution opposed the Protocol because of the
developing nation exemption and cost issues for American coal-burning
power plants.117 Although he signed the Protocol in 1998, President Clinton
decided not to submit it to the Senate for ratification due to the Senate's
overwhelming opposition. us Because the Constitution clearly requires
Senate ratification for all treaties, the Protocol is not part of the law of the
United States, and therefore, no citizen has standing to enforce it. 119
In 2001, newly elected President Bush strongly rejected the Kyoto
Protocol and any mandatory regulation of GHGs despite his campaign
promise in 2000 to support mandatory reductions in GHGS.120 Since 2001, the
Bush Administration has primarily committed to research about the causes
of climate change, and its Climate VISION program has encouraged
voluntary reductions by industry in the amount of GHGs released. 121 In its
115 See STAVINS, supra note 109, at 8-9 (noting that the United States gross domestic product
grew by 37% in the 1990s).
116 See STAVINS, supra note 109, at 8-9 (describing the effect of economic growth on the
burden of reducing GHG emissions).
117 Bugnion & Reiner, supra note lll, at 495. The Byrd-Hagel Resolution stated,

[T]he United States should not be a signatory to any protocol ... which would(A) mandate new commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for the
Annex I Parties, unless the protocol or other agreement also mandates new specific
scheduled commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for Developing
Country Parties within the same compliance period, or
(B) would result in serious harm to the economy of the United States....
S. Res. 98, 105th Cong., 143 CONGo REC. 15,808 (1997) (enacted).
118 HUNTER ET AL., supra note 9, at 626--29; Bugnion & Reiner, supra note Ill, at 496; Hodas,
supra note 58, at 58.
119 See Hodas, supra note 58, at 59 (describing treaty ratification process).
120 Id at 58; Randy Lee Loftis, The Green Vote; Where Bush and Keny Stand on
Environmental Issues, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 23, 2004, at A3, available at 2004 WL 58933299.
121 See Dep't of Energy, Climate VISION- Voluntary Innovative Sector Initiatives:
Opportunities Now, at http://www.climatevision.gov (last visited Feb. 20, 2005) (encouraging
private industry to reduce GHGs); Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and
Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922, 52,932 (Sept. 8, 2003) ("The 'Climate VISION' (Voluntary
Innovative Sector Initiatives: Opportunities Now) program, a Presidential initiative launched by
the Department of Energy (DOE) in February 2003, is a voluntary public-private partnership
designed to pursue cost-effective strategies to reduce the growth of GHG emissions, especially
by energy-intensive industries."); News Release, EPA, Bush Administration Launches "Climate
VISION" (Feb. 12, 2003), http://www.epa.gov/newsrooml2003/headline_021203a.htm; ClJMATE
ACTION REPORT 2002, supra note 10, at 50--61 (discussing federal policies encouraging the
private sector to reduce GHGs); id at 62-69 (discussing private sector initiatives, some in
partnership with federal government, to reduce GHGs); Carlson, supra note 58, at 289
(discussing the Bush Administration's voluntary programs to encourage GHG reductions,
including the Climate Vision program); McKinstry, supra note ll, at 22-24 (same); id at 58-64
(discussing voluntary GHG reductions by private industry); Loftis, supra note 120, at A3 ("Bush
has earmarked $4.4 billion for climate-change efforts, including $1.75 billion for research and
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2002 Climate Action Report to the United Nations required by the
Framework Convention, the Bush Administration conceded that climate
change was a significant problem, but also argued that the United States
should not adopt changes that could harm the U.S. economy and instead
contended that the government should research more efficient ways to
reduce GHGS.122 Instead of reducing GHG emissions compared to a baseline
year, e.g., 1990, the Bush Administration seeks to reduce the ratio of GHGs
to total gross domestic product by making the economy at least 18 percent
more energy efficient. That approach, however, will still result in a total
increase in GHG levels because of economic and population growth. 123

lIT. ARTICLE lIT STANDING
The courts have issued conflicting decisions about whether to allow
standing for plaintiffs who flle suits alleging general injuries to the public at
large---cases in which virtually every citizen has a small, common injury.
Should courts resolve such issues or leave such questions to the politically
elected branches of government-the President and Congress?124 In cases
involving generalized, abstract injuries that affect the public as a whole, such
as misuse of taxpayer funds,125 the courts have often concluded or suggested
that it is inappropriate to allow a plaintiff standing to pursue such a suit
because the political branches-the legislative or executive branches-are
better suited than the judicial branch to resolve such controversies. 126 In

Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc. (Duke
$500 million in energy-efficiency tax incentives. ").
122 CLIMATE ACTION REPORT 2002, supronote 11, at 2-7 (summarizing report).
123 Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. at 52,931-32
("The President's goal is to lower the U.S. rate of emissions from an estimated 183 metric tons
per million dollars of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2002 to 151 metric tons per million
dollars of GDP in 2012."); CLIMATE ACTION REPORT 2002, supra note 11, at 5-6 (discussing U.S.
plan to reduce GHG intensity by 18% in ten years, but acknowledging that total GHG emissions
will grow); id. at 70-80 (projecting increased U.S.GHG emissions by 2020).
124 See infro Part m.B.2.d.
125 See, e.g., Asarco, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 616-17 (1989) (concluding for a plurality
that a taxpayer suit would have been dismissed had the action initially been brought in federal
court); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176-77 (1974) (holding that a federal taxpayer
did not have standing to seek disclosure of CIA expenditures based upon the Accounts Clause
of the Constitution so that he could "properly fuliill his obligations as a member of the
electorate in voting" because he was not il\iured in fact); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 88 (1968)
(holding that a federal taxpayer did not have standing to challenge spending allegedly in
violation of Constitution); Cantrell v. City of Long Beach, 241 F.3d 674, 683-84 (9th Cir. 2001)
(stating that federal courts require a taxpayer seeking standing to demonstrate direct il\iury in a
case alleging mishandling of municipal or state tax funds); Hodas, supro note 64, at 471-72
(discussing the narrow scope of taxpayer standing).
126 See, e.g., Defenders, 504 U.S. 555, 576-77 (1992) (asserting that vindication of the public
interest is a function of Congress and the Executive); Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176-77 (1974)
(stating that generalized grievances do not give rise to a concrete il\iury); Covington, 358 F.3d
626, 651 (9th Cir. 2004) (Gould, J., concurring) (same); Florida Audubon Soc'y v. Bentsen
(Florida Audobon) , 94 F.3d 658, 667 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("The plaintiff must show that he is not
simply il\iured as is everyone else, lest the il\iury be too general for court action."); Grossman,
supro note 59, at 40 n.217.
HeinOnline -- 35 Envtl. L. 21 2005

22

ENVIRONMENTAL LA W

[Vol. 35:1

Power),127 the Supreme Court stated in 1978 that a court could deny standing
if a suit would raise "general prudential concerns 'about the proper-and
properly limited-role of the courts in a democratic society.'"128 The Duke
Power Court concluded, "Thus, we have declined to grant standing where

the harm asserted amounts only to a generalized grievance shared by a large
number of citizens in a substantially equal measure. "129
Conversely, some Supreme Court decisions on standing implied or
stated that plaintiffs could establish standing even if they suffered an iI\jury
common to many people. In its 1973 decision United States v. Students
Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP) ,130 the Court declared
that "to deny standing to persons who are in fact irUured simply because
many others are also iI\jured, would mean that the most iI\jurious and
widespread ... actions could be questioned by nobody. "131 Additionally, in
its 1975 decision Warth v. Seldin,132 the Court held that a plaintiff may be
able to satisfy Article III standing requirements "even if it is an iI\jury shared
by a large class of other possible litigants. "133
A. Basics ofStanding

Article III of the Constitution establishes the parameters of the federal
judicial branch by creating a Supreme Court and authorizing Congress to
establish lower federal COurts. l34 Article III does not contain explicit
standing requirements for suits in federal COurtS. 135 Article III indirectly
places limits on the federal judicial power by stating that the "judicial Power
shall extend to all Cases... [and] ... Controversies,"136 thus excluding
advisory opinions. 137 Early Supreme Court decisions indirectly established
standing requirements by limiting suits to common law forms of action or
the statute at issue. l38 Since 1944, the Supreme Court has interpreted Article
III's limitation of judicial decisions to cases and controversies as implying
that federal courts should require plaintiffs to meet certain standing criteria
to ensure that the plaintiff has a genuine interest and stake in a case. 139 The
Court's development of formal standing requirements was probably
influenced by the rise of new administrative agencies during the 1930s and
438 u.s. 59, 80 (1978).
Id (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)).
129 Id
130 412 U.S. 669, 688 (1973).
131 Id
132 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975).
133 Id
134 U.S. CONST. art. ill.
135 Robert V. Percival, "Greening" the Constitution-Hannonizing Environmental and
Constitutional Values, 32 ENVTL. L. 809, 827 (2002); Cass R. Sunstein, Whats Standing After
Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries, "and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 170 (1992).
136 U.S. CONST. art. ill, § 2, cl. l.
137 Percival, sup.rn note 135, at 827; Sunstein, supra note 135, at 170-75.
138 Percival, sup.rn note 135, at 827; Sunstein, supra note 135, at 170-75.
139 Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 310 (1944); Hodas, supra note 64, at 454; Sunstein, supra
note 135, at 169.

127
128
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the need to clarify whether potential beneficiaries of regulation could
challenge administrative decisions. 140
In the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) of 1946,141 Congress
explicitly recognized that beneficiaries of regulation had standing to
challenge adverse agency decisions. 142 The APA authorizes judicial review
both for those who have allegedly suffered common law injuries-a "person
suffering legal wrong because of agency action"-and those who are
allegedly denied statutory benefits by an agency-a person "adversely
affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of the relevant
statute."143 It was not until the 1970 decision in Association of Data
Processing Organizations v. Camp (Data Processing) 144 that the Court
interpreted the APA to require a plaintiff to have suffered an "injury in fact"
to obtain standing to challenge a government action. 145 Furthermore, Data
Processing was the first Court decision requiring plaintiffs suing under the
APA to demonstrate that their suit is "arguably within the zone of interests
to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in
question. "146
Courts have treated standing requirements as jurisdictional and have
required them to be met at each stage of federal litigation. 147 Rejecting
standing for a taxpayer suit, the Court stated, "The question is whether the
person whose standing is challenged is a proper party to request
adjudication of a particular issue and not whether the issue itself is
justiciable. "148 For standing in an Article III court, the Court currently
requires a plaintiff to show "(1) [she] has suffered 'an injury in fact' that is
(a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural
or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of
the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the

140 See, e.g., Fed. Communication Comm'n v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 47677 (1940) (holding that a competing radio station may challenge an FCC licensing decision
because the station was a beneficiary of the goal of the Federal Communications Act of 1934 to
promote the public interest in adequate communications service); Percival, supra note 135, at
827; Sunstein, supra note 135, at 179.
141 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706, 1305,3105,3344,4301,5335,5372, 7521 (2000).
142 Percival, supra note 135, at 827.
143 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2000); Percival, supra note 135, at 827.
144 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970).
145 Id at 152-56; Sunstein, supra note 135, at 169, 185-86 (criticizing Data Processing's
iI\jury in fact test as inconsistent with the language of the APA).
146 Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 153--54 (1970) (requiring for the first time that a plaintiff
suing under the APA demonstrate that his suit is "arguably within the zone of interests to be
protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question"); William W.
Buzbee, Expanding the Zone, Tilting the Field· Zone of Interests and Article m Standing
Analysis After Bennett v. Spear, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 763,778-79 (1997) ("The 'zone of interests'
test was first articulated in Association ofData Processing.").
147 See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc. (Laidlaw), 528 U.S. 167,
180 (2000) ("[W)e have an obligation to assure ourselves that [petitioner) had Article ill standing
at the outset of the litigation.").
148 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99-100 (1968).
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injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. "149 A plaintiff has the burden
of establishing all three elements. 150
1.

lIUmy in Fact

Several court decisions have addressed and explained the first standing
requirement-injury in fact.151 The "party seeking review must be himself
among the injured,"152 and, therefore, if an organization sues, at least one of
its members must have a requisite injury .153 A plaintiff must demonstrate
that the injury is "distinct and palpable"l54 or "concrete and
particuiarized,"155 and not diffuse, vague, or too general. 156 A threatened
injury, as opposed to an actual injury, must be "imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical. "157
Some lower courts have held that a plaintiff must establish a
"geographical nexus" between where the injury occurs and her location,
especially in procedural rights cases where the alleged procedural error
must affect land or the environment reasonably near to where the plaintiff

528 U.S. at 180-81 (quoting Defenders, 504 U.S. 555, 560--61 (1992».
See Defenders, 504 U.S. at 561 ("[T)he party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the

149 Laidlaw,

150

burden of establishing these elements. ").
151 See William M. Orr, Florida Audubon Society v. Bentsen: An Improper Application of
Ltijan to a Procedural Rights Plaintiff, 15 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 373, 377-78 (1997) (outlining the
iI\jury in fact element).
152 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972).
153 As stated in Laidlaw,
An association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when its members

would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right, the interests at stake are
germane to the organization's purpose, and neither the claim asserted nor the relief
requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.
528 U.S. at 181 (2000) (citing Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising, 432 U.S. 333, 343
(1977». See also Siena Club, 405 U.S. at 735-39 (requiring an environmental organization to
demonstrate that at least one of its members suffered an iI\jury in fact and rejecting
organizational standing); Percival, supra note 135, at 828 (discussing the standing requirements
in Siena Club).
154 Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982); Orr, supra note 151, at 377-78 (discussing same).
155 Defenders, 504 U.S. at 560--6l.
156 See infra Parts m.B.2.a-b, m.C.
157 Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990); Orr, supra note 151, at 378.
HeinOnline -- 35 Envtl. L. 24 2005

2005]

STANDING AND GLOBAL WARMING

25

lives or uses land for recreation. 158 In United States v. A v.x Corporation, 159
the First Circuit held that the plaintiff
bore [the] burden, to the extent its standing was dependent on a claim of
procedural harm, to [describe] with fair specificity some concrete nexus
between its members and the harbor area. Without such a nexus, any
procedural harm its members suffered was common to all members of the
public and, therefore, did not rise to the level of stating an individualized claim
of harm. 160

The Supreme Court has not used the term "geographical nexus,"161 but has
emphasized that the proximity of a plaintiff to the location of alleged harm is
a significant factor in deciding whether the plaintiff has a concrete injury
necessary for standing. 162 Thus, an allegation that a plaintiff hikes "in the
vicinity" of a large tract of land may be insufficient to prove an injury in
fact. 163

158 See, e.g., Florida Audubon, 94 F.3d 658, 667 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc) ("As the
'geographic nexus' test at issue here was in fact intended to ensure that a plaintiff's iIijury met
this first criterion of being particularized and personal, an analysis of that test that does not
actually require the plaintiff to demonstrate that such particularity must be invalid. "); City of
Evanston v. Reg'l Transp. Auth., 825 F.2d 1121, 1126, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1005 (7th Cir. 1987)
(holding that plaintiffs did not prove standing under NEPA because they did "not sufficiently
allege where they lived in relation to the property. "); City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 671
(9th Cir. 1975) ("The procedural iIijury implicit in agency failure to prepare an EIS ... is itself a
sufficient 'iIijury in fact' to support standing, provided this iIijury is alleged by a plaintiff having
a sufficient geographical nexus to the site of the challenged project that he may be expected to
suffer whatever environmental consequences the project may have."); Nelson, supra note 32, at
260-61,277-78 (criticizing cases applying an overly strict geographical nexus requirement); Orr,
supra note 151, at 380--86 (discussing cases using a geographical nexus requirement for standing
in procedural rights cases).
159 962 F.2d 108 (1st Cir. 1992).
160 Jd at 119--20.
161 Orr, supra note 151, at 383-86 (stating that although the Court in Defenders did not use
the tenn "geographical nexus," the court recognized that showing geographical nexus created a
concrete interest).
162 See Defenders, 504 U.S. 555, 567 n.3 (1992) ("The dissent may be correct that the
geographic remoteness ... does not 'necessarily' prevent such a rmding-but it assuredly does
so when no further facts have been brought forward. "); id at 572 n.7 (rejecting "standing for
persons who have no concrete interests affected-persons who live (and propose to live) at the
other end of the country from [the environmental impact)"); Randall S. Abate & Michael J.
Myers, Broadening the Scope of Envirorunentai Standing: Procedural and /nfonnationaJ fI/iuryin-Fact After Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 12 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'y 345, 364 n.113 (1994)
("Although the Supreme Court [in Defenders] did not specifically address the geographic nexus
requirement ... Justice Scalia would appear to consider such a nexus to be a 'separate concrete
interest. '"); Brian J. Gatchel, /nfonnation and Procedural Standing After Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 11 J. LAND USE & ENVrL. L. 75,94-95 (1995) (noting same); Orr, supra note 151, at 38386 (noting same).
163 Defenders, 504 U.S. at 565--66 ("[A] plaintiff claiming iIijury from environmental damage
must use the area affected by the challenged activity and not an area roughly 'in the vicinity' of
it.") (citations omitted); Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n (NJW'), 497 U.S. 871, 887-89 (1990)
(rejecting "in the vicinity" allegations as too vague where the plaintiff challenged government
reclassification of a large area of land).
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Although the injury in fact requirement inevitably restricts standing by
excluding those without concrete injuries, the Court in some ways has
adjusted the injury requirement to address the special problems faced by
environmental or procedural plaintiffS. l64 For instance, as is discussed in
Parts lli.B.2.e and V.E, the Court has relaxed the imminence requirement for
plaintiffs alleging procedural injuries, such as the failure of a federal agency
to prepare an environmental impact statement. 165 The Court has defined the
concept of injury relatively broadly to include "aesthetic, conservational or
recreational harm," stating that "environmental plaintiffs adequately allege
injury in fact when they aver that they use the affected area and are persons
'for whom the aesthetic and recreational values of the area will be lessened'
by the challenged activity. "166 To demonstrate an injury in fact for standing,
an environmental plaintiff does not need to prove that pollution harmed her
or the environment that she uses, but she must merely allege "reasonable
concerns" that such pollution might plausibly be harmful. 167
2. Traceability-Causation

The second standing requirement-traceability-is essentially a
causation requirement. 168 A plaintiff must demonstrate "a causal connection
between the injury and the conduct complained of-the injury has to be
fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not the result
of the independent action of some third party not before the court. "169 In its
1973 SCRAPdecision, the Court allowed standing despite an "attenuated line
of causation, "170 but that case involved a Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss, which
164 Defenders, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7 ("There is this much truth to the assertion that 'procedural
rights' are special: The person who has been accorded a procedural right to protect his concrete
interests can assert that right without meeting all the normal standards for redressability and
inunediacy."); Orr, supra note 151, at 375 ("Significantly lower standards are required of
procedural rights plaintiffs to meet the test of standing."), 380-86 (discussing standing rules for
procedural rights defendants).
165 See Defenders, 504 U.s. at 572 n.7 (1992); Cantrell, 241 F.3d 674, 679 n.3 (9th Cir. 2001)
("[T)he ir\jury in fact requirements are adjusted for plaintiffs raising procedural issues in that
although they must show a 'concrete interest' at stake, they need not show that the substantive
environmental harm is imminent" (emphasis added)).
166 Sierra Club, 405 U.S. 727, 734-39 (1972).
167 Laidlaw, 528 U.S. 167, 181, 183-84 (2000) ("[T)he affiant members' reasonable concerns
about the effects of those discharges, directly affected those affiants' recreational, aesthetic,
and economic interests.").
168 Defenders, 504 U.S. at 560; Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.s. 26,41-42 (1976);
City of Los Angeles v. Nat'l Highway Safety Admin. (City of Los Angeles), 912 F. 2d 478, 483
(Ginsburg, D.H., J., dissenting in part) (D.C. Cir. 1990), overruled by Florida Audubon, 94 F. 3d
658,669 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc).
169 Defenders, 504 U.S. at 560 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Simon, 426 U.S. at
41-42).
170 SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 688-90 (1973) (concluding plaintiffs had alleged sufficient facts to
survive a motion to dismiss despite the "attenuated line of causation" alleged by the plaintiffs);
Percival, supra note 135, at 828. In SCRAP, law students alleged that a freight rate increase
would harm them by discouraging the use of recycled materials and would thus increase litter
in Washington's Rock Creek Park, which would impair their aesthetic interest in using the park.
The Court held this allegation was sufficient to give the students standing to challenge the
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requires a court to assume that the facts alleged by a plaintiff are true.
Subsequently, the Court has rejected SCRAPs application to cases in which
a defendant files a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment, which requires a
plaintiff to aver specific facts to support its allegations. l7l Thus, in deciding a
motion for summary judgment, a court may fmd insufficient causation if a
plaintiff alleges an attenuated injury based on a series of weakly connected
events. 172
3. RedressabiJity

The third standing requirement-redressability-overlaps to some
extent with the second traceability requirement because both are concerned
with causation,173 but there are some differences between the two
requirements. Redressability is concerned with whether a favorable decision
by a court would actually redress-solve or prevent-at least some of the
problems causing the plaintiffs injuries. 174 "[F]or a plaintiff who is injured or
threatened with injury due to illegal conduct ongoing at the time of suit, a
sanction that effectively abates that conduct and prevents its recurrence
provides a form of redress."175 If a favorable decision is highly uncertain to
have a positive impact on the defendant's behavior or the cause of the
injuries affecting the plaintiff, a court may conclude that the issue is not
redressable. 176
Finally, the Court has stated that a plaintiff must demonstrate standing
for each form of relief sought.177 If all injuries are wholly in the past and
there is no possibility of recurrence, then a citizen suit that seeks only civil
penalties payable to the government and no injunctive relief provides no
actual relief to the plaintiffs and there is no standing. 178 If, however, there is

Interstate Commerce Commission's decision to approve the rate increase even though the
students would suffer at most an iI\jury that was common to a wide range of people. See
SCRAP, 412 U.s. at 690; Percival, supra note 135, at 828--29.
171 See NWF, 497 U.S. 871, 889 (1990) (rejecting application of SCRAP, a case finding that
plaintiff had standing where defendant fIled motion to dismiss, to a case involving defendant's
motion for summary judgment, and stating that "[t)he SCRAP opinion, whose expansive
expression of what would suffice for Section 702 [of the Administrative Procedure Act) review
under the particular facts, has never since been emulated by this Court"). Because SCRAP
involved a motion to dismiss while NWF involved a motion for summary judgment, the NWF
Court did not have to address whether SCRAPwas good law because different standards apply
to these two different types of motion, and, therefore, NWF did not overrule SCRAP; but
Justice Scalia's majority opinion questioned SCRAP's continuing validity in deflning causation
for standing.
172 See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 757-58 (1984) ("The indirectness of the iI\jury ... may
make it substantially more difficult to meet the minimum requirement of Art. ill.") (quoting
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 505 (1975)).
173 Allen, 468 U.S. at 753 n.19; City of Los Angeles, 912 F. 2d at 483 (Ginsburg, D.H., J.,
dissenting in part); Haitian Refugee etr. v. Gracey, 809 F.2d 794, 801 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
174 Simon, 426 U.S. at 38; Orr, supra note 151, at 378, 385; Sunstein, supra note 135, at 229.
175 Laidlaw, 528 U.S. 167, 18&-86 (2000).
176 See infra notes 217-20 and accompanying text.
177 Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 183,185.
178 Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 106-09 (1998).
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any reasonable chance that a defendant's paying civil penalties to the
government will deter it from committing future violations that could harm
the plaintiff, then a plaintiff has standing to sue even if it does not seek, or if
the court does not grant, irUunctive relief. 179
4. "Prudential" Limits

In addition to meeting the mandatory constitutional irUury in fact,

traceability, and redressability standing requirements discussed above,
federal courts have also imposed "prudential" limits on standing. 180 For
example, a plaintiffs suit must fall within the "zone of interests" protected
by the relevant statute or constitutional provision. 181 Additionally, courts will
generally refuse third parties the authority to file suit on behalf of another. 182
Furthermore, courts may limit suits alleging general irUuries common to
large numbers of persons that otherwise meet applicable standing
requirements if the sheer number of suits would overwhelm the courts and
other branches of government are capable of providing remedies, or if the
federal government could sue on behalf of those irUured. l83 Unlike
constitutional limits on standing, however, Congress may expressly override
prudential zone of interest limitations by, for example, providing expansive
citizen suit provisions that reach the limits of constitutional standing. 184

179 Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 174, 185-86 ("To the extent that [civil penalties] encourage
defendants to discontinue current violations and deter them from committing future ones, they
afford redress to citizen plaintiffs who are injured or threatened with injury as a consequence of
ongoing unlawful conduct. ").
ISO See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162-63 (1997) (describing the "zone of interests"
standard as a "prudential limitation" rather than a mandatory constitutional requirement); Data
Processing, 397 U.S. 150, 153-54 (1970) (requiring plaintiff seeking standing to demonstrate that
his suit is "arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or
constitutional guarantee in question."); Buzbee, supra note 146, at 778-82 (arguing that the
Supreme Court uses the "zone of interests" test to determine whether it is prudential to allow
standing).
181 See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 162-163; Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 153-54.
182 See Defenders, 504 U.S. 555, 560--561 (1992) (stating that a court may reject standing if
plaintiff is asserting the rights of a third party not before the court); Simon, 426 U.S. at 41-42

(same).
183 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984); Duke Power, 438 U.S. 59, 80 (1978) (stating that
a court may deny standing if a suit would raise "general prudential concerns 'about the properand properly limited-role of the courts in a democratic society' ... Thus, we have declined to
grant standing where the harm asserted amounts only to a generalized grievance shared by a
large number of citizens in a substantially equal measure.") (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,
498 (1975)); Covington, 358 F.3d 626, 654-55 & n.12 (9th Cir. 2004) (Gould, J., concurring)
(discussing the authority of federal courts to use prudential concerns to limit suits that are
excessively burdensome if political branches or suit by the United States could resolve the
issue).
184 Bennett, 520 U.S. at 162~6 (holding that "unlike their constitutional counterparts,
[prudential limits on standing] can be modified or abrogated by Congress," and concluding that
a citizen suit provision abrogated the zone of interest limitation); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at
501.
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B. Justice Scalia: hUuIY to All is IrUury to NoneLet the Political Branches Decide

s

1. Justice Scalia 1983 Law Review Article: A Road Map to His Argument

that Generalized hUuries Belong to the Political Branches
In 1983, before he joined the Supreme Court in 1986 and while he was a
judge on the D.C. Circuit, then-Judge Scalia wrote a law review article that
disagreed with the relaxed approach to standing adopted by the Supreme
Court and many lower court decisions. 185 Scalia favored a narrower
approach to standing because standing doctrine was a "crucial and
inseparable element" of separation-of-powers principles, and more
restrictive standing rules would limit judicial interference with the popularly
elected legislative and executive branches."186 He argued that when
"allegedly wrongful governmental action ... affects 'all who breathe,'" no
one has standing to seek redress in court, and the political branches should
resolve the issue instead. 187
Criticizing judges who had suggested that courts adopt a more lenient
approach to standing in environmental cases, he questioned "the judiciary's
long love affair with environmental litigation."lBS Scalia argued that judges
who enforce environmental laws are "likely (despite the best of intentions)
to be enforcing the political prejudices of their own clasS."189 Responding to
Judge Skelly Wright's pro-environmentalist opinion in Calvert Cliffs
Coordinating Committee v. Atomic Energy Commission 190 that "our duty, in
short, is to see that important legislative purposes, heralded in the halls of
Congress, are not lost or misdirected in the vast hallways of the federal
bureaucracY,"191 then-Judge Scalia suggested that judicial nonenforcement of
certain laws, such as Sunday Blue laws, because of standing barriers could
actually have positive social impacts. He argued that, "[t]he ability to lose or
misdirect laws [by denying standing where no particular hann to particular
individuals or minorities is in question] can be said to be one of the prime
engines of social change. "192 Judge Wright's suggestion that courts should
treat environmental plaintiffs better than many other plaintiffs is certainly
questionable. Yet Scalia's implication that society might be better off if
courts did not enforce certain environmental laws is equally

185 See Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine ofStanding as an Essential Element of the Separation of
Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. 1. REV. 881 (1983); see also Hodas, supra note 64, at 456-57 (discussing

Justice Scalia's 1983 standing article).
186 Scalia, supra note 185, at 881; Percival, supra note 135, at 847.
187 Scalia, supra note 185, at 896.
1BS Id at 884.
189 Percival, supra note 135, at 84 7 (quoting Scalia, supra note 185, at 896).
190 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
191 Id at 1111.
192 Scalia, supra note 185, at 897 (observing that Sunday blue laws initially were commonly
unenforced before they were repealed by legislatures).
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questionable and contrary to congressional intent in enacting those
statutes. 193
2. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife

In the 1992 decision, Lqjan v. Defenders of Wildlife (Defenders),194
Justice Scalia convinced the Court to partially adopt his approach to
standing. A divided Court concluded that the environmental group
Defenders of Wildlife (Defenders) lacked standing to challenge a
Department of Interior rule interpreting section 7 of the Endangered Species
Act (ESAY95 as not applying to extraterritorial impacts of federal action. 196
Defenders alleged that the United States provided partial funding for dam
projects in Sri Lanka and Egypt that would likely damage the habitat of, and
promote the extinction of, endangered and threatened species in those
countries. 197 Defenders sought standing based on the affidavits of two of its
members who had traveled to those countries in the past, were concerned
about endangered species in those two countries, and wanted to revisit the
countries in the future but had no current travel plans. 198

a. "Concrete" and "Imminent" lIUwy
In a majority and plurality opinion completely joined only by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, Justice White, and Justice Thomas,199 Justice Scalia
concluded that Defenders failed to meet standing requirements for four
reasons. First, although he acknowledged that a plaintiffs "desire to use or
observe an animal species, even for purely esthetic purposes is undeniably a
cognizable interest for purposes of standing, "200 Justice Scalia concluded
that Defenders had failed to assert a valid interest in endangered or
threatened species in Egypt or Sri Lanka because the vague goals of the
affiants to return to these countries "some day," without "any description of
concrete plans... do not support a finding of... 'actual or imminent'
injury. "201 In an influential and significant concurring opinion, Justice
Kennedy, joined by Justice Souter, agreed that the affiants' plans were too
193 See Hodas, supra note 64, at 456-57 (criticizing Justice Scalia's narrow interpretation of
standing for environmental plaintiffs).
194 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
195 Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000). ESA section 7 appears at
id § 1536.
196 Defenders, 504 U.S. at 578; Hodas, supra note 64, at 464.
197 Defenders, 504 U.S. at 563; Hodas, supra note 64, at 464.
198 Defenders, 504 U.S. at 563--64; Hodas, supra note 64, at 464.
199 Only Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Thomas joined Part m-B of Justice
Scalia's opinion, which addressed redressability. Defenders, 504 U.S. at 556, 568-71; see infra
Part ill.B.2.c (discussing redressability). Justice Kennedy and Souter concurred in the other
portions of Justice Scalia's majority opinion, but Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion joined by
Justice Souter that suggested they might take a different approach to standing issues in future
cases. Defenders, 504 U.S. at 556, 579-81 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
200 Defenders, 504 U.S. at 562-63.
201 Id at 562-64 (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)).
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indefinite for them to have the requisite iIUury in fact required for
standing. 202 Justice Kennedy, however, stated that a member of Defenders
could have met the Court's standing requirements in several ways: by buying
a plane ticket to visit these lands, setting a specific date to visit the habitat of
the endangered species at issue, or visiting the lands on a regular basis. 203

b. No Nexus Theories ofStanding
Second, Justice Scalia's opinion rejected the three nexus theories of
standing proposed by Defenders on the grounds that each was so
implausible as to be unacceptable as a matter of law. 204 Both implicitly and
explicitly, Justice Scalia demanded that plaintiffs demonstrate that they
were located in relatively close geographical proximity to where alleged
injuries occur,205 and, therefore, he rejected the nexus theories in part
because they would have allowed plaintiffs to claim iIUuries from distant
events that they had merely read about in a newspaper. 206 Defenders had
contended in its briefs that standing could be established by one of three
alternative theories of causation: 1) the "ecosystem" nexus theory, which
claimed that "any person who uses any part of a 'contiguous ecosystem'
adversely affected by a funded activity has standing even if the activity is
located a great distance away, "207 2) the animal nexus theory, which claimed
that "anyone who has an interest in studying or seeing the endangered
animals anywhere on the globe has standing,"208 and 3) the vocational nexus
theory, which claimed that "anyone with a professional interest in
[endangered] animals can sue."209 According to Justice Scalia's plurality
opinion, "Under these [animal nexus and vocational nexus] theories, anyone
who goes to see Asian elephants in the Bronx Zoo, and anyone who is a
keeper of Asian elephants in the Bronx Zoo, has standing to sue. "210 Justice
Scalia concluded that the animal nexus and vocational nexus theories were
202
203
204
205

See id at 579-80 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
See id; Rodas, supra note 64, at 466; Sunstein, supra note 135, at 201.
See Defenders, 504 U.S. at 566-67.
See id at 565-Q6 ("[A] plaintiff claiming il\iury from environmental damage must use the

area affected by the challenged activity and not an area roughly 'in the vicinity' of it.") (citations
omitted); id at 567 n.3 ("The dissent may be correct that the geographic remoteness ... does
not 'necessarily' prevent such a rmding-but it assuredly does so when no further facts have
been brought forward."); id. at 572 n.7 (rejecting "standing for persons who have no concrete
interests affected-persons who live (and propose to live) at the other end of the country from
[the environmental impact]"); Rodas, supra note 64, at 462-66 (discussing Justice Scalia's
implicit and explicit requirement that plaintiffs demonstrate geographical proximity to alleged
il\iury); Orr, supra note 151, at 383-86 (same); see also NWF, 497 U.S. 871, 887-89 (1990) (Scalia,
J.) (rejecting "in the vicinity" allegations as too vague where plaintiff challenged the government
reclassification of a large area of land)); supra notes 163-67 and infra note 392 and
accompanying text (discussing geographical nexus requirement).
206 See Defenders, 504 U.S. at 565-Q7; Rodas, supra note 64, at 466 (discussing Justice
Scalia's rejection of nexus theories).
207 Defenders, 504 U.S. at 565.
208 Id at 566.
209 Id
210 Id
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"beyond all reason .. , [because] lilt goes ... into pure speculation and
fantasy, to say that anyone who observes or works with endangered species,
anywhere in the world, is appreciably harmed by a single project affecting
some portion of that species with which he has no more specific
connection."211 Justice Scalia repudiated Defenders' ecosystem nexus theory
as inconsistent with Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation (NWF) ,212 "which
held that a plaintiff claiming injury from environmental damage must use the
area affected by the challenged activity and not an area roughly 'in the
vicinity of it.'"213 He concluded that the ESA's protection of broad
ecosystems did not change the Court's requirement that plaintiffs specify
with sufficient particularity the geographical area where an alleged injury
occurred, stating, "To say that the Act protects ecosystems is not to say that
the Act creates (if it were possible) rights of action in persons who have not
been injured in fact, that is, persons who use portions of an ecosystem not
perceptibly affected by the unlawful action in question. "214
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion, joined by Justice Souter, agreed
that the three nexus theories proposed by Defenders in the case did not
support its standing because there was no evidence that Congress intended
the ESA to confer standing based on those nexus theories. However, the
concurrence accepted as a matter of law "the possibility ... that in different
circumstances a nexus theory similar to those proffered here might support
a claim to standing. "215 He indicated that courts "must be sensitive to the
articulation of new rights of action that do not have clear analogs in our
common-law tradition. "216
c. Redressability

Third, Justice Scalia concluded for a plurality of the Court that
Defenders failed to meet the Constitution's redressability requirement
because judicial relief would not necessarily stop the projects. 217 First,
because the United States provided only a relatively small portion of the
international funding-approximately ten percent-the termination of U.S.
aid would not necessarily stop the dam projects: 218 "[I]t is entirely
coJ\jectural whether the nonagency activity that affects respondents will be
altered or affected by the agency action they seek to achieve. "219 Second, it
was not clear that U.S. funding agencies, who were not parties to the suit,
would be bound by the district court's or the Secretary of Interior's order to
stop the funding because the statute gave the Secretary only a consultative
211 Id at 566-67.
212 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
213 Defenders, 504 U.S. at 565-66 (citing NWF, 497 U.S. at 887-89).
214Id
215 Id at 579-80 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
216 Id
217 Id at 568-71 (Scalia, J.); see also Gatchel, supra note 162, at 95-98 (discussing the
redressability issue in Defenders); Sunstein, supra note 135, at 200 (same).
218 Defenders, 504 U.S. at 568-7l.
219 Id
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role, it was not clear that the Secretary's regulations could bind the funding
agencies because they had the initial decision about when it was appropriate
to consult the Secretary, and the funding agencies were not parties subject
to the district court's order.220 Only three other justices-Chief Justice
Rehnquist, Justice White and Justice Thomas-agreed with Justice Scalia
that the case was not redressable.
Although he concurred in the judgment that the ESA did not apply
overseas, Justice Stevens argued that the claim would be redressable
because he assumed that if the Court required funding agencies to consult
with the Secretary, the funding agencies would obey the Court's
interpretation. 221 In a dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice
O'Connor, argued that the plaintiffs met the redressability requirement
because there was a reasonable possibility that a judicial decision in the
case might affect the dam construction projects. 222 For example, because a
threatened or actual withdrawal of U.S. engineering support resulting from a
judicial decision might well persuade the foreign governments to reduce or
stop the projects, there was a sufficient possibility that a judicial decision
would achieve the plaintiff's goal of stopping the projects to establish
redressability.223 Both Justices Kennedy and Souter declined to reach the
redressability issue, resulting in no majority decision on this issue. 224

d

The Concrete lIUmy Requirement and Separation-oI-Powers
Principles

Fourth and most importantly, Justice Scalia concluded that both Article
II and Article III forbid Congress to give universal standing to every citizen
regardless of ir\jury to challenge in the federal courts the alleged failure of
the executive branch to exercise its duty under Article II to faithfully
execute the law. 225 The court of appeals had relied on the citizen-suit
provision of the ESA, which authorizes "any person [to] commence a civil
suit on his own behalf: (A) to er\ioin any person, including the United States
and any other governmental instrumentality or agency ... who is alleged to
be in violation of any provision of this chapter."226 Justice Scalia concluded
that statutes purporting to allow citizens to sue even if government action
did not ir\jure them in any way were unconstitutional as applied because

220 Id The Agency for International Development took the position that it was bound to
consult the Secretary only for domestic projects that might harm endangered species in the
United States. Id
221 Id at 584-85 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). Justice Scalia agreed that the agencies
would likely obey a decision of the Supreme Court even if they were not technically bound to
do so, but argued that the pertinent issue was whether they would have obeyed the district
court's decision when they were not parties to the case and therefore not bound to do so, which
was doubtful. See id at 569-70 n.5 (Scalia, J.).
222 Id at 595-601 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
223 Id at 601.
224 See id at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
225 Id at 571-78 (Scalia, J.).
226 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1) (1988).
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standing requires that a plaintiff assert a concrete irijury.227 Justice Scalia
asserted that separation-of-powers principles restrict the authority of
Congress to confer standing in citizen suits because the executive branch
has the sole authority under Article II to execute laws if no one suffers a
concrete irijury.228 He stated, "The concrete irijury requirement has ...
separation-of-powers significance,"229 so Congress cannot convert "the
public interest in proper administration of the laws (specifically, in agencies'
observance of a particular, statutorily prescribed procedure) . .. into an
individual right by a statute that denominates it as such, and that permits all
citizens ... to sue."230 Justice Scalia emphasized that "[v]indicating the
public interest (including the public interest in government observance of
the Constitution and laws) is the function of Congress and the Chief
Executive," and that Congress may not transfer "from the President to the
courts the Chief Executive's most important constitutional duty," that is, "to
'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed. "'231
Justice Scalia's concrete irijury test, however, does not necessarily
preclude broad citizen suits. Some commentators have argued that a
concrete irijury requirement does not prevent Congress from providing
virtually universal standing through citizen suits if it simply authorizes a
small reward or cash bounty for successful plaintiffs challenging private or
government action, similar to a qui tam suit. 232 The first federal Congresses
enacted several statutes authorizing either qui tam actions or informant's
actions, which respectively allowed citizens either to bring civil suits against
private parties on behalf of the government for violations of federal laws or
to assist governmental suits, and provided successful plaintiffs or informants
with a portion of any recoveries and fmes. 233
In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Souter,
stated that Congress has significant, but not unlimited, discretion to define
the irijuries for which the public may sue. 234 Justice Kennedy agreed with
Justice Scalia that Article Ill's cases and controversies requirement does not
allow Congress to authorize courts "to vindicate the public's nonconcrete
interest in the proper administration of the laws. While it does not matter
how many persons have been irijured by the challenged action, the party
bringing suit must show that the action injured him in a concrete and
personal way. "235 Justice Kennedy nevertheless maintained that "Congress
Defenders, 504 U.S. at 571-78.
Id. at 577.
229 Id.
230 Id. at 576-77.
231 Id.
232 See Sunstein, supra note 135, at 223-24, 232-34 (proposing cash bounties or qui tilIn suits
227
228

as way for Congress to give standing to citizen plaintiffs despite Justice Scalia's attempt to limit
standing in Defenders).
233 See Vermont Agency v. United States ex reI. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765 (2000) (discussing
history of qui tilIn and informers' suits in English common law and early American
constitutional history); Jonathan E. Wells, Comment, Shouldn't Standing Be Closer to the Heart
ofCongressionaJ Intent?, 49 EMORYL.J. 1359, 1364-65, 1375 (2000) (same).
234 Defenders, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
235 Id. at 581.
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has the power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will
give rise to a case or controversy where none existed before. "236
Subsequently, numerous decisions have favorably cited this language in
standing cases, including Judge Gould in his concurring opinion in
Covington. 237 In Defenders, however, Justice Kennedy determined that
Congress had refused to "identify the injury it seeks to vindicate and relate
the injury to the class of persons entitled to bring suit."238 Justice Kennedy's
approach would likely allow Congress to provide standing for global
warming injuries as long as a statute defined which types of harm from
climate change comprise the requisite injury.
e. Procedural IJ?iUIies

In dictum, Justice Scalia addressed how the Court's concrete injury

requirement would affect plaintiffs challenging alleged procedural errors of
the government, particularly in NEPA cases. If a plaintiff has suffered or will
suffer a concrete injury from a governmental action, Justice Scalia
acknowledged that such a plaintiff may challenge a procedural error by a
government agency.239 He stated in footnote seven that a plaintiff suffering
or expected to suffer a concrete injury may challenge a procedural violation
without meeting the "normal standards for redressability and immediacy"
even if correcting the procedural error may not prevent the injury.
There is this much truth to the assertion that "procedural rights" are special:
The person who has been accorded a procedural right to protect his concrete
interests can assert that right without meeting all the normal standards for
redressability and immediacy. Thus, under our case law, one living adjacent to
the site for proposed construction of a federally licensed dam has standing to
challenge the licensing agency's failure to prepare an environmental impact
statement, even though he cannot establish with any certainty that the
statement will cause the license to be withheld or altered, and even though the
dam will not be completed for many years. 240

Id at 580.
See infra notes 293, 433-41 and accompanying text.
238 Defenders, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
239 See Defenders, 504 U.S. at 572-73 nn.7-8 ("We do not hold that an individual cannot

236

237

enforce procedural rights; he assuredly can, so long as the procedures in question are designed
to protect some threatened concrete interest of his that is the ultimate basis of his standing. ").
240 Defenders, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7; see Buzbee, supra note 146, at 794-95,803,808--10,820,
824 (discussing the analysis of standing criteria in "procedural rights" cases presented in
footnote seven of Defenders); Gatchel, supra note 162, at 91-92 (same); Bruce Morris, How
Footnote 7 in Lujan II May Expand Standing for Procedurallrifuries, 9 NAT. RES. & ENV'T. 75, 7577 (1995) (discussing lower court decisions interpreting standing criteria in procedural rights
cases); Abate & Myers, supra note 162, at 364 (discussing examples in Defenders where a
plaintiff asserting procedural error by the government would have standing). But see
Christopher T. Burt, Comment, Procedural lrifUIY Standing After Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
62 U. Cm. L. REV. 275,284-85, 297-99 (1995) (criticizing dictum in footnote seven of Defenders
as vague and arguably unconstitutional, but arguing that footnote seven is valid if it is
understood to require that a procedural iIijury threatens a concrete interest of plaintiff);
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Although footnote seven is technically dictum, a number of scholars have
suggested that footnote seven may represent the thinking of a majority of
the court because the dissenting justices in Defenders likely agreed with its
analysis. 241 Without footnote seven, Justice Scalia's analysis of redressability
and immediacy arguably would have raised serious questions about the
viability of NEPA suits because a NEPA plaintiff can rarely demonstrate that
an agency would likely change the substance of a proposed project if it
remedies a procedural error in an environmental assessment. 242 Plaintiffs in
NEPA cases and other procedural cases have often cited footnote seven as
allowing them to meet relaxed standards for redressability and
immediacy.243 Unfortunately, footnote seven does not clearly explain the
extent to which redressability and immediacy requirements are waived in
procedural rights cases, and thus leaves many unanswered questions. 244 As
Douglas Sinor, Tenth Circuit Survey: Environmental Law, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 859, 879 (1998)
(criticizing footnote seven because it "is confusing and raises more questions than it answers").
241 See Buzbee, supra note 146, at 808-10 (observing that footnote seven in Defenders is
technically dictum, but likely represented views of the majority of the Court). But see Burt,
supra note 240, at 276, 284-86, 297-99 (criticizing dictum in footnote seven of Defenders as
vague and arguably unconstitutional, but arguing that footnote seven is valid if it is understood
to require that a procedural ir\jury threatens a concrete interest of plaintiff).
242 See Buzbee, supra note 146, at 803, 808-10 (arguing footnote seven in Defenders was
essential in preserving administrative suits where it is often difficult to show that an agency's
proper compliance with procedure would change the substantive result).
243 See Buzbee, supra note 146, at 808-10 (discussing the use of footnote seven in NEPA
cases); Sinor, supra note 240, at 881-S9 (same, and arguing that the Tenth Circuit has adopted
an effective and workable approach to interpreting footnote seven).
244 As summarized by one commentator,
[Defenders'] procedural ir\jury dicta is not without its problems, however. At best, it is vague
and provides little guidance for prospective plaintiffs and the lower courts; at worst, it
eviscerates the standing requirements of the Constitution. The approach is, in the words of
Justice Blackmun, "standardless." After [Defenders], the contours of the redressability and
ir\jury-in-fact standing requirements in procedural ir\jury cases are unknown. The Court
failed to answer whether redressability falls out entirely from the standing inquiry in
procedural cases, or whether procedural plaintiffs must show something short of the
"normal" standard for redressability. Even if the Court can constitutionally loosen the
redressability requirement, the question of how to apply the requirement remains. The Court
suggested that the "normal" standards of redressability need not be met. The normal
requirement is that the plaintiff must show that the relief is likely to redress the ir\jury. Under
the Court's suggestion, does "likely" become "possible," or something else? The Court offers
no guidance on this point Similarly, the Court did not make it clear whether it intended
completely to abandon the inuninence component of the iIUury-in-fact requirement. The
vagueness of the suggested approach is likely to lead to inconsistencies among the lower
courts.

Burt, supra note 240, at 285; see also Gatchel, supra note 162, at 100 ("The Defenders opinion
can be interpreted as either failing to indicate how footnote seven should be applied or as
setting broad outer limits that are only approached infrequently. Using either interpretation,
Defenders provides little guidance . . . for the more standard situations where plaintiffs
complain of violations of procedural rights."); Sinor, supra note 240, at 879-81 ("Footnote
seven, however, is confusing and raises more questions than it answers, since the court did not
apply the standards it set forth ... because [it] was not a procedural rights case. Thus, the lower
courts are given the task of interpreting and applying the standards it set forth.") (citations
omitted); Nelson, supra note 32, at 269 ("[The Defenders] discussion of procedural ir\juries only
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discussed below in Part V, the circuits have split regarding how to apply
footnote seven to procedural rights defendants in NEPA cases. 245
C. A Retum to Broader Standing: Federal Election Commission v. Akins
1. Justice Breyer's Majority Opinion

In its 1998 decision Federal Election Commission v. Akins (Akins),246
the Court clarified its apparently conflicting decisions about whether
plaintiffs who suffer common irUuries are entitled to standing. In Akins, the
issue was whether voters had standing to challenge a Federal Election
Commission final decision that a lobbying group, the American Israeli
Political Action Committee (AlPAC), was not a "political committee" within
the definition of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971,247 and,
therefore, was not required to disclose its donors, contributions, or
expenditures. 248 The Court concluded that voters' inability to obtain
information for which the Act had required disclosure was a constitutionally
"genuine 'irUury in fact. '"249 In Akins, the Court determined that the plaintiff
voters had suffered a "concrete and particular" irUury in fact because they
were deprived of the statutory right to receive designated "information
[which] would help them ... to evaluate candidates for public office."25O The
Court determined that this harm was distinguishable from taxpayer standing
cases, where a plaintiff rarely has standing to sue. 251
An important question in Akins was why the Court had permitted
standing in some cases involving widespread irUuries, but denied it in other
cases when "the political process, rather than the judicial process, may
provide the more appropriate remedy for a widely shared grievance. "252
Justice Breyer's majority opinion explained that the Court denied standing
for widely shared, generalized irUuries only if the harm is both widely shared
and also of "an abstract and indefinite nature-for example, harm to the
contributed to the existing confusion and uncertainty surrounding standing requirements for
NEPA claims. ").
245 See infro Part V.

246
247

524 U.s. 11 (1998).
2 U.S.C. §§ 431-456 (2000).
248 Akins, 524 U.S. at 13-18.
249 Id at 21; Hodas, supro note 64, at 471.
250 Akins, 524 U.S. at 21; Hodas, supro note 64, at 471.
251 See, e.g., Asarco, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 616-17 (1989) (concluding for a plurality
that a taxpayer suit would have been dismissed had the action initially been brought in federal
court); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176-77 (1974) (holding that a federal taxpayer
did not have standing to seek disclosure of CIA expenditures based upon the Accounts Clause
of the Constitution so that he could "properly fulfill his obligations as a member of the
electorate in voting" because he was not iI\jured in fact); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.s. 83, 88 (1968)
(holding that a federal taxpayer did not have standing to challenge spending allegedly in
violation of Constitution); Cantrell v. City of Long Beach, 241 F.3d 674, 683-84 (9th Cir. 2001)
(stating that federal courts require a taxpayer seeking standing to demonstrate direct iI\jury in a
case alleging mishandling of municipal or state tax funds); Hodas, supro note 64, at 471-72
(discussing the narrow scope of taxpayer standing).
252 Akins, 524 U.S. at 23; Hodas, supronote 64, at 471.
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'common concern for obedience to law.'"253 He maintained that the Court
had denied standing if the ir\jury is too abstract, but had allowed standing
even if many people suffered the same harm as long as that harm is
concrete. 254 The AldnsCourt stated that "an ir\jury ... widely shared ... does
not, by itself, automatically disqualify an interest for Article III purposes.
Such an interest, where sufficiently concrete, may count as an 'ir\jury in
fact. "'255 Justice Breyer's majority opinion in Akins concluded that a plaintiff
who suffers a concrete actual ir\jury, even though it is shared by many
others, usually can meet the ir\jury in fact requirement:
[T]he fact that a political forum may be more readily available where an iIijury
is widely shared. . . does not, by itself, automatically disqualify an interest for
Article III purposes.... This conclusion seems particularly obvious where (to
use a hypothetical example) large numbers of individuals suffer the same
common-law iIijury (say, a widespread mass tort), or where large numbers of
voters suffer interference with voting rights conferred by law. We conclude
that, similarly, the informational iIijury at issue here, directly related to voting,
the most basic of political rights, is sufficiently concrete and specific such that
the fact that it is widely shared does not deprive Congress of constitutional
power to authorize its vindication in the federal courts. 256

Justice Breyer's opinion implied that Congress may grant standing to all
citizens concretely harmed by a particular ir\jury even if every other citizen
is similarly adversely affected. 257 In Pye v. United States,258 the Fourth
Circuit summarized Aldns as establishing that "so long as the plaintiff ... has
a concrete and particularized ir\jury, it does not matter that legions of other
persons have the same ir\jury."259 Conversely, Justice Breyer concluded that
the Constitution's generalized restrictions on Congress, such as the
Accounts Clause,260 must be resolved by the political branches because there
are no concrete standards for courts to apply.261

s

2. Justice Scalia Dissenting Opinion

Justice Breyer's majority opinion was fundamentally inconsistent with
Justice Scalia's 1983 separation-of-powers and standing article, as well as the
spirit of Justice Scalia's separation-of-powers arguments in Defenders.
253 Akins, 524 U.S. at 24 ("The abstract nature of the hann ... deprives the case of the
concrete specificity that characterized those controversies which were 'the traditional concern
of the courts at Westminster', and which today prevents a plaintiff from obtaining what would,
in effect, amount to an advisory opinion.") (citations omitted).
254 Id at 24-25 (citations omitted).
255 Id at 24. (emphasis added); see Covington, 358 F.3d 626, 651 (9th Cir. 2004) (Gould, J.,
concurring) (discussing Akins).
256 Akins, 524 U.S. at 24-25 (citations omitted).
257 Id
258 269 F.3d 459 (4th Cir. 2001).
259 Id at 469.
260 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 ("A regular statement and account of the receipts and
expenditures of all public money shall be published from time to time. ").
261 Akins, 524 U.S. at 24-25; Hodas, supra note 64, at 472.
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Justice Scalia's central argument was that the political branches, not the
judiciary, should address broadly held grievances. 262 Justice Breyer's
majority opinion in Akins implicitly rejected Justice Scalia's conclusion in
Defenders that "'[t]o permit Congress to convert the undifferentiated public
interest in executive officers' compliance with the law into an 'individual
right' vindicable in the courts is to permit Congress to transfer from the
President to the courts the Chief Executive's most important constitutional
duty. "'263
Accordingly, Justice Scalia dissented in Akins. First, he contended that
the majority's reasoning was flawed if Congress, by enacting a statute, could
define an injury-in-fact, when the Constitution's requirements for the
Judiciary did not. 264 He also contended that the majority's distinction
between taxpayers, who generally could not obtain standing, and voters,
who could obtain standing, was "a silly distinction, given the weighty
governmental purpose underlying the 'generalized grievance' prohibitionviz., to avoid 'something in the nature of an Athenian democracy or a New
England town meeting to oversee the conduct of the National Government
by means of lawsuits in federal COurts.'"265 Finally, he raised his strongest
disagreement with the majority's analysis, arguing that the Court had
obliterated the line between generalized grievances for which there should
be no standing and particularized ones for which Article III intends
standing. 266 According to Justice Scalia, it is irrelevant whether generalized
grievances are concrete or abstract because all "undifferentiated" grievances
"common to all members of the public ... must be pursued by political,
rather than judicial, means. "267
In his dissenting opinion in Akins, Justice Scalia went beyond his
emphasis on concrete injuries in Defenders to argue that it was
inappropriate to provide universal public standing at all because issues that
are shared by the public at large belong to the political branches regardless
of whether every citizen arguably receives a minor injury. In his Akins
dissent, he rejected the majority's distinction between concrete and
generalized grievances, and instead argued that all "undifferentiated"
grievances "common to all members of the public ... must be pursued by
political, rather than judicial, means. "268 Thus, he returned to the broader
principle in his 1983 law review article that standing doctrine was a "crucial
and inseparable element" of separation-of-powers principles and that more
restrictive standing rules would limit judicial interference with the popularly
elected legislative and executive branches. 269 Despite not addressing global
524 U.S. at 37 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id at 36 (quoting Defenders, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992». See generally eass Sunstein,
Information Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613,
638-53 (1999) (discussing differences in standing philosophy between Defenders and Akins).
264 Akins, 524 U.S. at 36-37 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
265 Id at 33 (citations omitted).
266 Id at 35.
262 Akins,

263

267Id

268

Id

269 Scalia, supra note 185, at 881; see Percival, supra note 135, at 84 7.
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wanning specifically, Justice Scalia's view that courts should reject
generalized grievances on standing grounds and instead leave such issues to
the political branches would make it very difficult for plaintiffs to
demonstrate standing to challenge the government's failure to regulate
GHGs, except those who have unique ir\iuries different from the public at
large. 27o Yet Justice Scalia, in footnote seven of Defenders, suggested a
relaxed standard for procedural plaintiffs that in some instances could allow
a plaintiff to challenge the government's failure to discuss global warming in
a NEPA study. 271

IV. THE MAJORITY OPINION IN

COVINGTON: THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE STANDING
UNDER THE CAA AND RCRA

A. Majority Opinion
In Covington, the Ninth Circuit determined that the plaintiffs had
satisfied the ir\iury-in-fact requirement for Article III standing for their RCRA
claims by alleging that the defendants had increased the risk of fires,
explosions, groundwater contamination, scavengers, and disease-carrying
vermin, thus harming the plaintiffs by failing to comply with RCRA
requirements for operating a landfill. 272 Affirming the district court, the Ninth
Circuit found,
The Covingtons live just across the road from the landfJll. If the landfill is not
run as required by RCRA, the Covingtons are directly confronted with the risks
that RCRA sought to minimize: Fires, explosions, vectors, scavengers, and
groundwater contamination, if such occur, threaten the COvingtons [sic]
enjoyment of life and security of home. Violations of RCRA increase the risks of
such injuries to the Covingtons. Such risks from improper operation of a
landfill are in no way speculative when the landfill is your next-door neighbor.
The Covingtons' factual showing of fires, of excessive animals, insects and
other scavengers attracted to uncovered garbage, and of groundwater
contamination, evidence a concrete risk of harm to the Covingtons that is
sufficient for injury in fact.273
Additionally, the court determined that the plaintiffs had satisfied the
ir\iury-in-fact requirement for Article III standing for the CAA by alleging that
the defendants had mismanaged "white goods," i.e., appliances, disposed of
at the landfill by not ensuring that chlorofluorocarbons CCFCs) were treated
as required by the CAA and its regulations,274 and, therefore had increased
270 See Hodas, supra note 64, at 473-78 (arguing that Justice Scalia's standing decisions,
especially in Defenders, led lower courts to restrict standing in ways that would make it more
difficult for climate change plaintiffs to obtain standing).
271 See supra notes 239-40 and accompanying text.
272 See Covington, 358 F.3d 626, 638-40 (9th Cir. 2004) (concluding that plaintiffs had
standing under RCRA).
273 [d. at 638.
274 See 42 U.S.C. § 7671g (2000); 40 C.F.R. §§ 82.154(a), 82.156(f), 82.166(i), (m) (2004)
(requiring removal or recapture of CFCs and other ozone-depleting substances before disposal
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the risk that CFCs would leak and contaminate the plaintiffs' property.275
The district court had held that the Covingtons lacked standing for the
alleged CAA violations because there was no evidence of a leak of ozonedepleting substances, and, therefore, no evidence that the CAA violations
caused an injury to the Covingtons. 276 The court of appeals disagreed with
the district court's finding that there was no evidence ofleaking because the
plaintiffs had stated in their affidavits that they had obselVed liquids and
gases leaking from the white goOds. 277 The Ninth Circuit reversed the district
court's finding of no standing under the CAA, stating, "The district court's
conclusion on this score cannot stand in this summary judgment context,
where the Covingtons' evidence, even if contested, must be credited. "278
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the defendants had the burden
of establishing that CFCs had not leaked from the appliances because they
had failed to keep proper records. 279

B. Judge Gould's Concuning Opinion
In his concurring opinion, Judge Gould addressed this more difficult
question of whether the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the global
impacts of the CFCs released from the landfill. 28o Because the Covingtons
"suffer no greater injury than any other person" from the global impacts of
the CFCs from the landfill, the question is whether a plaintiff can meet
standing requirements if he suffers a "widely shared injury."281 Judge Gould
acknowledged that Defenders and some taxpayer standing cases suggest
that widespread injuries to all are not "concrete and particularized" enough
to give any individual plaintiff standing because "'injury to all is injury to
none'" for standing purposes. 282
Judge Gould argued, however, that the Supreme Court's standing
precedent as a whole, especially its Akins decision, suggested that a
widespread injury can establish standing as long as the plaintiffs injury is
sufficiently concrete and particularized. 283 First, citing the SCRAP
decision,284 he contended that it is wrong to deny standing to a plaintiff who

or recycling); Covington, 358 F.3d at 640-41 (discussing the CAA's requirements for disposal of
CFCs); id At 653 (Gould, J., concurring) (discussing the explicit congressional decision to allow
citizen suits to enforce ozone protection requirements).
275 Covington, 358 F.3d at 640-41 (concluding that plaintiffs had standing under the CAA).
276Id
277 Id at 640 n.19.
278Id
279 Id ("[I)f, as here, a CAA claimant demonstrates a failure on the part of the disposer to
compile appropriate paperwork showing that CFCs have been removed from the white goods,
we presume that the white goods leaked CFCs unless and until the disposer affmnatively
demonstrates otherwise.").
280 Id at 650--55 (Gould, J., concurring).
281 Id at 650.
282 Id at 650--51 (citing United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176--77 (1974) (stating that
generalized grievances of taxpayers do not give rise to a concrete iI\imy)).
283 Id at 651-52.
284 SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 688 (1973) ("To deny standing to persons who are in fact iI\iured
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has suffered real injuries because many others have suffered the same
injury.285 Summarizing Akins, he concluded that "[a] concrete actual injury,
even though shared by others generally is sufficient to provide injury in fact.
It appears to be abstractness, not wide dispersal, of an injury that may
prevent the injury from being sufficient to confer standing. "286 Even Justice
Scalia's Defenders decision suggested that a plaintiff who receives a
particularized injury has standing to sue even if many suffer the same
injury.287 Judge Gould concluded that the plaintiffs had suffered a
particularized injury, stating, "The increased risk of skin cancer, cataracts,
and/or a suppressed immune system affect the Covingtons in a personal and
individual way. Because the asserted injury is so clearly particularized, my
analysis focuses more on whether the injury is sufficiently concrete in light
of the widespread injury. "288
Under the Akins analysis, Judge Gould concluded that "the injury
suffered by the Covingtons is concrete rather than 'abstract and
indefinite."'289 He gave several reasons for his conclusion:
First. .. the scientific evidence shows a marginal increase in the risk of
serious maladies from increased UV-B radiation that results from the landfill's
release of CFCs. I recognize that the environmental follies and errors
committed at one landfill in rural Idaho, no matter how egregious, can cause
only a small increase in risk to the world, including threat to the Covingtons.
But the size of the injury to the environment, even if small from improper CFC
releases at one landfill, would appear to have no bearing on whether the
increased risk to the Covingtons is "concrete.» Here, if ozone is lost, more
radiation makes it through the atmosphere to create a risk of higher incidence
of skin cancer, cataracts, and/or a depressed immune system. These are deadly
serious maladies, and the risk of such grave harms minimizes the required
probability of their occurrence for ir\iury in fact purposes. Thus the Covingtons'
exposure and fear of exposure to heightened risk of such harms appear to be
concrete ir\iuries. 290

Second, Judge Gould emphasized that in the 1990 Amendments to the
CAA, Congress had specifically prohibited the disposal of refrigerants in a
manner that allows CFCs to enter the environment and required EPA to
promulgate regulations to regulate the disposal and recycling of such
CFCS.291 Furthermore, he observed that "Congress explicitly decided that
any citizen could sue to enforce these laws."292 Citing Justice Kennedy's

because many others are also injured, would mean that the most injurious and widespread ...
actions could be questioned by nobody. We cannot accept that conclusion.").
285 Covington, 358 F.3d at 651-52 (Gould, J., concurring).
286 Id at 651 (citing Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998)).
287 Id at 651-52 (citing Defenders, 504 U.s. 555, 560 & n.1 (1992)).
288 Id. at 652.
289Id

Id (citations omitted).
Id at 653 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7671g (2000); 40 C.F.R. §§ 82.156(1); 82.166(i), (m) (2004)).
292 Covington, 358 F.3d at 653 (Gould, J., concurring) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 7604(a)(1),
7604(1)(3) (2000)).
290
291
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concurring opinion in Defenders that Congress has the broad power to
define injuries,293 Judge Gould concluded that "[t]he Covingtons' asserted
hanns fall within the injuries recognized by Congress. The Covingtons, as
part of the public, have a corresponding right to vindicate their statutory
protections."294 He cited several cases, including Akins, that had relied on
congressional intent in the statute to define the types of injuries and harms
that establish standing. 295 He concluded that Congress had recognized "the
individual nature of this hann by an explicit grant of a right to citizen suit
when interested officials do not timely act to protect the air. "296
Third, Judge Gould argued that the Supreme Court's decision Friends of

the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental SeIVices (TOC), Inc. (Laidlaw)297
had "held that even less concrete injury than present here is sufficient for
standing purposes" by focusing on whether the plaintiffs had "reasonable
concerns" about pollution rather than whether the pollution caused actual
hann to the environment:298
If subjective fear of river pollution alone is enough for iI\iury in fact, then a
fortiori objective and certain increased risks of skin cancer, cataracts, and

depressed inunune systems may satisfy the iI\iury in fact standard.
For these reasons, I believe that the Covingtons' iI\iury from increased risks
of maladies caused by ozone depletion, which will follow from mishandling of
white goods at the landfill, is concrete and particularized. And, upon analysis,
the remaining elements of constitutional standing appear satisfied. 299
He concluded that there is causation because "[t]here is a scientifically
proven link between CFCs and ozone-depletion" and Congress had
recognized the significance of the risk by enacting legislation to regulate
CFCS.300
Finally, he determined that "the injury is imminent and redressable. "301
Judge Gould maintained that the injury to the plaintiffs from the release of

293 Id at 653 (quoting Defenders, 504 U.S. 555, 580 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
294Id
295 Id (citing Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 22 (1998) (noting that the statute at issue "[sought) to
protect individuals such as respondents from the kind of hann they say they have suffered"));
see al50 Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling, Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 156 (4th Cir.
2000) (en banc) (noting that the plaintiff "alleged precisely [those) types of iI\iuries that
Congress intended to prevent"); Baur v. Veneman, 352 F.3d 625,635 (2d Cir. 2003) ("[T)here is a
tight connection between the type of iI\iury which [the plaintiff] alleges and the fundamental
goals of the statutes which he sues under-reinforcing [his) claim of cognizable iI\iury.") In a
footnote, Judge Gould cited several law review articles that concluded Congress has significant
discretion to defme the iI\iuries that give rise to standing. Covington, 358 F.3d at 653 n.9 (Gould,
J., concurring).
296 Covi.ngton, 358 F.3d at 653 (Gould, J., concurring).
297 528 U.S. 167, 181, 183-84 (2000) ("[T)he affiant members' reasonable concerns about the
effects of those discharges, directly affected those affiants' recreational, aesthetic, and
economic interests.").
298 Covington, 358 F.3d at 653 (Gould, J., concurring).
299 Id at 653-54 (citing Laidlaw, 528 U.S. 167, 181, 183-84 (2000)).
300 Id at 654.
301 Id
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CFCs is imminent because the release of CFCs immediately increases their
risk of intensified exposure to UV-B radiation. 302 Furthermore, he concluded
that the injury is redressable under Laidlaw's holding that civil penalties
payable to the government may directly redress a plaintiffs injuries even if a
court does not issue an injunction against a defendant because such
penalties may redress a plaintiffs injuries by abating current violations and
deterring future ones by a defendant. 303 Additionally, Judge Gould
determined that the civil penalties authorized under the CAA against those
who mishandle CFCs would deter future violations by the defendants. 304
Judge Gould conceded that some commentators and judges would
likely argue that courts should for prudential reasons refuse standing for
injuries that are so widespread that virtually every person in the world is
affected, both because such minimal standing requirements could lead to an
unreasonably large number of suits and because the political branches are
better equipped to address such suits. 305 In a footnote, probably thinking of
Justice Scalia's approach to standing issues, Judge Gould acknowledged that
"[aJ respectable counterpoint would be the theory that injury to all does not
justify private litigation and may be redressed only by the political branches,
or the federal government's institution of litigation."306 Judge Gould,
however, argued that there was strong precedent for allowing victims of
widespread injuries to have standing to sue if they have suffered concrete
and particular injuries rather than mere generalized harms:
The Supreme Court's standing precedents, when sensibly read as a whole,
may reject the idea that "iI\iury to all is iI\iury to none." A widespread injury, in
itself, is no bar to constitutional standing. The landftll has increased the
Covingtons' risk of UV-B related health maladies. I see nothing in the
Constitution or in Supreme Court precedent that would prevent the Covingtons
from having constitutional standing on that basis alone. 307

If suits addressing ozone destruction became too numerous and

burdensome on the judiciary, which he believed to be unlikely, Judge Gould

302Id
303 Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 174, 185-86 ("To the extent that [civil penalties] encourage
defendants to discontinue current violations and deter them from committing future ones, they
afford redress to citizen plaintiffs who are injured or threatened with injury as a consequence of
ongoing unlawful conduct. ").
304 Covington, 358 F.3d at 654 (Gould, J., concurring) (citing LaidJaw, 528 U.S. at 185-86).
305 See, e.g., Duke Power, 438 U.S. 59,80 (1978) (stating that a court may deny standing if a
suit would raise "general prudential concerns 'about the proper-and properly limited-role of
the courts in a democratic society.' Thus, we have declined to grant standing where the hann
asserted amounts only to a generalized grievance shared by a large number of citizens in a
substantially equal measure." (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)); David Pettit,
Commentary, Standing at a Distance, ANDREWS ENVTL. WIG. REP., May 21, 2004, at 12, 2004 WL
213210 (disagreeing with Judge Gould's argument for standing for plaintiffs who suffer injuries
common to virtually everyone-like injuries from global ozone destruction-and suggesting
that courts impose prudential standing limits).
306 Covington, 358 F.3d at 655 n.12 (Gould, J., concurring).
307 Id at 655 (footnote omitted).
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conceded that courts could impose prudential limits on such suits even if
plaintiffs have suffered some minimal injury in fact:
If courts would accept personal standing based solely on ozone depletion

claims, most likely future cases would still follow the mold in this case: that is,
concerned neighbors who witness ongoing violations of federal law designed to
minimize release of CFCs can be expected to sue to stop such violations. If this
is incorrect, however, the courts would have the ability to limit the scope of
permissible litigation through the application of the prudential standing
doctrine. 308

Because numerous people may receive concrete injuries from a global
pollution problem, Judge Gould suggested it may be necessary to limit suits
to those who have relatively direct injuries, e.g., the Covingtons, or, perhaps,
to those who can show that their injuries are more serious than most other
citizens, e.g., an Alaska Native directly harmed by melting permafrost. 309

V. NEPA AND STANDING: THE SPilT IN THE CIRCUITS AND CLIMATE CHANGE
There is currently a split in the circuits regarding the test for standing
under NEPA.310 Although a divided D.C. Circuit decision in 1990 concluded
that an environmental group had standing to raise global warming issues,3ll
in 1996, an en banc D.C. Circuit decision overruled the standing criteria used
in the 1990 decision and required plaintiffs to present evidence showing a
"substantial probability" of injury to obtain standing, which would make it
difficult but not impossible for future climate change plaintiffs to achieve
standing in that circuit. 3l2 Conversely, the Ninth and Tenth Circuits have
explicitly rejected the more stringent standard for NEPA standing now used
in the D.C. Circuit. 3l3 This Article concludes that the more liberal standing
test for NEPA cases used in the Ninth and Tenth Circuits is appropriate
under footnote seven of Defenders and is consistent with Congress's intent
in NEPA that federal agencies address all significant environmental inlpacts
caused by their actions. 3l4
A. Basics ofNEPA: Evaluating Environmental Impacts and Altematives

NEPA requires that federal agencies "include in every recommendation
or report ·on proposals for legislation and other major federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed

308 Id at 654-55 (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 75()"'51 (1984)); see also id at 655 n.12
(conceding courts could use prudential concerns to limit suits).
309 See supra notes 305-08 and accompanying text.
310 See infra Part V.
311 City ofLos AngeJes, 912 F.2d 478 (D.C. Cir. 1990), overruled by Florida Audubon, 94 F.3d
658 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc); see inJTa Part V.B.
312 Florida Audubon, 94 F.3d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see infra Part V.C.
313 See infra Part V.D.
314 See infra Parts V.E, VIT.
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statement by the responsible official on the environmental impact of the
proposed action. "315 This statement is commonly known as an environmental
impact statement (EIS) and is only required if the project has "significant"
environmental impacts. 316 An agency first prepares an environmental
assessment (EA) , typically a short report, to determine if the project will
create significant environmental impacts and requires an EIS, which is
needed for less than one percent of federal actions-approximately 400 to
500 EISs out of a total of 50,000 EAs.3l7 In the remaining 99 percent of all
assessments, an agency makes a rmding of no significant impact (FONSI),
which ends the assessment process. 318
NEPA serves the dual purposes of 1) "inject[ing] environmental
considerations into the federal agency's decisionmaking process" and 2)
"inform [ing] the public that the agency has considered environmental
concerns in its decisionmaking process. "319 An agency must consider any
significant environmental impacts of the proposed action. 32o Additionally, it
must conduct a "rigorous analysis" of reasonable alternatives to the
proposed plan, including a "substantial treatment" of these alternatives in
comparison to the proposed plan, and discuss why it selected the proposal
rather than the alternatives. 321
315 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2000).
316 See Robertson v. Methow Valley

Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989); 40 C.F.R. §§
1502.1-.25 (2004); nyssa Bimbach, Note, Newly hnposed Limitations on Citizens'Right to Sue
for Standing in a Procedural Rights Case, 9 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 311, 313-15 (1998)
(swmnarizing NEPA and the envirorunental impact inquiry); Nelson, supra note 32, at 255-56;
Orr, supra note 151, at 379 (same).
317 See 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4 (2004) (discussing whether to prepare an EIS, depending on finding
significant envirorunental impacts); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA:
Monitoring and Managing Government's Environmental Perfonnance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903,
909-10 (2002) ("Federal agencies annually conduct approximately 50,000 EAs leading to
'Findings of No Significant Impact' (or 'FONSIs,' in the NEPA jargon); in contrast, only about
500 EISs are produced each year.").
318 See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.4(e), 1508.13 (2004) (discussing when to prepare a FONSI, when
action will not have any significant environmental impacts); Karkkainen, supra note 317, at 90910.
319 Catron County Bd. of Conun'rs v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., 75 F.3d 1429, 1434
(10th Cir. 1996); see Bimbach, supra note 316, at 314-15; Nelson, supra note 32, at 255-56.
320 Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Espy, 998 F.2d 699, 703 (9th Cir. 1993) (using a two-part test to
decide whether an agency has adequately evaluated environmental impacts: 1) whether the EIS
contains a "reasonably thorough discussion of the significant aspects of the probable
environmental consequences," and 2) whether the agency has "taken a 'hard look' at a
decision's environmental consequences"); see also Bimbach, supra note 316, at 316-17; Nelson,
supra note 32, at 255.
321 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(iii) (2000) (requiring an environmental assessment to consider
"alternatives to the proposed action"); 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (2004) (stating that the consideration
of "alternatives" is the "heart" of an EIS), 40 C.F.R. § 1505.2 (stating that the agency has duty in
its record of decision to discuss why it selected its proposal instead of alternatives); Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519, 551 (1978) (requiring
the agency to evaluate "reasonable" alternatives in an EIS, but not "unconunon or unknown"
alternatives); Sierra Club v. Marita, 46 F.3d 606, 616 (7th Cir. 1995) (requiring the agency
conducting an EIS to engage in "rigorous analysis" and "substantial treatment" of alternatives to
the proposed plan); Bimbach, supra note 316, at 316; Bradford C. Mank, Title W and
Environmental Justice: Making Recipients Justify Their Siting Decisions, 73 TuL. L. REV. 787,
HeinOnline -- 35 Envtl. L. 46 2005

2005]

STANDING AND GLOBAL WARMING

47

The statute is purely procedural and a court may not reject an EA or
EIS because the judge believes that the agency's decision to build a project
is unwise; judicial review is limited to determining whether the agency
adequately evaluated a proposal's environmental irnpacts. 322 For example,
the agency must adequately discuss ways to mitigate the impacts of the
proposed action, but is not required to actually implement mitigation
techniques. 323 An agency must consider and discuss reasonable alternatives
to a proposed project or action but does not have to select the least
environmentally damaging alternative. 324
Because NEPA does not provide for a private right of action, citizens
must sue under the APA to challenge a federal agency's alleged failure to
comply with NEPA. 325 Under the APA, a plaintiff has standing to sue an
agency if he or she is "adversely affected" by an agency action. 326 A plaintiff
has the burden of proving that an agency's decision not to discuss an
allegedly significant environmental issue or alternative, or to issue a FONSI
instead of preparing an EIS, was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."327

819, 821-22 (1999) (discussing NEPA's requirement that the agency examine reasonable
alternatives to a proposed project).
322 See Robertson, 490 U.S. at 350 ("NEPA itself does not mandate particular results, but
simply prescribes the necessary process. "); Birnbach, supra note 316, at 315-17; Nelson, supra
note 32, at 257 ("Therefore, while environmental groups can challenge the procedural adequacy
of an EIS, they cannot use the courts to impose or require any particular result. "), 279-80; see
also Orr, supra note 151, at 379 ("Since NEPA imposes only procedural requirements on
governmental agencies, NEPA lawsuits typically challenge shortCOmings in EIS preparation
procedures. ").
323 See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.16(h) (2004) (requiring the agency to discuss mitigation methods);
See Robertson, 490 U.S. at 352-53 (holding that the agency has a duty in an EIS to discuss
mitigation measures, but is not required to implement them); Mank, supra note 321, at 829-31
(stating that agencies have a duty to discuss mitigation measures, but no duty to implement
them unless they promise to do so). An agency may be bound in some circumstances to
implement mitigation measures that it has publicly promised to adopt, especially if the agency
has stated in a FONS! that a project or action will not have significant impacts because it will
implement certain mitigation actions. See Mank, supra note 321, at 830-31 (discussing and
citing cases regarding when an agency's promise to implement mitigation measures is
enforceable).
324 See 40 C.F.R. § 1505.2 (2004) (stating that the agency has a duty in its record of decision
to discuss why it selected its proposal instead of alternatives); Stephen M. Johnson, NEPAs and
SEQAs in the Quest for EnvirorunentaJ Justice, 30 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 565, 577 (1997) (discussing
decisions concluding that an agency does not have to choose the less harmful alternative).
325 Birnbach, supra note 316, at 311; Nelson, supra note 32, at 256 n.10; Silvia L. Serpe, Note,
Reviewability of EnvirorunentaJ Impact Statements on LegisJative Proposals After Franklin v.
Massachusetts, 80 CORNELLL. REV. 413, 413 (1995).
326 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2000) ("A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or
adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is
entitled to judicial review thereof."); see also Data Processing, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970)
(requiring plaintiff seeking standing under the APA to demonstrate that his suit is "arguably
within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional
guarantee in question"); Nelson, supra note 32, at 256 n.lO.
327 See 5 U.s.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000) (requiring the reviewing court to evaluate whether an
agency decision was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law"); DANIEL R. MANDELKER, NEPA LAw AND LITIGATION § 4.51 (2d ed. 2004)
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B. City of Los Angeles
In its 1990 decision, City of Los Angeles v. National Highway Safety
Administration,328 which was decided two years before Defenders, a

majority of a divided D.C. Circuit three-judge panel concluded that the
Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) had standing to challenge the
failure of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to
consider the impacts of global warming when it decided that it was not
necessary to prepare an EIS on setting Corporate Average Fuel Economy
(CAFE) standards for model year 1989 at 26.5 miles per gallon (mpg), one
mpg below the presumptive level of 27.5 set by Congress. 329 A different
majority, however, concluded on the merits that not enough evidence of
harm from global warming from the 26.5 mpg standard existed to require
NHTSA to prepare an EIS.33o Then...Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg was the key
swing vote in this case, agreeing with Judge Wald that NRDC had standing to
challenge NHTSA's alleged procedural failure to prepare an EIS, but
agreeing with Judge D.H. Ginsburg that NHTSA's determination on the
merits that it did not need to prepare an EIS addressing the impacts on
global warming was not arbitrary and capricious, although a "close question"
according to Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg. 331
The NRDC complained that the agency "should have prepared an EIS in
order to consider the adverse climatic effects of the increase in fossil fuel
consumption that would result from setting a CAFE standard lower than
27.5 mpg" because the less stringent standard would result in greater fuel
usage and GHG emissions by 1989 model year cars, which would allegedly
"lead to a global increase in temperatures, causing a rise in sea level and a
decrease in snow cover that would damage the shoreline, forests, and
agriculture of California. "332 According to NRDC, global warming resulting
from less stringent CAFE standards would injure the economic and
recreational interests of its members in California. 333

(stating that a m[\jority of courts place the burden of proof on plaintiffs in NEPA cases and
listing cases); Mank, supra note 321, at 821 (stating that a m[\jority of NEPA decisions place the
burden on plaintiff to show that an EIS is inadequate). See generally Bennett, 520 U.S. 154, 174179 (1996) (discussing "arbitrary and capricious" standard under APA).
328 912 F.2d 478 (D.C. Cir. 1990), oveITUled by Honda Audubon, 94 F.3d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(en banc).
329 Id at 482-83; Hodas, supra note 64, at 473-75. There was a separate petition by various
city and state petitioners, including the City of Los Angeles, which challenged NHTSA's decision
under NEPA not to prepare an EIS covering its Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE)
standards for model years (MYs) 1987-1988. City ofLos Angeles, 912 F.2d at 481-82. "As to MYs
1987 and 1988, we hold that the city and state petitioners, based on their obligations under the
Clean Air Act, have standing to sue under NEPA on air pollution grounds, but that their
challenge fails on the merits." Id
330 City of Los Angeles, 912 F.2d at 478, 484-490 (upholding agency analysis of fuel
consumption standard); see Hodas, supra note 64, at 474.
331 City ofLos Angeles, 912 F.2d at 504 (Ginsburg, Ruth B., J., concurring).
332 See id at 483 (Ginsburg, D.H., J., dissenting in part).
333

Id
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In City of Los Angeles, the majority stated that an agency's failure to
prepare an EIS causes injury to a plaintiff if the agency fails to assess a
"reasonable risk" that environmental damage could occur in the plaintiffs
geographical location: "The procedural and informational thrust of NEPA
gives rise to a cognizable iI"\iury from denial of its explanatory process, so
long as there is a reasonable risk that environmental harm may occur. "334
Using a two-part test from the Ninth Circuit for standing in NEPA cases, the
City of Los Angeles court first required a plaintiff to demonstrate that the
"agency's failure to prepare an EIS . . . 'creates a risk that serious
environmental harms will be overlooked."'335 The second part mandated that
a plaintiff prove that he "'ha[s] a sufficient geographical nexus to the site of
the challenged project that he may be expected to suffer whatever
environmental consequences the project might have.'"336
Chief Judge Wald, with Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg concurring,
concluded that the NRDC plaintiffs had demonstrated an iI"\iury under the
two-part standing test because NHTSA's "failure to prepare an EIS
explaining the effects of the rollbacks on global warming presents the risk of
overlooking an environmental injury that will personally affect its
members."337 Judge Wald concluded that the plaintiffs had demonstrated a
"geographical nexus" between their alleged injuries and global warming by
showing that their members living in coastal and agricultural locations
would be harmed by a warmer climate's effect on coastal and agricultural
resources even though "the effects of a change in global atmosphere would
obviously be felt throughout this country, and indeed, the world."338 The
causation prong of the standing test was met because "[n]o one disputes the
causal link between carbon dioxide and global warming" and the agency
decision to reduce the fuel economy standard would increase these
emissions. 339 To meet the causation and redressability requirements, "NRDC
had only to show some likelihood that a full EIS would influence [the
agency's] decision. "340
Judge D.H. Ginsburg dissented from the majority's conclusion that
NRDC had standing for its global warming claim.341 Although acknowledging
that NRDC's "allegations make out injury indeed," he contended that "NRDC
has failed to explain how that injury can be traced causally to the challenged
decision and how the relief it seeks could redress the harm it foresees. "342 He
argued that the causation requirements for both traceability and
redress ability were usually similar.343 He contended that the causation

at 492 (Wald, C.J., dissenting in part).
Id at 492 (quoting City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 671 (9th Cir. 1975)).
336Id
337 Id at 494.
338 Id
339 Id at 495-97.
340 Id at 498.
341 Id at 483-84 (Ginsburg, D.H., J., dissenting in part).
342 Id at 483.
343 Id (citing Haitian Refugee Center v. Gracey, 809 F.2d 794, 801 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (opinion of
Bork, J.); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737,753 n.19 (1984)).
334 Id
335
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requirements for both traceability and redressability required NRDC to
allege and then prove that NHTSA's decision to reduce the CAFE standard
from 27.5 mpg to 26.5 mpg would have an "identifiable" "marginal impact" on
global warming, and not simply to assert that fossil fuel emissions cause
global warming. 344 Because "NRDC failed to allege that a 1.0 mpg reduction
would produce any marginal effect on the probability, the severity, or the
imminence of global warming," he concluded that it did not have standing to
raise any global warming issues. 345 He criticized the majority's relaxed
approach to causation that allowed NRDC to simply allege that fossil fuel
emissions cause global warming and that CAFE standards are a part of the
overall problem because under the majority's standing methodology, "the
standing requirement would, as a practical matter, have been eliminated for
anyone with the wit to shout 'global warming' in a crowded courthouse."346
The judges in the majority explicitly rejected Judge D.H. Ginsburg's
strict approach to causation because it "confus[es] the standing
determination with the assessment of [the] case on the merits."347 Quoting
Duke Power, they questioned Judge D.H. Ginsburg's strict causation test by
observing that "[t]o meet the causal nexus, petitioners need only show that
the alleged injury is 'fairly traceable' to the proposed action."348 To avoid
conflating standing with assessing the merits, they warned "that where, as
here, the relevant harms are probablistic and systemic, with widespread
impact, courts must be especially careful not to manipulate the causation
requirements of standing so as to prevent the anticipated regulatory
beneficiaries from gaining access to court. "349
Rejecting the dissenting opinion's demand that NRDC demonstrate a
close causal nexus between the CAFE standard change and the harmful
effects of global warming, the majority asserted that "Judge D.H. Ginsburg is
wrong in asserting that NRDC must establish or even allege with precision
the cause-and-effect relationship between the CAFE rollback and the serious
environmental harms of global warming; our precedents require only that it
show a reasonable likelihood that if NHTSA performed an EIS, it would
arrive at a different conclusion about the CAFE rollback. "350 Even though a
one mpg change in the CAFE standard would only result in a one percent
increase in total U.S. GHG emissions, the majority determined that NRDC
had met the "reasonable likelihood" of a "different conclusion" standard. 351
The majority rejected Judge D.H. Ginsburg's demand for precise causal
proof because such a demanding standard would cause courts to exclude all

344 ld at 484.
3451d
3461d
347 ld at 495 (Wald. C.J., dissenting in part).
348 ld (quoting Duke Power, 438 U.S. 59, 72 (1978)).
349 See id at 495 n.5 (citing Cass Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88
COLUM. 1. REV. 1432, 1463 (1988); Daniel Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations by Law
Enforcement Officials: Plaintiffs and Defendants as Private Attorneys General, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 247, 304 (1988) (making the same argument in the context of constitutional claims)).
350 See id at 497.
351 ld
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but the simplest evidence in environmental cases, would result in courts
ignoring "virtually any contributory cause to the complex calculus of
environmental harm ... as too small to supply the causal nexus required for
standing, and would call into question cases where we have found standing
in the past."352 Furthermore, because the appropriate causation standard
was "some likelihood" that preparing an EIS would influence the ultimate
decision,353 the majority concluded that the proper redressability standard is
not whether changing the CAFE decision would reduce global warming, but
whether "an EIS would redress its asserted injury, i.e., that any serious
effects in global warming will not be overlooked."354
C. Florida Audubon: Following D.H. Ginsburg's Dissent
1. Majority Opinion

In 1996, in Florida Audubon Society v. Bentsen (Florida Audubon),355
the D.C. Circuit in an en banc decision overruled City of Los Angeles and
essentially adopted the standing approach in Judge D.H. Ginsburg's
dissenting opinion.356 The Florida Audubon majority adopted a four-part test
for procedural rights plaintiffs that was far more restrictive than the twopart test of City of Los Angeles. 357 Most importantly, the standing test for
NEPA and other procedural rights plaintiffs under Florida Audubon is
arguably more restrictive than and therefore inconsistent with at least the
spirit of Justice Scalia's statement in footnote seven of his Defenders
opinion that "[t]he person who has been accorded a procedural right to
protect his concrete interests can assert that right without meeting all the
normal standards for redressability and immediacy."358 Unfortunately, the
D.C. Circuit continues to apply Florida Audubon's strict four-part standard
for standing in procedural rights cases. 359
In Florida Audubon, the plaintiffs were environmental groups
challenging the refusal of the Treasury Department and its Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) to prepare an EIS on the environmental impacts of a tax credit
for ethyl-tertiary butyl ether (ETBE), a fuel additive derived from plantbased ethano1. 36o The plaintiffs contended that the tax credit for ETBE

352
353

Id at 498.
Id
354 Id at 499.
.
355 94 F.3d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc).
356 See Hodas, supra note 64, at 4 7~78.
357 See Birnbach, supra note 316, at 324-26 (discussing four-part test for standing in
procedural rights cases); Orr, supra note 151, at 390--91 (same).
358 See Defenders, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992); Birnbach, supra note 316, at 312-13, 323-36
(arguing that Florida Audubon is inconsistent with Defenders in demanding more proof than
necessary in determining causation and standing for procedural rights plaintiffs).
359 See, e.g., Crete Carrier Corp. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 363 F.3d 490,492-93 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(applying Defenders and Florida Audubon); Nelson, supra note 32, at 273-76 (discussing the
Ninth Circuit's relaxed standing requirements in NEPA cases and comparing them to strict
standing requirements in D.C. Circuit).
360 Florida Audubon, 94 F.3d at 662; see also Orr, supra note 151, at 387-89 (summarizing
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would increase production of com, sugar cane, and sugar beets that are the
natural sources for the ethanol and its derivative ETBE, and that increased
production of these crops would in tum harm neighboring wildlife areas that
the plaintiffs used for recreation and aesthetic enjoyment. 361 After the
district court granted sununary judgment in favor of the government
because it concluded that the plaintiffs lacked standing, a divided threejudge panel of the D.C. Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Rogers, reversed the
district court and concluded that the plaintiffs' allegations fulfilled
applicable standing requirements for both injury in fact and causation under
the standard in Cjty ofLos Angeles because the agencies' preparation of an
EIS might result in the tax credit being canceled or adjusted. 362 After
granting the agencies' motion for en banc review,363 the D.C. Circuit reversed
the panel decision and overruled Judge Wald's standing test in City of Los
Angeles. 364 Explicitly adopting Judge D.H. Ginsburg's dissenting opinion in
City ofLos Angeles, the en banc majority stated "that a plaintiff must show a
causal connection between the challenged change in federal regulation-and
the incremental environmental effect the new regulation would allegedly
cause-and the alleged injury to the particularized interests of the
pam
I . tiff."365
a. Particularized lIUmy

A majority of the en banc Florida Audubon court adopted a new and
more restrictive four-part test for determining whether procedural rights
plaintiffs have standing. 366 The first part of the Florida Audubon standard
requires that the procedural rights plaintiff have a particularized injury367
and demonstrate that "everyone else"368 is not injured, so that the injury is
not too general for judicial action, which is arguably consistent with Justice
Scalia's opinion in Defenders. 369 Going beyond standing precedent, however,
facts).
361

Florida Audubon, 94 F.3d at 662; see also Orr, supra note 151, at 388-89 (summarizing

facts).

362 Florida Audubon Soc'y v. Bentsen, 54 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1995),

overruled en bane, 94

F.3d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
363 Florida Audubon Soc'y v. Bentsen, 64 F.3d 712 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (granting en banc review).
364 Florida Audubon, 94 F.3d at 669; Hodas, supra note 64, at 476-78 (discussing the relevant
test for standing and what is required to show irijury).
365 Florida Audubon, 94 F.3d at 665 (citing and summarizing City of Los Angeles, 912 F.2d
478, 483--84 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Ginsburg, D.H., J., dissenting in part), overroJed by Florida
Audubon, 94 F.3d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc)).
366 Id at 666-69; Birnbach, supra note 316, at 324 (discussing new test); Orr, supra note 151,
at 390 (same).
367 Florida Audubon, 94 F.3d at 667 nA (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975)).
368 Id (citing United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176-80 (1974) (stating that
generalized grievances do not give rise to standing)).
369 Compare Defenders, 504 U.s. 555, 560 (1992) (requiring particularized iIijury for
standing), with Florida Audubon, 94 F.3d at 666-67 & nA (requiring, for standing, a
particularized iIijury and a demonstration that the injury is not so general that "everyone else" is
affected). See also Birnbach, supra note 316, at 324 (arguing that the Florida Audubon first
prong, requiring particularized injury for standing, is consistent with Defenders); Orr, supra
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the Florida Audubon court also stated that the D.C. Circuit would apply
"even more exacting scrutiny" in reviewing standing for a plaintiff alleging
an ir\jury from broad rulemaking than in the case of a plaintiff challenging a
governmental action at a particular site. 37o Additionally, to prove that an
ir\jury is particularized and personal, rather than general, a plaintiff must
present evidence addressing the "geographical nexus" between the
governmental action and the location of the ir\jury to the plaintiff, a
requirement which also implicates the second part of the test. 371
b. Demonstrable Risk

The second part of the Florida Audubon standing test arguably goes
beyond Defenders by demanding that plaintiffs demonstrate they are
suffering an ir\jury in fact as a result of a governmental action that affects "a
particularized environmental interest of theirs that will suffer demonstrably
increased risk. "372 In the ETBE case before it, the court stated that the
plaintiffs must show "whether the tax credit promulgated by the defendant is
substantially likely to cause that demonstrable increase in risk to their
particularized interest. "373 The Florida Audubon court explicitly adopted
Judge D.H. Ginsburg's test in his City ofLos Angeles dissenting opinion that,
to demonstrate a requisite ir\jury in fact for standing purposes, a plaintiff
"must show" that the EIS failure creates a "demonstrable risk not previously
measurable (or the demonstrable increase of an existing risk) of serious
environmental impacts that imperil [plaintiffs] particularized interests. "374 In
response to Judge Rogers's dissenting opinion, the majority acknowledged
that, under its new "demonstrable risk" or "demonstrable increase" test for
standing, "a plaintiff seeking to challenge a governmental action with alleged
diverse environmental impacts may have some difficulty meeting this
standard," but contended that its approach was consistent with Defenders. 375

note 151, at 390-91 (noting that the florida Audubon test requires a demonstration that the
injury is particular and not general to public at large).
370 florida Audubon, 94 F.3d at 667; see also Orr, supra note 151, at 390 (arguing that florida
AuduboIis application of stricter standing requirements in cases involving "broad rulemaking"
was "[ w ]ithout the support of precedent").
371 See florida Audubon, 94 F.3d at 667 n.4 ("As the 'geographic nexus' test at issue here was
in fact intended to ensure that a plaintiffs injury met this first criterion of being particularized
and personal, an analysis of that test that does not actually require the plaintiff to demonstrate
that such particularity must be invalid,"); Orr, supra note 151, at 390-91 (discussing the injuryin-fact requirement) .
372 florida Audubon, 94 F.3d at 665.
373 Id; see also Hodas, supra note 64, at 476--77 (discussing the court's analysis); Birnbach,
supra note 316, at 324 (same); Orr, supra note 151, at 390-91 (same).
374 florida Audubon, 94 F.3d at 666.
375 Id at 666; Hodas, supra note 64, at 476--77 (discussing the aclmowledged difficulty of
meeting the standard); Sam Kalen, Standing on Its Last Legs: Bennett v. Spear and the Past and
Future ofStanding in Environmental Cases, 13 J.1AND USE & ENVTL. L. 1,47 (1997) (same).
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c. TraceabJity and Substantial Probability

The third part of the Florida Audubon test mandates that the
demonstrable particularized h\iury be fairly traceable to the agency action,
or in other words, appropriately requires a plaintiff to present evidence that
the government's action or omission caused the particular harm alleged to
have h\iured the plaintiff. 376 Unfortunately, in the fourth part of its standing
test, the Florida Audubon majority required a procedural rights plaintiff to
show that it is "substantially probable" that the agency action will cause the
demonstrable h\iury alleged by the plaintiff. 377 As is discussed in Parts V.D
and V.E, this "substantial probability" standard is more demanding than, and
inconsistent with, the spirit of footnote seven in Defenders,378 which implies
that a plaintiff with a threatened concrete h\iury can challenge an agency's
failure to follow mandatory statutory procedures even if there is no
guarantee that correcting the procedural error will change the substantive
result. 379
d No Standing Because No Proven lIUwy

Applying the four-part test, the majority determined that the plaintiffs
had failed to prove that the tax credit would necessarily cause the farmers
near the wilderness areas to increase their crop production and thereby
cause harm to wilderness areas used by the plaintiffs. 380 Even though
members of Congress predicted in the statute's legislative history that the
tax credit would increase agricultural production in the United States, the
majority found too many "uncertain links in a causal chain" to be sure that
the tax credit would cause increased production among the farmers
neighboring the plaintiffs. 381 Because the plaintiffs could not prove increased
376 Birnbach, supra note 316, at 324-25 (arguing that Florida Auduboris third prong,
requiring the plaintiff to show that a demonstrable particularized ir\iury is fairly traceable to the
agency action, is consistent with Defenders). Compare Defenders, 504 U.S. 555, 572 (1992)
(requiring plaintiff to show that the alleged ir\iury is fairly traceable to the agency action), with
Florida Audubon, 94 F.3d at 666 (requiring plaintiff show that a demonstrable particularized
ir\iury is fairly traceable to the agency action).
377 Florida Audubon, 94 F.3d at 672; see also Birnbach, supra note 316, at 312, 325
(discussing the "substantially probable" standard and causation).
378 See Nelson, supra note 32, at 278 ("Although the District of Columbia Circuit [in Florida
Audubon] viewed [Defenders] as altering ir\iury-in-fact analysis for NEPA cases, the dicta in
[footnote seven of Defenders] suggests the Supreme Court did not intend to change standing
requirements in NEPA cases."); infra Parts V.D-E (evaluating the Ninth and Tenth Circuits'
rejection of the Florida Audubon standard).
379 See Buzbee, supra note 146, at 803 ("The lesson of Defenders' footnotes seven and eight
seemed to be that no certainty or even probability of changed outcomes is necessary when a
plaintiff with a threatened concrete interest complains of a procedural irregularity."); see also
supra Part ill.B.2.e (discussing footnote seven in greater detail); infra Part V.E (arguing that the
Ninth and Tenth Circuits' liberal standing tests are consistent with footnote seven).
380 Florida Audubon, 94 F.3d at 668; see also Kalen, supra note 375, at 48 (illustrating an
application of the test); Nelson, supra note 32, at 272 (same); Orr, supra note 151, at 391 (same).
381 Florida Audubon, 94 F.3d at 670; see also Kalen, supra note 375, at 48-49 (showing court's
reliance on causal chain).
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crop production would take place in areas near them, the court concluded
that the plaintiffs had "not demonstrated such a geographical nexus to any
asserted environmental injury. "382 Accordingly, the court held that the
plaintiffs had failed to establish an injury to their interests, which is a
necessary requirement for standing, and therefore did not have standing to
sue. 383
2. Judge Buckley's Concurring Opinion

Judge Buckley concurred in the result, but not with the reasoning of the
majority.384 Agreeing with the dissent that the majority's opinion "imposes an
unduly heavy burden on appellants," Judge Buckley argued that the court's
opinion would require plaintiffs to perform the research expected of the
government in writing an EIS simply to meet the four-part standing test. 385
"Quite simply, the court now requires that a litigant be able to establish the
nature and likelihood of the environmental injury that it is the purpose of an
environmental impact statement to identify. We had it essentially right in
City of Los Angeies."386 Judge Buckley warned that "the court has adopted
new criteria for the establishment of standing in NEPA cases that will erode
the effectiveness of one of the most important environmental measures of
the past generation. "387 Because the plaintiffs "failed to establish the
necessary 'nexus' between the tax credit and the injuries they foresee,"
Judge Buckley concurred with "regret" in the result. 388

3. Judge Rogers's Dissenting Opinion
Judge Rogers's dissenting opinion, which was joined by Chief Judge
Edwards and Judges Wald and Tatel, argued that the majority's new test for
standing in procedural rights cases "imposes so heavy an evidentiary burden
on appellants to establish standing that it will be virtually impossible to
bring a NEPA challenge to rulemakings with diffuse impacts. "389 Judge
Rogers criticized the majority's standard for virtually requiring plaintiffs to
prepare an EIS, and for ignoring how preparation of an EIS might lead an
agency to change its policies. 39o Instead of the majority's test, Judge Rogers
382 Florida Audubon, 94 F.3d at 668; see also Kalen, supra note 375, at 48 (discussing
plaintiffs inability to establish geographical nexus); Nelson, supra note 32, at 272 (same); Orr,
supra note 151 at 391 (same).
383 Florida Audubon, 94 F.3d at 668; see also Kalen, supra note 375 at 48 (discussing court's
holding); Orr, supra note 151, at 391 (same).
384 Florida Audubon, 94 F.3d at 672 (Buckley, J., concurring); see also Orr, supra note 151, at
391-92 (discussing Judge Buckley's concurrence).
385 Florida Audubon, 94 F.3d at 672 (Buckley, J., concurring).
386Id
387 Id; see also Orr, supra note 151, at 391-92.
388 Florida Audubon, 94 F.3d at 672 (Buckley, J., concurring); see also Orr, supra note 151, at

391-92.

389 Florida Audubon, 94 F.3d at 674 (Rogers, J., dissenting); see also Bimbach, supra note
316, at 323 (discussing dissent); Kalen, supra note 375, at 49-50 (same).
390 Florida Audubon, 94 F.3d at 674 (Rogers, J., dissenting); see also Nelson, supra note 31, at
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argued that the City of Los Angeles two-part standing test for NEPA
plaintiffs was consistent with Justice Scalia's statement in footnote seven of
Defenders that procedural rights cases are special, and that the plaintiffs in
this case had met the two-part test. 391
In evaluating whether the plaintiffs had met the requirement of injury in
fact, Judge Rogers's dissenting opinion concluded they "[had] demonstrated
concrete and particularized injury by establishing that they had a
'geographical nexus' to the threatened environmental injury."392 The
plaintiffs presented "voluminous evidence" that the tax credit would
encourage local farmers to abandon crop ,rotation to plant crops that
produce ethanol, that such monoculture would likely cause increased
erosion of their farm lands, and that soil erosion and water pollution
resulting from greater use of pesticides and fertilizer for crops producing
ethanol ingredients would harm wildlife habitats enjoyed by the plaintiffs.
Furthermore, plaintiff Diane Jensen presented evidence that the tax credit
would encourage farmers to use more pesticides and that such pesticides
would result in contamination of her groundwater and drinking water. 393
Judge Rogers also disagreed with the majority's conclusion that the
plaintiffs had not established an injury in fact because they had not
established that their injury was imminent. 394 She argued that the majority
had erred because they had ignored Justice Scalia's statement in footnote
seven of Defenders that a plaintiff in a procedural rights case is not required
to meet the normal standard of imrnediacy.395 Judge Rogers concluded that
the plaintiffs had demonstrated injury in fact and established standing
because they presented evidence demonstrating "a greater likelihood of a
localized impact where Ms. Jensen lives."396
D. The Ninth and Tenth Circuits Disagree with Florida Audubon
1. The Tenth Circuit Rejects Florida Audubon

In 1996, the Tenth Circuit in Committee to Save the Rio Hondo v.
Lucero (Rio Hondo)397 expressly disagreed with Honda Audubon's

"substantial probability" causation standard, and argued that the D.C.
Circuit's approach to causation was inconsistent with Defenders and
273 (criticizing Florida Audubon for essentially requiring plaintiffs to perfonn agency's role in
assessing environmental impacts); Orr, supra note 151, at 392 (same).
391 Florida Audubon, 94 F.3d at 674 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (discussing footnote seven of
Defenders); see also Kalen, supra note 375, at 49-50; Orr, supra note 151, at 392.
392 Florida Audubon, 94 F.3d at 677 (Rogers, J., dissenting); see also Birnbach, supra note
316, at 316; Kalen, supra note 375, at 50; Orr, supra note 151, at 392.
393 Florida Audubon, 94 F.3d at 677-78 (Rogers, J., dissenting); see also Birnbach, supra note
316, at 325.
394 Florida Audubon, 94 F.3d at 678 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (citing Wilderness Soc'y v. Griles,
824 F.2d 4, 18 (D.C. Cir. 1987)); see also Orr, supra note 151, at 392-93.
395 Florida Audubon, 94 F.3d at 678 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (discussing footnote seven of
Defenders); see also Orr, supra note 151, at 393.
396 Florida Audubon, 94 F.3d at 679 (Rogers, J., dissenting); Orr, supra note 151, at 393.
397 102 F.3d 445 (10th Cir. 1996).
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congressional intent underlying NEPA 398 The Rio Hondo court interpreted
Defenders as making it relatively easy for procedural rights plaintiffs to
achieve standing if they have a concrete iI\jury:
Although Defenders of Wildlife was an Endangered Species Act case, it has
important implications for standing in the National Environmental Policy Act
context. In Defenders of WildJife, the court explained that in the context of the
National Environmental Policy Act, litigants face few standing barriers where
an agency's procedural flaw results in concrete ir\iuries. 399

In particular, the Tenth Circuit observed that footnote seven in
Defenders relaxed the immediacy standard for procedural rights plaintiffs:
The Supreme Court has explained that in the context of a National
Environmental Policy Act claim, the litigant need not satisfy the requirement of
immediacy for purposes of ir\iury in fact because the federal project
complained of may not affect the concrete interest for several years; however,
the ir\iury in fact requirement certainly is met where the litigant establishes that
ir\iury to concrete interests is imminent. 400

The Tenth Circuit also concluded that the causation requirements in
Defenders for procedural rights plaintiffs are relatively relaxed as long as a
plaintiff has a concrete iI\jury:
In addition to establishing ir\iury in fact, a plaintiff must also establish

causation. To establish causation, a plaintiff must show its ir\iuries are fairly
traceable to the conduct complained of. In the context of a National
Emironmental Policy Act claim, the ir\iury is the increased risk of
environmental harm to concrete interests, and the conduct complained of is the
agency's failure to follow the National Environmental Policy Act's procedures.
To establish causation, a plaintiff need only show its increased risk is fairly
traceable to the agency's failure to comply with the National Environmental
Policy ACt. 401

The Rio Hondo court observed that the D.C. Circuit in Florida Audubon
had adopted a "somewhat different causation analysis" for NEPA claims

398 Id at 451-52; see also Birnbach, supra note 316, at 312, 327-30, 334, 336 (discussing the
Tenth Circuit's analysis of standing and NEPA in Rio Hondo); Kalen, supra note 375, at 50-53
(same); Sinor, supra note 240, at 881-S9 (same, and arguing that the Tenth Circuit has adopted
the best interpretation of footnote seven).
399 Rio Hondo, 102 F.3d at 447 n.2; see also Sinor, supra note 240, at 884-87 (arguing that the
Tenth Circuit in Rio Hondo clarified and simplified footnote seven of Defenders by focusing on
whether procedural error caused concrete iI\jury).
400 Rio Hondo, 102 F.3d at 449 n.4 (citing footnote seven of Defenders); see also Sinor, supra
note 240, at 885-S7 (discussing the Tenth Circuit's relaxed approach to immediacy in Rio

Hondo).
401 Rio Hondo, 102 F.3d at 451 (citing footnote seven of Defenders); see also Sinor, supra
note 240, at 884, 886 (discussing the Tenth Circuit's relaxed approach to causation in Rio
Hondo).
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than its test in the above quoted paragraph. 402 The Tenth Circuit contended
that the Florida Audubon "analysis appears to confuse the issue of the
likelihood of the harm, which is better addressed in the iIUury in fact prong
of the analysis, with its cause. "403 In detennining causation in a NEPA case,
the Tenth Circuit argued that the proper analysis is whether the alleged
agency failure to prepare an EIS in accordance with NEPA increases the risk
of harm to the plaintiff and not whether there is a substantial probability that
the action will actually harm the plaintiff:
Whether an increased risk will or will not occur due to the agency action
determines whether a plaintiff has suffered irtiury in fact, not causation.
Certainly, under the irtiury in fact prong, a plaintiff cannot merely allege that
some highly attenuated, fanciful environmental risk will result from the agency
decision; the risk must be actual, threatened or imminent. However, once the
plaintiff has established the likelihood of the increased risk for purposes of
irtiury in fact, to establish causation, as the Committee has here, the plaintiff
need only trace the risk of harm to the agency's alleged failure to follow the
National Environmental Policy Act's procedures. Under the National
Environmental Policy Act, an irtiury results not from the agency's decision, but
from the agency's uninfonned decisionmaking. The increased risk of adverse
environmental consequences is due to the agency's "failure substantively to
consider the environmental ramifications of its actions in accordance with
[NEPA]."404

The Rio Hondo court conduded that the burdensome evidentiary
requirements in the Florida Audubon "substantial probability" test for
standing were contrary to NEPA's intent to require federal agencies to
examine the environmental impacts of their actions:
To require that a plaintiff establish that the agency action will result in the very
impacts an environmental impact statement is meant to examine is contrary to
the spirit and purpose of the National Environmental Policy Act. The National
Environmental Policy Act was not intended to require the plaintiff to show with
certainty, or even with a substantial probability, the results of agency action;
those examinations are left to an environmental impact statement. To the
extent that the D. C. Circuit's standard requires a plaintiff to establish something

Rio Hondo, 102 F.3d at 451.
Id; see also Kalen, supra note 375, at 52-53. According to the Tenth Circuit, the risk-ofhann issue should be analyzed as one part of a two-part test in detennining whether there is an
iI\jury in fact:
402

403

(1) [T]he litigant must show that in making its decision without following the National
Environmental Policy Act's procedures, the agency created an increased risk of actual,
threatened or inuninent environmental hann; and (2) the litigant must show that the
increased risk of environmental hann iI\jures its concrete interests by demonstrating
either its geographical nexus to, or actual use of the site of the agency action.

Rio Hondo, 102 F.3d at 449; see also Birnbach, supra note 316, at 328--29.
404 Rio Hondo, 102 F.3d at 451-52 (quoting Catron County Bd. of Comm'rs v. United States
Fish & Wildlife Serv., 75 F.3d 1429, 1433 (10th Cir. 1996)).
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more than set out here, it is contrary to the intent and essence of the National
Environmental Policy Act and is, therefore, rejected. 405

2. The Ninth Circuit's Relaxed Approach to NEPA Standing Also Disagrees

with Florida Audubon

In 2003, the Ninth Circuit in Citizens for Better Forestry v. United States
Dept of Agriculture (Citizens for Better Forestry)406 explicitly rejected
Florida Audubon S standing test. 407 In the Ninth Circuit,
Environmental plaintiffs '''seeking to enforce a procedural requirement the
disregard of which could impair a separate concrete interest of theirs,' . . . can
establish standing 'without meeting all the normal standards for ...
immediacy.'" Rather, they "need only establish 'the reasonable probability of
the challenged action's threat to [their) concrete interest.'"408

Based on footnote seven of Defenders, the Ninth Circuit stated, "Once a
plaintiff has established an injury in fact under NEPA, the causation and
redressability requirements are relaxed. "409
Pursuant to the Ninth Circuit's broad approach to NEPA cases, a
federal district court in California in 2003 concluded that an environmental
assessment prepared by federal agencies, including the Department of
Energy, was inadequate because it did not disclose or consider the
significance of the environmental impacts of CO2 emissions. 410 The court
found that the plaintiffs had standing because they lived near the
transmission lines and power plants at issue, but did not specifically address
whether the plaintiffs had standing regarding their CO2 claim. Compared to
Judge Gould's subsequent concurring opinion in Covington, the district
court failed to address the more complex standing issues raised by global
pollution issues, especially whether injury to all is injury to none for
standing purposes. 411

405 Id at 452; see also Nelson, supra note 32, at 277-81 (arguing that Defenders did not
change standing requirements in NEPA cases, that Florida Audubon misinterpreted Defenders
in applying unnecessarily strict standing requirements in NEPA cases and arguing in favor of
relaxed standing in such cases).
406 341 F.3d 961 (9th Cir. 2003).
407 Id at 974.
408 Id at 972 (internal quotations omitted); see also Nelson, supra note 32, at 273-76
(discussing the Ninth Circuit's relaxed standing requirements in NEPA cases and comparing
them to the strict standing requirements of D.C. Circuit).
409 Citizens for Better Forestry, 341 F.3d at 975 (internal quotations and citations omitted);
see also Nelson, supra note 32, at 273-76 (discussing the Ninth Circuit's relaxed standing
requirements in NEPA cases and comparing them to the strict standing requirements of the D.C.
Circuit).
410 Border Power Plant Working Group v. Dep't of Energy, 260 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1028-29, 1033
(S.D. Cal. 2003). The environmental assessment evaluated the proposed issuance of presidential
permits and federal rights of way allowing two utilities to build electricity transmission lines to
connect new power plants in Mexico with the power grid in southern Ca1;fnrn;., TA
4ll Id at 1008-11.
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E The Standing Tests in the Ninth and Tenth Circuits are Closer to Footnote
Seven in Defenders and Congressional Intent for NEPA
The relaxed standing tests in the Ninth and Tenth Circuits for
procedural rights plaintiffs are closer to the spirit of footnote seven in
Defenders, which allows a plaintiff with a threatened concrete injury to
challenge an agency's failure to follow mandatory statutory procedures even
if there is no guarantee that correcting the procedural error will change the
substantive result,412 than are the demonstrable and substantial probability
components of the Florida Audubon test. 413 As suggested by both the Ninth
and Tenth Circuits, the fourth part of the standing test in Florida Audubonthat the plaintiff must demonstrate that the "challenged act is substantially
probable to cause the demonstrated particularized injury"414_is inconsistent
with at least the spirit of footnote seven in Defenders as well as Congress's
intent in NEPA to make agencies evaluate the environmental harms resulting
from their actions. 415 In footnote seven of Defenders, Justice Scalia
acknowledged that standing requirements are relatively easy to fulfill for a
plaintiff who is challenging an alleged procedural error by the government
that caused her a concrete injury: "There is this much truth to the assertion
that 'procedural rights' are special: The person who has been accorded a
procedural right to protect his concrete interests can assert that right
without meeting all the normal standards for redressability and
immediacy."416 The D.C. Circuit's "substantial probability" standard makes it
too difficult for NEPA plaintiffs who have concrete injuries to challenge an
412 See Buzbee, supra note 146, at 803 ("The lesson of Defenders' footnotes seven and eight
seemed to be that no certainty or even probability of changed outcomes is necessary when a
plaintiff with a threatened concrete interest complains of a procedural irregularity."); see also
Nelson, supra note 32, at 277-81 (arguing that Defenders did not change standing requirements
in NEPA cases and that Florida Audubon misinterpreted Defenders in applying unnecessarily
strict standing requirements in NEPA cases, and arguing in favor of relaxed standing in such
cases); infra notes 415-22 and accompanying text.
413 See Citizens for Better Forestry, 341 F.3d at 974 (rejecting defendant's argument that the
court should adopt Florida Auduboris test requiring "heightened standing scrutiny"); Birnbach,
supra note 316, at 315-13,323-36 (arguing that Florida Audubon is inconsistent with Defenders
in demanding more proof than necessary in determining causation and standing for procedural
rights plaintiffs); Nelson, supra note 32, at 278 ("Although the District of Columbia Circuit [in
Florida Audubon) viewed [Defenders) as altering iIijury-in-fact analysis for NEPA cases, the
dicta in [footnote seven of Defenders) suggests the Supreme Court did not intend to change
standing requirements in NEPA cases."); Sinor, supra note 240, at 886 (criticizing Florida
Audubon: "By adding a demonstrable iIijury requirement and refusing to relax the redressability
and causation requirements as suggested in footnote seven, the court made it substantially
more difficult for plaintiffs who challenge progranunatic decisions, or decisions with diffuse
impacts, to establish standing.").
414 Florida Audubon, 94 F.3d 658, 666 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc).
415 See Citizens for Better Forestry, 341 F.3d at 974 (noting the conflict between the Ninth
and D.C. Circuits); Birnbach, supra note 316, at 312-13,323-36 (arguing that Florida Audubon is
inconsistent with Defenders in demanding more proof than necessary in detennining causation
and standing for procedural rights plaintiffs); Sinor, supra note 240, at 886 (criticizing Florida
Audubon for making it "more difficult for plaintiffs who challenge progranunatic decisions, or
decisions with diffuse impacts, to establish standing").
416 Defenders, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992).
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agency's failure to prepare an EIS because it is usually uncertain whether a
revised EIS would change an agency's substantive decision to build a
project.4!7 The Florida Audubon court's analysis is inconsistent with over 20
years of NEPA precedent allowing plaintiffs with threatened concrete
injuries to challenge agencies' procedural errors without proof that fixing
the procedural errors will lead to a different result.418 By contrast, the Ninth
Circuit's test that "[o]nce a plaintiff has established an injury in fact under
NEPA, the causation and redressability requirements are relaxed," comes
much closer to the spirit of footnote seven and NEPA precedent.419
Furthermore, Florida Audubon's standing prerequisite that plaintiffs
collect substantial evidence proving that an agency action will harm them is
inconsistent with NEPA's statutory language, legislative history, and
purpose, as Congress properly assigned such research and evaluation to the
agency.420 NEPA requires an agency's environmental assessment to consider
all reasonable alternatives, even if an agency lacks the substantive authority
actually to implement or the jurisdiction to approve an alternative, including
those alternatives that would require congressionallegislation. 421 Thus, an
agency should consider pending legislative proposals to reduce GHGs as
reasonable alternatives that deserve some discussion in an EIS addressing
global warming. 422
In response to the dissent's argument that Congress intended to provide
a cause of action for plaintiffs asserting procedural errors under NEPA, at
least where the plaintiff is threatened with concrete harms from the
procedural error, the Florida Audubon majority inappropriately refused to
discuss the issue, stating "We, of course, do not concede--or even need to
address-the dissent's repeated suggestion that our analysis somehow
417

See Buzbee, supra note 146, at 803,808-10; Sinor, supra note 240, at 886.
See Buzbee, supra note 146, at 808-10 (interpreting NEPA precedent as not requiring a
plaintiff with concrete iIijury to prove that remedying procedural errors will change the
substantive result).
419 Citizens for Better Forestry, 341 F.3d at 975 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
420 See Nelson, supra note 32, at 273; supra notes 415-419 and accompanying text.
421 See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(c) (2004) ("[A)gencies shall ... [i)nclude reasonable alternatives
not within the jurisdiction of the lead agency."); Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458
F.2d 827, 833-37 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (holding that the Secretary of the Interior must consider
reasonable alternatives to a proposal even if the agency or government lacks authority to
implement them, and that reasonable alternatives may require consideration of actions that
would require Congress to pass new legislation); Welch v. United States Air Force, 249 F. Supp.
2d 797, 833 (N.D. Tex. 2003) (same, quoting Morton), vacated by Davis Mtns. Trans-Pecos
Heritage Ass'n v. F.A.A., 2004 WL 2295986 (5th Cir., Oct. 12, 2004) (unreported opinion); Nat'!
Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 235 F. Supp. 2d 1143, 1154 (W.D. Wash. 2002)
(same, quoting Morton); Jason J. Czamezki, Comment, Defining the Project Pwpose Under
NEPA: Promoting Consideration of ViabJe EIS Alternatives, 70 U. Cm. L. REV. 599, 602 (2003)
(discussing Morton). See generally id at 599-618 (discussing the conflicting views of agency
authority to interpret the range of alternatives narrowly or broadly, and arguing that courts
should require agencies to adopt a broad view of alternatives to promote the statute's goal of
informed public choice).
422 See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25 (2004) (outlining the scope of an EIS). One such legislative
proposal is the Climate Stewardship Act of 2003, S. 139, 108th Cong., 1st Sess. (2003) (proposing
reduced U.S. emissions of six GHGs to 2000 levels by 2010 and then to 1990 levels beginning in
2016).
418

HeinOnline -- 35 Envtl. L. 61 2005

62

ENVIRONMENTAL LA W

[Vol. 35:1

violates 'Congress's determination' to provide a private cause of action to
individuals alleging some procedural lapse ... as Congress did not expressly
create this right in NEPA "423 The Florida Audubon dissenters correctly
observed that "[t]he causation inquiry in a NEPA case, however, must be
conducted in light of the procedural injury that the statute creates. "424
Quoting Justice Kennedy's crucial concurring opinion in Defenders, which
observed that "Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate
chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where none
existed before," the Florida Audubon dissenters responded that "the nature
of the causation inquiry is shaped by the procedural right asserted under
NEPA "425 Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit in Rio Hondo recognized that the
appropriate question in determining causation and traceability is whether an
agency's failure to prepare an EIS in accordance with NEPA increases the
risk of harm to the plaintiff from unstudied environmental consequences,
and not whether there is a substantial probability that the action will
actually harm the plaintiff.426
Returning to the facts in City of Los Angeles, the court in that case
properly found standing because NRDC had shown there was a "reasonable
likelihood" that requiring the agency to prepare an EIS could lead the agency
to a "different conclusion."427 First, the appropriate causation standard is
whether there is "some likelihood" that preparing an EIS would influence the
ultimate decision.428 Second, the proper redressability standard is not
whether changing the CAFE decision would reduce global warming, but
whether "an EIS would redress its asserted injury, i.e., that any serious
effects in global warming will not be overlooked. "429 Because the proof
required of a plaintiff for standing in a procedural rights case should be less
than the evidence demanded of a plaintiff to prove that the agency's
substantive decision was arbitrary and capricious when it ignored significant
environmental impacts, the majority in City of Los Angeles appropriately
rejected Judge D.H. Ginsburg's demand that the plaintiffs prove that the
agency's one mpg change in gas mileage would cause global warming that
would actually harm them. The City of Los Angeles majority was correct in
noting that this stringent approach to causation would unreasonably
preclude virtually all complex environmental claims, including global
423

Florida Audubon 94 F.3d 658, 665 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc).
Id at 674 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
425 Id at 674-75 (emphasis added and citation omitted) (citing Idaho Conservation League v.
Mumma, 956 F.2d 1508, 1516 (9th Cir. 1992), for the proposition that "[t]he standing
examination ... must focus on the likelihood that the defendant's action will i.njure the plaintiff
in the sense contemplated by CongresS'); see Buzbee, supra note 146, at 813.
426 Rio Hondo, 102 F.3d at 451-52; see Birnbach, supra note 316, at 329-30 (paraphrasing the
holding in Rio Hondo and noting its inconsistency with Florida Audubon); Kalen, supra note
375, at 52-53 (same).
427 City of Los Angeles, 912 F.2d at 497; see Hodas, supra note 64, at 475 (paraphrasing the
City ofLos Angeles holding).
428 City of Los Angeles, 912 F.2d at 498; see Hodas, supra note 64, at 475-76 (discussing the
"some likelihood" standard of causation in the context of City ofLos Angeles).
429 City of Los Angeles, 912 F.2d at 499; see Hodas, supra note 64, at 476 (discussing City of
Los Angeles and noting the appropriate redressability standard).
424
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pollution and warming issues, because, although the scientific evidence that
GHGs cause global warming is strong, it is difficult to prove how any single
source or factor contributes to the total harm. 430 As implied by the dissenters
in Flon'da Audubon, as well as the Tenth Circuit in Rio Hondo, the
demonstrable and substantial probability parts of the majority's four-part
standing test inappropriately confused standing with substance by requiring
plaintiffs to research and produce their own EIS merely to obtain standing to
allege that the government should have prepared an EIS.431 Under the
relaxed causation and redressability requirements in footnote seven of
Defenders and NEPA's goal of informed decision making by agencies, it is
enough for plaintiffs to have standing that NHTSA's proper evaluation of
those harms in an EIS might have changed the agency's policies and actions
or informed the public of significant environmental impacts, and that a
proper evaluation could reasonably reduce harm to the plaintiffs in the
future. 432
VI. IN THE CLEAN AIR ACT, CONGRESS HAs NOT CLEARLY AUTHORIZED
REGULATION OF OR CITIZEN SUITS INVOLVING GLOBAL WARMING

Courts and commentators have recognized that whether a plaintiff has
standing depends to a significant extent on whether Congress has intended
to authorize suits for a particular type of irUury or harm by conferring a
cause of action in a statute. 433 In his concurring opinion in Defenders, Justice
Kennedy argued that "Congress has the power to derme irUuries ... [and]
articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy
where none existed before. "434 In the 1998 Akins decision, the Court

430 See Hodas, supra note 64, at 475 (discussing Judge D.H. Ginsburg's dissenting opinion in
City ofLos AngeJes).
431 See Rio Hondo, 102 F.3d at 451-52; Florida Audubon, 94 F.3d at 674 (Rogers, J.,
dissenting); supra notes 389-90, 403-04, and accompanying text.
432 See Hodas, supra note 64, at 475 (discussing Judge D.H. Ginsburg's dissenting opinion in
City ofLos AngeJes).
433 See Covington, 358 F.3d 626, 653 n.9 (9th Cir. 2004) (Gould, J., concurring) (citing
sources). One commentator has explained,
Through the process of statutory enactment, the legislature can make legally
cognizable forms of iI\jury that the Court previously would have considered unduly
abstract. ...
Once the legislature has declared a fonn of iI\jury legally cognizable!,] ... the Court's
power and authority to decline to recognize that fonn of iI\jury is severely limited....
Courts should also defer to legislative determinations of causal relationships.
3 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 16.8 (4th ed. 2002); see also 1
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 397 (3d ed. 2000) ("[T]here is good reason
to afford Congress a wide berth in specifying ... new forms of 'iI\jury. '"); Buzbee, supra note
146, at 767 (arguing that Congress should have the power to defme iI\jury); Jerry L. Mashaw,
"Rights" in the Federal Administrative State, 92 YALE L.J. 1129, 1168 (1983) (discussing the role
of a statutory scheme in determining standing); Cass R. Sunstein, Standing hUuries, 1993 SUP.
CT. REV. 37, 58 (1994) (arguing that courts should defer to congressional defmition of iI\jury).
434 Defenders, 504 U.S. 555, 580 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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appeared to follow Justice Kennedy's approach when it stated that the
statute at issue "[sought] to protect individuals such as respondents from the
kind of harm they say they have suffered."435 Following Justice Kennedy's
approach, federal courts of appeals decisions have emphasized whether
Congress intended in a statute to protect potential plaintiffs from the types
of iIUuries at issue in the case. 436 Thus, because Congress had explicitly
authorized citizen suits for violations of both RCRA437 and the CAA,438 the
Covington court concluded that the Covingtons had standing.439
Accordingly, in deciding whether any plaintiff could have standing
under the CAA to sue EPA to regulate GHGs, a crucial issue is whether
Congress intended to give EPA the authority to regulate GHGs under the
CAA and whether it intended to allow citizens to sue the agency concerning
such issues. Although EPA during the Clinton Administration had suggested
that the CAA provides it with some authority to regulate GHGs, in 2003,
EPA's then-General Counsel Robert Fabricant concluded in a memorandum
that Congress specifically intended to preclude EPA from regulating GHGs
under the CAA.440 If the Fabricant Memorandum is correct, then any suit
seeking to compel EPA to regulate GHGs must fail because it would be
outside the statute's zone of interests for standing. 441
Gregory B. Foote, an EPA attorney writing in his private capacity and
not on behalf of the agency, has argued in a recent article, however, that
EPA has a duty to consider significant unregulated pollutants, including CO2
and other GHGs, when it reviews proposed permits for new power plants
under the CAA's New Source Review (NSR) program even if the Fabricant
Memorandum is correct that EPA has no direct authority to regulate them.442
If Foote is correct, then EPA would have a duty to consider GHGs during the
NSR process, and standing would be possible. If EPA has a duty to consider
GHGs as part of the NSR permit process, a plaintiff who is "adversely
affected or aggrieved by agency action within meaning of a relevant
statute"443 could sue under the APA to determine whether the agency's
approach to regulation is arbitrary and capricious. 444
435 Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 22 (1998); COvington, 358 F.3d at 651 (Gould, J., concurring)
(discussing Akins).
436 See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 156 (4th
Cir. 2000) (en banc) (observing that the plaintiff "alleged precisely those types of il\iuries that
Congress intended to prevent"); Baur v. Veneman, 352 F.3d 625,635 (2d Cir. 2003) ("[T]here is a
tight connection between the type of il\iury which [the plaintiff] alleges and the fundamental
goals of the statutes which he sues under-reinforcing [his] claim of cognizable il\iury.").
437 See 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (2000) (authorizing citizens to sue defendants violating RCRA).
438 See id § 7604(a)(1) (authorizing citizens to sue defendants violating the CAA).
439 Covington, 358 F.3d at 638 n.13.
440 See infra notes 458-66 and accompanying text.
441 See infra Part VI.D.l.
442 See generaUy Foote, supra note 50 at 10,662-64 ("[T]he CAA requires that NSR permit
decisions consider environmental impacts of unregulated pollutants such as CO 2,"); infra Part
VI.C.
443 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2000) ("A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or
adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled
to judicial review thereof. ").
444 Id § 706(2)(A) (2000) (granting courts the authority to set aside agency action that is
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eAA to Regulate GHGs?

A case currently pending before the D.C. Circuit raises the important
question of whether EPA has a duty pursuant to the CAA to regulate
GHGs. 445 On October 20, 1999, the International Center for Technology
Assessment (lCTA) and several other organizations petitioned EPA to
regulate CO 2 and other GHGs from new motor vehicles and engines under
section 202(a)(1) of the CAA.446 The petitioners claimed that these emissions
are significantly contributing to global climate change and that EPA has a
duty to regulate them under section 202(a) of the CAA and perhaps other
sections of the Act as well. 447 ICTA relied in large part on an April 10, 1998
memorandum entitled "EPA's Authority to Regulate Pollutants Emitted by
Electric Power Generation Sources" written by then-EPA General Counsel
Jonathan Z. Cannon to EPA Administrator Carol Browner (Cannon
Memorandum).448 At a March 11, 1998 hearing by the House Appropriations
Committee on the 1999 Fiscal Year VA-HUD Appropriations bill, in response
to a question by Congressman DeLay regarding whether EPA had authority
to regulate CO2 under the CAA, EPA Administrator Carol Browner suggested
that the CAA gives EPA authority to regulate CO 2, and agreed to have the
agency provide a legal opinion on the matter. 449 The Cannon Memorandum
asserts that CO2 fits within the definition of "air pollutant" under CAA
section 302(g),450 implying that EPA has the authority to regulate CO2 ,
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law").
445 See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
446 Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed Reg. 52,922,
52,922-23 (Sept. 8, 2003). The petitioners asked the EPA to regulate carbon dioxide, methane,
nitrous oxide, and hydrofluorocarbon (HFCs) emissions from new motor vehicles and engines.
Id
447 Id at 52,923.
448 Memorandwn from Jonathan Z. Cannon, EPA General Counsel, to Carol M. Browner,
EPA Administrator, EPA's Authority to Regulate Emissions by Electric Power Generation
Sources
(April
10,
1998)
[hereinafter Cannon MemorandwnJ,
available at
http://www.law.wnaryland.eduifacultyibpercival/casebookldocwnentslEPAC02memol.pdf;
Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. at 52,923
(discussing the Cannon Memorandwn); Fabricant Memorandwn, supra note 40, at 1-11
(concluding that EPA does not have authority to regulate CO, and rejecting the Cannon
Memorandwn as no longer representing the views of EPA); Reitze, supra note 39, at 10,258
(discussing the Cannon Memorandwn).
449 See Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development, and
Independent Agencies Appropriations for 1999: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House
Conun. on Appropriations, 105th Congo 200 (1998) (testimony of Carol Browner, Administrator,
United States Environmental Protection Agency) (opining that the CAA gives EPA "broad
authority" to regulate CO, emissions and agreeing to provide Senator DeLay with a legal opinion
on the matter-the Cannon Memorandwn); see also Bugnion & Reiner, supra note 111, at 499
(discussing EPA Administrator Carol Browner's 1998 congressional subcommittee testimony on
EPA's authority to regulate CO,); Fabricant Memorandwn, supra note 40, at 2 (same).
450 See Cannon Memorandwn, supra note 448, (discussing CAA § 302(g)); Bugnion & Reiner,
supra note 111, at 502-03 nn.65-57 (same); Reitze, supra note 39, at 10,257-58 (same). CAA §
302(g) states,
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However, the memorandum also states that the agency had not yet taken the
requisite procedural steps to find that CO2 had harmful impacts on public
health, public welfare, or the environment, a finding necessary for EPA to
regulate it as a pollutant. 451 On October 6, 1999, Gary S. Guzy, who
succeeded Cannon as General Counsel of EPA, testified before a House
subcommittee that he agreed with the Cannon Memorandum, but the agency
still took no steps to regulate CO2.452
Relying on the Cannon Memorandum's interpretation of the term "air
pollutant" in section 302(g), the ICTA petition contends that if CO2 is an air
pollutant then other significant GHGs should also meet the CAA's definition
of "air pollutant" under section 302(g).453 If GHGs are air pollutants as
defined in the CAA, the ICTA petition argues that EPA has a mandatory duty
to regulate motor vehicles emitting GHGs under CAA section 202(a).454
Section 202(a)(1) provides that
the Administrator [of EPA] shall by regulation prescribe ... in accordance with
the provisions of [section 202], standards applicable to the emission of any air
pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicle. .. , which in his
judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare. 455

The tenn "air pollutant" means any air pollution agent or combination of such agents,
including any physical, chemical, biological [or] radioactive ... substance or matter
which is emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air. Such tenn includes any
precursors to the fonnation of any air pollutant, to the extent that the Administrator has
identified such precursor or precursors for the particular purpose for which the tenn 'air
pollutant' is used.
42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) (2004).
451 See Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. at 52,923
(discussing the Cannon Memorandum and EPA's authority to regulate GHGs under CAA §
302(g)); Bugnion & Reiner, supra note 111, at 502~3 (same); Fabricant Memorandum, supra
note 40, at 1-2, 9-11 (same); Reitze, supra note 39, at 10,257-58 (same).
452 See Is CO2 a Pollutant and Does EPA Have the Power to Regulate It?: Joint Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on National Economic Growth, Natural Resources, and Regulatory
Affairs of the House Comm. on Govemment Reform and the Subcomm. on Energy and
Environment of the House Comm. on Science, 106th Congo 19 (1999) (testimony of Gary S.
Guzy, General Counsel, EPA) ("The opinion of my predecessor [Jonathan Z. Cannon] simply
clarifies-and I endorse this opinion-that CO, is in the class of compounds that could be
subject to several of the Clean Air Act's regulatory approaches."), available at
http://www.house.gov/science/guzy_100699.htm;Reitze.supranote39.at1O.258-59 (discussing
Guzy's congressional testimony) ..
453 See Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. at 52,923
(discussing lCTA petition); Bugnion & Reiner, supra note lll, at 520-21 (same); Fabricant
Memorandum, supra note 40, at 1-2, 9-11 (same); Reitze, supra note 39, at 10,259 (same); id at
10,257 ("If CO, is a pollutant under the CAA, then other GHGs presumably also would be
pollutants. ").
454 See Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. at 52,923
(discussing lCTA petition); Bugnion & Reiner, supra note 111, at 520-21 (same); Fabricant
Memorandum, supra note 40, at 1-2, 9-11 (same); Reitze, supra note 39, at 10,259 (same).
455 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(I) (2000).
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Despite the broad definition of "air pollutant" in CAA section 302(g), some
commentators argue that the legislative history of the 1990 Amendments to
the CAA strongly suggests that Congress did not want EPA to regulate GHGs
because it considered bills specifically including regulation of GHGs, but did
not adopt any language requiring EPA to regulate CO2 or other GHGS.456 If
Congress considers but rejects explicit statutory language authorizing an
agency to regulate a subject, the Supreme Court usually declines to interpret
a silent or ambiguous statute as nevertheless implicitly delegating such
authority.457
For almost four years, EPA delayed ruling on the ICTA petition. In 2001,
Administrator Browner and General Counsel Guzy, both Democratic
appointees, resigned, and President George W. Bush, a Republican,
announced his opposition to the Kyoto Protocol and appointed a new
leaderShip team at EPA. On August 28,2003, Robert E. Fabricant, then-EPA
General Counsel, wrote a memorandum entitled "EPA's Authority to Impose
Mandatory Controls to Address Global Climate Change Under the Clean Air
Act" to then-Acting EPA Administrator Marianne L. Horinko (Fabricant
Memorandum) that discussed and rejected the Cannon Memorandum as no
longer representing the views of EPA. 456 Even if the Cannon analysis had
been correct when it was issued in 1998, the Fabricant Memorandum
concluded that the Cannon Memorandum was no longer valid in light of the
Supreme Court's 2000 decision in Food and Drug Administration v. Brown &
WiJljamson Tobacco COIp. (Brown & Williamson).459 The Court in Brown &
WiJljamson held that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) did not have
authority under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA)460 to regulate
tobacco products despite broad statutory language appearing to give FDA
456 See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, S. 1630, 101st Congo § 206 (1990) (proposing
regulation of CO. from motor vehicle tailpipes); id § 601 (proposing "Stratospheric Ozone and
Climate Protection Act" that would have required the EPA to reduce GHGs to the maximum
extent possible); S. REP. No. 101-228, at 385 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.CAN. 3385, 3770
(discussing proposed "Stratospheric Ozone and Climate Protection Act" that would have
required the EPA to reduce GHGs to the maximum extent possible); 136 CONGo REC. 3701
(statement of Sen. Gore) (discussing elimination of proposed tailpipe emission standard from
the proposed amendments); Bugnion & Reiner, supra note 111, at 512-14 (arguing that the CAA
does not allow EPA to regulate GHGs because in passing the 1990 Amendments, Congress
considered but ultimately rejected regulation of GHGs by removing all proposed references to
regulating CO. or other GHGs); Reitze, supra note 39, at 10258-59 (same).
457 See lmmigration & Naturalization Servo v. Cardozo-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 442-43 (1987)
("Few principles of statutory construction are more compelling than the proposition that
Congress does not intend sub silentio to enact statutory language that it has earlier discarded. ");
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving, 419 U.S. 186, 200 (1974) (stating that congressional rejection of a
statute "strongly militates against a judgment that Congress intended a result that it expressly
declined to enact"); Amoco Oil Co. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 501 F.2d 722, 733 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(stating that a conference committee's decision to eliminate proposed authority "was a
deliberated one and was meant to have significance"); Bugnion & Reiner, supra note Ill, at 513
(discussing the principle of statutory construction that courts will not interpret a statute to
authorize certain regulation if Congress explicitly considered proposed language authorizing
such regulation, but did not include that language when it enacted statute).
456 Fabricant Memorandum, supra note 40.
459 529 U.S. 120 (2000); see Fabricant Memorandum, supra note 40, at 4.
460 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 21 U.S.C. § 301-399 (2000).
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the discretion to regulate all "drugs" and "devices." The Court did not extend
FDA's regulatory authority because it was unreasonable to assume that
Congress wanted FDA to impose regulations having drastic consequences on
the national economy without explicit congressional authorization. 461
Although some broad language in the CAA might suggest that EPA has
the authority to regulate CO2 and other GHGs, relying on the Court's
approach in Brown & Williamson, the Fabricant Memorandum concluded
that any attempt by EPA to regulate GHGs by limiting the burning of fossil
fuels is a momentous actionwith potentially huge economic consequences
that can be justified only if there is specific evidence that Congress wanted
EPA to regulate such a broad area of the economy.462 In reviewing the
history of the CAA and especially the legislative history of the 1990
Amendments to the CAA, the Fabricant Memorandum determined that
Congress did not intend to give EPA the authority to regulate CO2 or other
GHGs; instead, Congress simply wanted the agency to conduct research
regarding global warming so that Congress could decide in the future
whether or how to regulate GHGS.463 The Fabricant Memorandum also
argued that the Cannon Memorandum misread EPA's authority to regulate
CO2 and other GHGs under CAA section 302(g) by focusing on the general
term "air pollutant," but ignoring that section's use of the arguably narrower
term "air pollution agent."464 The Fabricant Memorandum determined that
CO 2 and other GHGs are not "agents" of air pollution subject to EPA
regulation under the CAA.465 The Fabricant Memorandum concluded that the
Cannon Memorandum and the statements by Mr. Guzy agreeing with the
Cannon Memorandum "no longer represent the views of EPA's General
Counsel. "466
On September 8,2003, EPA published in the Federal Register its Notice
of Denial of lCTA's petition for rulemaking. 467 In its Notice of Denial, EPA
largely relied on the arguments in the Fabricant Memorandum that EPA
lacked authority to regulate CO2 in light of the history of the CAA and the

461

Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 160-161; see Fabricant Memorandum, supra note 40, at

9.

462 Fabricant Memorandum, supra note 40, at 4-1l.
463 Id

464 Id at 10-11 n.9. Late in the publication process for this Article, a student note was
published arguing that CO, is an "air pollutant" as dermed in CAA §§ 302(g) and 103(g), 42
U.S.C. §§ 7602 (g), 7403(g) (2000), and therefore, that the Fabricant Memorandum's conclusion
that CO, is not an "air pollutant" under the Act is wrong. The note also argues that the Fabricant
Memorandum's conclusion that CO, is not an "air pollutant" under the Act clearly contradicts
congressional intent in §§ 302(g) and 103(g) and therefore is not entitled to Chevron deference.
Nicholle Winters, Note, Carbon Dioxide: A Pollutant in the Air; But Is the EPA Correct that It Is
Not an ~ Pollutant n? 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1996 (2004). More specifically, the note states that
"[t]he argument that Brown & Williamson mandates the EPA to disavow the authority to
regulate carbon dioxide is not persuasive," concluding that the Fabricant Memorandum merits
"little deference" even under a Skidmore analysis. Id at 2018, 2024.
465 Fabricant Memorandum, supra note 40, at 10-11 n.9.
466Id

See generally Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed.
Reg. 52,922 (Sept. 8, 2003) (denying petition to regulate CO, under the CAA).
467
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Brown & Williamson decision.468 The Notice stated, "The General Counsel's
opinion [the Fabricant Memorandum] is adopted as the position of the
Agency for purposes of deciding this petition and for all other relevant
purposes under the CAA."469
Because of the economic importance of fossil fuels to the U.S.
economy, EPA concluded, as had the Fabricant Memorandum,470 that the
Brown & Williamson approach to interpreting the scope of agency authority
applies because it is unlikely that Congress wanted EPA to regulate GHGs
without express congressional approval. 471 Citing the Fabricant
Memorandum in a footnote,472 the agency also concluded that GHGs were
not "air pollution agents" as defined by section 302(g) of the CAA because
EPA lacks the authority to regulate GHGs, and, therefore GHGs were not air
pollution as defined in the statute.473 Furthermore, EPA determined that any
468 Id at 52,924-25, 52,928 (discussing Brown & Williamson as interpreted by the Fabricant
Memorandum).
469 Id at 52,925.
470 See Fabricant Memorandum, supra note 40, at 9-10 (concluding in light of Brown &
Williamson that EPA does not have authority to regulate GHGs because fossil fuels are such an
important part of the U.S. economy that it is unlikely Congress wanted to provide authority to
regulate without explicit approval).
471 EPA argued,
It is hard to imagine any issue in the environmental area having greater "economic
and political significance" than regulation of activities that might lead to global climate
change. Virtually every sector of the U.S. economy is either directly or indirectly a source
of GHG emissions, and the countries of the world are involved in Scientific, technical,
and political-level discussions about climate change. We believe, in fact, that an effort to
impose controls on U.S. GHG emissions would have far greater economic and political
implications than FDA's attempt to regulate tobacco.

In light of Congress' attention to the issue of global climate change, and the absence
of any direct or even indirect indication that Congress intended to authorize regulation
under the CAA to address global climate change, it is unreasonable to conclude that the
CAA provides the Agency with such authority. An administrative agency properly awaits
congressional direction before addressing a fundamental policy issue such as global
climate change, instead of searching for authority in an existing statute that was not
designed or enacted to deal with the issue. We thus conclude that the CAA does not
authorize regulation to address concerns about global climate change.
It follows from this conclusion, that GHGs, as such, are not air pollutants under the
CAA's regulatory provisions, including sections 108, 109, 111, 112 and 202.
Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. at 52,928; see also
Fabricant Memorandum, supra note 40, at 9-10.
472 See Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. at 52,929
n.3 ("As General Counsel Fabricant notes in his memorandum, a substance does not meet the
CAA definition of 'air pollutant' simply because it is a 'physical, chemical, biological, radioactive
* * * substance or matter which is emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air.' It must also
be an 'air pollution agent.'").
473 EPA explained,
CAA authorization to regulate is generally based on a finding that an air pollutant causes
or contributes to air pollution that may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public
health or welfare. CAA section 302(g) defines "air pollutant" as "any air pollution agent
or combination of such agents, including any physical, chemical, biological, radioactive
* * * substance or matter which is emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air. Such
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effort to regulate CO2 from motor vehicles would interfere with the authority
of the Department of Transportation (DOT) to regulate fuel economy
standards. 474 Even if EPA had authority to regulate vehicle emissions under
CAA section 202, EPA argued that such authority was discretionary and did
not mandate that the agency regulate GHGS.475 Finally, EPA endorsed the
Bush Administration's approach of delaying regulation of GHGs while it
conducted further research on the causes of global warming and the best
strategies for reducing such emissions at reasonable cost.476 EPA also
argued that voluntary industry programs to reduce GHGs were more cost
effective than the mandatory regulation sought by ICTA. 477

term includes any precursors to the formation of any air pollutant[.J" The root of the
defInition indicates that for a substance to be an "air pollutant," it must be an "agent" of
"air pollution." Because EPA lacks CAA regulatory authority to address global climate
change, the term "air pollution" as used in the regulatory provisions cannot be
interpreted to encompass global climate change. Thus, CO2 and other GHGs are not
"agents" of air pollution and do not satisfy the CAA section 302(g) defInition of "air
pollutant" for purposes of those provisions. We reserve judgment on whether GHGs
would meet the CAA defInition of "air pollutant" for regulatory purposes were they
subject to regulation under the CAA for global climate change purposes.
Id at 52,928-29 (footnote omitted).
474 EPA argued,

Congress has already created a detailed set of mandatory standards governing the fuel
economy of cars and light duty trucks, and has authorized DOT-not EPA-to
implement those standards
... [I]n light of the language, history, structure and context of the CAA and Congress'
decision to give DOT authority to regulate fuel economy under [the CAFE program], it is
clear that EPA does not have authority to regulate motor vehicle emissions of CO. and
other GHGs under the CAA.
Id at 52,929.
475 EPA explained,
In any event, the CAA provision authorizing regulation of motor vehicle emissions does

not impose a mandatory duty on the Administrator to exercise her judgment. Instead,
section 202(a)(I) provides the Administrator with discretionary authority to address
emissions in addition to those addressed by other section 202 provisions . . . . While
section 202(a)(l) uses the word "shall," it does not require the Administrator to act by a
specifIed deadline and it conditions authority to act on a discretionary exercise of the
Administrator's judgment regarding whether motor vehicle emissions cause or
contribute to air pollution that may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health
or welfare.
Id

476 EPA stated,
We do not believe ... that it would be either effective or appropriate for EPA to establish
GHG standards for motor vehicles at this time. As described in detail below, the
President has laid out a comprehensive approach to climate change that calls for nearterm voluntary actions and incentives along with programs aimed at reducing scientifIc
uncertainties and encouraging technological development so that the government may
effectively and efficiently address the climate change issue over the long term.
Id at 52,929-30.
477 Id at 52,931-33.
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B. Petition Challenging Denial ofPetition

In October 2003, 12 states, with Massachusetts as lead petitioner, five
governmental entities and 14 environmental organizations filed eight
separate but now consolidated petitions in the D.C. Circuit challenging both
EPA's denial of the ICTA petition to regulate GHGs and the Fabricant
Memorandum. 478 The D.C. Circuit has scheduled oral argument for April 8,
2005. 479 On June 22, 2004, the petitioners filed a brief presenting their
arguments.480
To briefly summarize their arguments, the petitioners argue that section
202(a)(I) of the CAA unambiguously authorizes the Administrator to
promulgate motor vehicle emissions standards for any air pollutant that he
determines may reasonably be anticipated to endanger the public health or
welfare. 481 By using the word "any," Congress demonstrated its intent to
delegate to EPA expansive authority to regulate all air pollutants causing
harms to "the public health or welfare."482 Section 302(h) specifically defines
"welfare" to include "effects on ... weather ... and climate. "483 Indeed, the
petitioners argue that EPA has acted unlawfully and arbitrarily in refusing to
regulate GHGs from motor vehicles because section 202(a)(l) uses the
mandatory term "shall" to require the EPA to regulate any pollutant causing
harms to the "public health or welfare. "484 The petitioners argue that nothing
in the CAA's text or legislative history demonstrates that Congress intended
to preclude EPA from regulating GHGs or the general subject of global
warming.485
The petitioners contend that Brown & Williamson does not apply to
regulation of GHGs because a substantial history of legislation demonstrates
Congress did not want FDA to prohibit all sales of tobacco, despite language
in the FDCA that could be read to authorize FDA to regulate and ban
tobacco as a dangerous drug; conversely, there is no similar evidence of
legislation prohibiting EPA from regulating GHGS.486 While for many years
the FDA stated that it had no authority to regulate tobacco and Congress
clearly relied on the FDA's disclaimer of regulatory authority, there is no
similar history of EPA denying authority to regulate GHGs; to the contrary,
EPA during the Clinton Administration had suggested that it had some
authority to regulate those gases.487 Furthermore, if the FDA had authority to
regulate tobacco it arguably would have a duty to ban it completely, but the
CAA would allow less drastic regulation of GHGs that would not decimate

478

Seesuprnnotes 41-44 and accompanying text.

479 Brief for Petitioners, supra note 41, at coverpage, 1.
480 fd.

at 68.

fd. at 15.
482 fd. (citing Dep't. of HUD v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 131 (2002) (noting that "the word 'any'

481

has an expansive meaning, that is, 'one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind'")).
483
484
485
486
487

fd.
fd. at 45.

See generally id. at 15-35.
See generally id. at 36--38.
See generally id.
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Fossil Fuel users.488 Finally, petitioners argue that the DOT's authority to
regulate vehicle mileage does not preclude EPA from regulating GHGs from
motor vehicles. 489
For the purposes of this Article, it is especially significant how the
petitioners sought to meet Article III standing requirements. The 12 states
and five government entities allege that the GHGs from vehicles are
increasing global warming and causing them injuries from "loss of stateowned property to rising sea-levels, including permanent losses from
inundation and periodic losses due to storm surge flooding," increased
emergency response costs and natural resource damages from flooding,
worsened ozone pollution resulting in increased regulatory costs, health
care costs and damage to natural resources, loss of water resources from
reduced snowpack, and increased wildfires. 490 The 14 environmental
organizations allege global warming causes their members to suffer harms
from aesthetic and recreational losses due to retreating glaciers, and adverse
health impacts from increased ozone and crop losses due to more extreme
weather events. 491 They allege these harms are redressable by a court order
requiring regulation of GHGs that would delay and reduce the harms from
global warming. 492
C. May EPA Regulate GHGs under the CAA s New Source Review Program?

Foote has argued in a recent article that EPA has a duty to consider
significant unregulated pollutants such as CO2 and other GHGs when it
reviews, pursuant to the CAA's NSR program, proposed permits for new
power plants, including fossil-fuel burning power plants, even if the
Fabricant Memorandum is correct that the agency may not directly regulate
them.493 The NSR permit requirement applies to "major new sources,"
including major modificiations, emitting a threshold level of an air pollutant
in a nonattainment area, or one emitting either 100 or 250 tons per year (tpy)
in an attainment area. 494 According to Foote, the NSR program requires EPA
or state permitting authorities to consider alternative fuels and processes, as
well as unregulated pollutants such as CO 2, when it determines what is the
best available control technology for new power plants; not just which
See generally id. at 37-38.
See generally id at 38-43.
Id at 2-3.
491 Id at 3-4.
492 Id at 4.
493 See Foote, supra note 50, at 10,643, 10,662-64 (proposing that EPA regulate CO, through
the program for issuing permits to new coal-burning power plants because EPA has authority to
regulate otherwise unregulated pollutants and consider alternative technologies in deciding
what is the best available technology).
494 See 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1) (2000) (defIning "major emitting facility"); 40 C.F.R. §§ 51.165,
52.21 (2004) (providing nonattainment and attairunent area NSR regulations); see also Foote,
supra note 50, at 10,644 (discussing the CAA's NSR program). Foote's article largely avoids the
more difficult question of when a "modifIed" existing source requires an NSR permit and
focuses on new sources. Id at 10,664. This Article will not address modifIed sources, but the
question of who has standing should be the same for both new and modifIed NSR sources.
488
489
490
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technology is best at reducing regulated pollutants such as sulfur dioxide. 495
Whether EPA or a state permitting agency has fulfilled its duty to consider
all appropriate information in evaluating a NSR permit is reviewable under
the APA's arbitrary and capricious standard. 496
There are two distinct NSR programs. First, the nonattainrnent area
NSR requirements (the NNSR program) in air quality regions that have failed
to attain the health-based national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS)
for criteria pollutants, e.g., ozone, are intended to facilitate states' meeting
the NAAQS.497 Pursuant to the NNSR program, each major new or modified
facility in a nonattainment area must achieve the lowest achievable
emissions rate (LAER), which requires "the most stringent emissions rate"
contained in any state's plan for "such class or category of source, unless the
owner or operator demonstrates it is not feasible. "498 To achieve attainment
as soon as possible, the CAA defines LAER more stringently than the "best
available control technology" (BACT) standard used in attainment areas. 499
In only very limited circumstances mayan applicant in a nonattainment area
avoid LAER for cost reasons. 5oo
Second, in areas that comply with the NAAQS, the CAA's "Prevention of
Significant Deterioration of Air Quality" (PSD) program requires
preconstruction review of all proposed major new or modified sources of air
pollutants to avoid degrading air quality to levels below the NAAQS.501 Under
the PSD program, a proposed major new facility must comply with BACT. 502
The CAA defines BACT for any major new facility as "an emission limitation
based on the maximum degree of [pollutant] reduction . . . which the
permitting authority, on a case-by-case basis, taking into account energy,
environmental, and economic impacts and other costs, determines is
achievable for [the) facility."503
For both PSD and NNSR permits, either EPA itself or a state authorized
to issue such permits must consider all technically available alternatives to
pollution control, not just those proposed by the applicant. 504 Although EPA
495 See Foote, supra note 50, at 10,650--67; see also In re North County Res. Recovery
Assocs., 2 E.AD. 229, 230, 1986 EPA App. LEXIS 14 (Adrn'r 1986) (concluding that EPA must
consider emissions of unregulated toxic pollutants raised by citizens in evaluating BACT).
496 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(a)(2); Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation v. Envtl. Prot. Agency
(Alaska), 540 U.S. 461, 496-97 (2004) (discussing EPA's duty to evaluate air pennits initially
approved by state environmental agency under APA's arbitrary and capricious standard).
497 42 U.s.C. § 7502(c)(l), (5) (2000).
498 Id § 7501(3) (deflning LAER); see id § 7503(a)(2) (requiring LAER for major new sources
in nonattainment areas).
499 Compare id § 7501(3) (deflning LAER), with id § 7479(3) (deflning BACT). See also
Foote, supra note 50, at 10,646-48 (comparing requirements of LAER and BACT, and concluding
LAER is more stringent).
500 Foote, supra note 50, at 10,648.
501 See 42 U.S.C. § 7470 (2000) (congressional declaration of purpose to prevent significant
deterioration of air quality); Alaska, 540 U.S. at 468 (discussing the PSD program).
502 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4) (2000); Alaska, 540 U.S. at 468, 484-485 (discussing BACT
requirements in PSD areas).
503 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (2000).
504 Foote, supra note 50, at 10,647; see Memorandum from John Calcagni, Director, Air
Quality Management Division, U.S. EPA, to EPA Regional Air Directors 4 (June 13, 1989)
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and state agencies conducting NSR review have often focused on "end of
stack" pollution controls, the statute and its legislative history demonstrate
that Congress wanted the NSR process to include evaluation of alternative
fuels or production techniques. 505 Furthermore, the "purposes" portion of
the PSD statute requires EPA or an authorized state to protect the public
health and welfare from any adverse effects that "may reasonably be
anticipated to occur from air pollutants" even after an area achieves
attainment. Foote argues that this provision requires EPA to consider the
impacts of all pollutants, including GHGs, and not just regulated
pollutants.506 EPA's Environmental Appeals Board (EAB), which consists of
three administrative law judges acting in lieu of the Administrator, has
interpreted the evaluation of "environmental impacts" in BACT cases to
include consideration of unregulated pollutants that are not "subject to
regulation" under PSD.507
Both the NNSR and PSD NSR programs require permitting agencies to
consider alternatives to a proposed new source, including technologies that
could reduce GHGs, although there are some differences between the two
types of NSR programs. 508 According to Foote, in PSD areas, a commenter
may have the burden of raising·a particular alternative to insure that the
permitting agency considers it. 509 By contrast, for NNSR permits, the
permitting agency probably has a duty to consider reasonable alternatives
even if no commenter raises them. 510
Foote argues that both EPA and a state NSR permitting agency have a
duty under the APA to provide a reasonable justification for their permitting
decisions, and that, in light of the requirements to consider unregulated
pollutants and reasonable alternative technologies, a reasoned decision
(discussing "core criteria" of any BACT analysis), available at http://www.epa.gov/Region7/
programs/artd/air/nsr/nsnnemosltopdawn.pdf.
505 See S. REP. No. 95-127, at 31 (1977) (authorizing pennitting agencies, in detennining
BACT, to consider "energy, environmental, and economic impacts" as well as community
concerns of the overall impact of the source on air quality); 123 CONGo REC. 18,742 (1977)
(documenting that Senate floor adoption of Up Amendment No. 387 added tenn "innovative fuel
combustion techniques" to "leave no doubt" that BACT review includes all feasible production
methods, including coal gasification); Foote, supra note 50, at 10,647-48 (describing the CAA
legislative history).
506 42 U.S.C. § 7470(1), (5) (2000); Foote, supra note 50, at 10648-49.
507 See In re Steel Dynamics, Inc., 9 E.A.D. 165, 189 (EAB 2000), available at
http://www.epagov/boarddeC/diskU/steeldyn.pdf(citing In re North County Resource Recovery
Associates, infra, as interpreting "statutory and regulatory def'mitions of BACT as requiring
consideration of environmental impacts"); In re Genesee Power Station, 4 E.A.D. 832, 848 1993
EPA App. LEXIS 23 (EAB 1993) (concluding BACT's def'mition allows "consideration of the
environmental consequences of choosing one control technology over another"); see also In re
North County Resource Recovery AssOciates, 2 E.AD. 229, 230, 1986 EPA App. LEXIS 14 (Adm'r
1986) (concluding EPA must consider emissions of unregulated toxic pollutants raised by
citizens in evaluating BACT); Foote, supra note 50, at 10,649-50 (discussing EAB decisions
requiring EPA to consider unregulated pollutants in conducting BACT analysis).
508 See Foote, supra note 50, at 10,650-51 (comparing the two programs).
509 See id (discussing the view that the commenter bears the burden of presenting
nonobvious alternatives).
510 See id (describing express NNSR provisions requiring states to justify construction of a
new pollution source).
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requires addressing GHGS. 511 In Alaska Department of Environmental
Conservation v. Environmental Protection Agency (Alaska),512 the Supreme
Court upheld EPA's authority to reject a state BACT permit and stop
construction of a major emitting facility approved by the state permitting
authority that EPA believed failed to consider reasonable alternative
technology.513 The Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation
(ADEC) had initially proposed selective catalytic reduction (SCR) as BACT
for a proposed facility, but ADEC ultimately required a less effective
pollution technology when the permit applicant complained that SCR was
too expensive. 514 In rejecting SCR as BACT, ADEC had ignored a letter from
EPA protesting that "elimination of SCR as BACT based on costeffectiveness grounds is not supported by the record and is clearly
erroneous. "515
Although the CAA provides states with considerable discretion in
issuing BACT permits, the Court concluded that two provisions in CAA give
EPA the authority to block construction of a major emitting facility if EPA
fmds that the state has failed to make a reasonable permit determination. 516
First, CAA section 113(a)(5) provides EPA with the authority to issue orders
stopping construction of any new or modified source when a state is not
acting in compliance with any CAA requirement relating to the construction
of such a new or modified source. 517 The Court observed that EPA itself had
"recognize[d] that its authorization to issue a stop order may be exercised
only when a state permitting authority's decision is unreasonable."518
Second, CAA section 167 requires EPA to "take such measures, including
issuing an order, or seeking injunctive relief, as necessary to prevent the
construction or modification of a major emitting facility which does not
conform to the requirements of this part," including state permits that do not
require appropriate BACT. 519 The Court "conclude[d] that EPA has
supervisory authority over the reasonableness of state permitting
authorities' BACT determinations and may issue a stop construction order,
under [sections] 113(a)(5) and 167, if a BACT selection is not reasonable."520
In reviewing EPA's exercise of its statutory authority under the APA, the
Court "further conclude[d] that, in exercising that authority, the Agency did
not act arbitrarily or capriciously in finding that ADEC's BACT decision in
this instance lacked evidentiary support. EPA's orders, therefore, were

511 See id at 10,643-44, 10,651 (discussing CAA requirements for reasoned decision making).
512 540 U.S. 461 (2004).
513

Id at 468--69, 488-96; Foote, supra note 50, at 10,643-44, 10,651.

514 Alaska, 540 U.S. at 475-77.
Id at 479.
Id at 488-96, 502.
517 See 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(5) (2000); Alaska, 540 U.S. at 484.
518 Alaska, 540 U.S. at 490.
519 See 42 U.S.C. § 7477; Alaska, 540 U.S. at 484.
520 Alaska, 540 U.S. at 502 (emphasis added).
515

516
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neither arbitrary nor capricious."521 Foote argues the Alaska case implies
that EPA itseifhas a duty to make a reasonable BACT determination. 522
To summarize Foote's complex analysis, both EPA and state permitting
authorities have some duty under NNSR and PSD NSR to consider
unregulated pollutants that could affect the environment, and to consider
alternative technologies that could reduce the harms from both regulated
and unregulated pollutants. 523 Because of the growing evidence that GHGs
cause global warming, Foote argues that NSR permitting authorities have a
duty to consider new technologies, such as coal gasification, that could
reduce CO2 or other GHGs from fossil fuels at new coal-fired power plants. 524
Foote contends that NNSR permitting authorities have a duty to consider
GHGs and reasonable alternative technologies even if no one raises them
during a permit's comment period. 525 For PSD NSR permits, a commenter
may have the burden of raising a particular alternative to ensure that the
permitting agency considers it. 526 At a minimum, if an NSR permitting
authority fails to respond to comments about GHGs or technologies such as
coal gasification that can reduce GHGs, in light of the recent Alaska
decision, Foote argues that such an agency would be acting arbitrarily and
capriciously in violation of the APA, and that EPA would have a duty to
reject any permit that fails to consider these issues. 527 If the NSR program
requires consideration of the impacts of unregulated pollutants such as
GHGs, then EPA must consider GHGs as a secondary issue when evaluating
NSR permit applications for new power plants even if the Fabricant
Memorandum is correct that EPA lacks any primary authority to regulate
GHGS. 528 The argument that EPA and states should consider IGCC clean-coal
technology is much stronger now that AEP has pledged to build one or more
commercial-scale (up to 1,000 megawatts) IGCC plants as soon as 2010, and
has estimated that a large-scale IGCC plant could produce energy at the
competitive cost of $1,300 per installed kilowatt. 529
521 Id
522 See Foote, supra note 50, at 10,643-44 (arguing EPA must use "reasoned decisionmaking"
reviewable under APA in evaluating NSR permits); see also Alaska, 540 U.S. at 496-97
(discussing EPA's duty to evaluate air permits initially approved by a state environmental
agency using the APA's arbitrary and capricious standard); 5 U.S.C. § 706(a)(2) (2000) (granting
courts the authority to set aside agency action that is arbitrary or capricious).
523 See Foote, supra note 50, at 10,649-67; see also In re North County Res. Recovery Assoc.,
2 E.A.D. 229, 230-31, 1986 EPA App. LEXIS 14 (Adrn'r 1986) (concluding that EPA must
consider emissions of unregulated toxic pollutants raised by citizens in evaluating BACT).
524 See Foote, supra note 50, at 10,649-67; see also In re North County Res. Recovery Assoc.,
2 E.A.D. 229, 230, 1986 EPA App. LEXIS 14 (Adrn'r 1986) (concluding EPA must consider
emissions of unregulated toxic pollutants raised by citizens in evaluating BACT).
525 See Foote, supra note 50, at 10,650-51.
526Id
527 See Foote, supra note 50, at 10,643-44; see also Alaska, 540 U.S. at 496-97; 5 U.S.C.

§ 706(a)(2) (2000).
528 See Foote, supra note 50, at 10,650-51.
529 AEP News Release, supra note 49 (pledging to build at least one IGCC plant and
estimating IGCC plant costs as low as $1300 per installed kilowatt); AEP REPORT, supra note 49,
at 49-52. See generally Foote, supra note 50, at 10,659-60 (discussing the ability of IGCC coal
gasification technology to remove most CO, and mercury from coal); Korostash, supra note 50,
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The Foote article, however, does not address who would have standing
to challenge an EPA or state agency failure to consider GHGs in the NSR
pennit process. It is necessary to address the issue of whether anyone has
standing to challenge impacts that harm all persons equally, or in other
words, whether "'injury to all is injury to none.'"530
D. Standing and GHGs
1. GHGs and the Zone ofInterests

A plaintiffs suit must fall within the zone of interests protected by the
relevant statute or constitutional provision. 531 In Bennett v. Spear, the
Supreme Court stated that "the breadth of the zone of interests varies
according to the provisions of law at issue. "532 The breadth of the zone of
interests may depend on whether Congress has specifically authorized a
citizen's suit533 or a plaintiff is merely relying on the general rights contained
in the APA. 534
In Bennett, Justice Scalia's majority opinion held that the plaintiffs, who
were ranchers and irrigation districts challenging water restrictions
designed to protect endangered fish, were within the ESA's zone of interests
for standing under both the ESA and the APA even though the plaintiffs' suit
was based on secondary provisions in the statute requiring the Secretary of

at 325 (discussing the ability of IGCC to remove sulfur from coal and improve energy
efficiency); supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
530 In Covington, Judge Gould wrote, "Under some precedents, the existence of a widely
shared iI\jury may be thought to compel a conclusion that the iI\jury was not 'concrete and
particularized.' This theory may be summed, at least by detractors, as 'iI\jury to all is iI\jury to
none' for standing purposes." 358 F.3d 626, 650--51 (9th Cir. 2004) (Gould, J., concurring).
531 See Bennett v. Spear 520 U.S. 154, 162-63 (1997) (describing the zone of interests
standard as a prudential limitation rather than a mandatory constitutional requirement); Data
Processing, 397 U.S. 150, 153-54 (1970) (requiring a plaintiff seeking standing under the APA to
demonstrate that his suit is "arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated
by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question"); Buzbee, supra note 146, at 778-82
(arguing the Supreme Court uses the "zone of interests" test to determine whether the plaintiff
meets prudential standing requirements).
532 Bennett, 520 U.S. at 163; see Buzbee, supra note 146, at 782 (discussing the zone of
interest test under Bennett).
533 See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 164-72 (concluding that the requirement of 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2)
that FWS use "the best scientific data available" and "consider[] the economic impact, and any
other relevant impact, of specifying any particular area as critical habitat" gave plaintiffs
standing to sue under the Endangered Species Act's citizen suit provision, jd § 1540(g)).
534 See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 161-63 ("We have made clear ... that the breadth of the zone of
interests varies according to the provisions of law at issue, so that what comes within the zone
of interests of a statute for purposes of obtaining judicial review of administrative action under
the 'generous review provisions' of the APA may not do so for other purposes." (citing Clarke v.
Sec. Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 400 n.16 (1987) (quoting Data Processmg, 397 U.S. 150, 156
(1970)))); jd at 172-79 (holding that plaintiffs had standing under APA to challenge whether
agencies violated § 7 of the ESA, 16 U.s.C. § 1536, which requires, mter alia, that each agency
"use the best scientific and commercial data available," § 1536(a)(2)); see also 5 U.S.C. §§ 702,
704, 706 (2000); Buzbee, supra note 146, at 782-84 (discussing Bennett's analYSis of APA cause
of action).
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the Interior to use the best scientific evidence and to consider economic
impacts when he protects endangered species and their critical habitat, and
not on the statute's primary purpose, which is protecting endangered
species. 535 Because the ESA's citizen suit provision applies to "any
person,"536 Justice Scalia concluded that the statute applies to property
owners and others suffering economic losses from the statute who assert
that the Secretary has overenforced the critical habitat provisions in section
4 of the ESA by failing to use the best scientific evidence or to consider the
economic consequences when designating habitat for a species.537 Unlike
constitutional limits on standing, Congress may expressly override
prudential zone of interest limitations by providing expansive citizen suit
provisions with broad standing. 538
The citizen suit provisions, however, did not reach alleged violations by
the Secretary of section 7 of the ESA, which governs the Secretary's
consultation with other federal agencies and preparation of a biological
opinion about the species and its critical habitat. 539 Nonetheless, because the
APA allows a person "adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action
within the meaning of the relevant statute"540 to challenge agency decisions
when "there is no other adequate remedy in a court, "541 the Court held that
535 See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 164-72 (concluding 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2)'s requirement that
FWS use "the best scientific data available" and "consider[) the economic impact, and any other
relevant impact, of specifying any particular area as critical habitat" gave plaintiffs standing to
sue under statute's citizen suit provision, id § 1540(g)); 520 U.S. at 172-79 (holding that
plaintiffs had standing under APA to challenge whether agencies violated § 7 of the ESA, 16
U.S.C. § 1536, which requires, inter alia, that each agency "use the best scientific and
commercial data available," § 1536(a)(2)).
536 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2000).
537 See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 164-72 (concluding 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2)'s requirement that
FWS use "the best scientific data available" and "consider[) the economic impact, and any other
relevant impact, of specifying any particular area as critical habitat" gave plaintiffs standing to
sue under statute's citizen suit provision, id § 1540(g)).
538 See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 162-66 (stating that "unlike their constitutional counterparts,
[prudential standing requirements] can be modified or abrogated by Congress," and concluding
citizen suit provision abrogated zone of interest limitation) (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.s. 490,
501 (1975)).
539 See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2000) (requiring each federal agency to consult with Secretary
of the Interior whenever agency action may "jeopardize the continued existence of any
endangered or threatened species"); id 1536(b) (requiring Secretary to prepare biological
opinion). The Court concluded that the Secretary's alleged omission of the required procedures
of decision making under id § 1536 were not reviewable under either citizen suit provision, id §
1540(g)(I)(A) or (C), because the Secretary's maladministration in implementing or enforcing
the ESA was not a "violation" of the ESA within the meaning of those provisions. See Bennett,
520 U.S. at 173-74. The Court, however, did conclude that the plaintiffs could challenge the
Secretary's alleged maladministration under the APA because the ESA does not preclude such
review, and the claim that petitioners will suffer economic harm because of an erroneous use of
scientific evidence is within the zone of interests protected by 16 U.s.C. § 1536. See Bennett, 520
U.S. at 175--77. Additionally, the Court concluded that the Biological Opinion constituted final
agency action for APA purposes, and hence the plaintiffs claims were reviewable. Bennett, 520
U.S. at 177-78.
540 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2000); see Buzbee, supra note 146, at 782-84 (discussing Bennett's
analysis of the APA cause of action).
541 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2000); Bennett, 520 U.S. at 161-62,175.
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the plaintiffs' alleged economic irUuries were within the APA's zone of
interests as applied to section 7 and that they had standing under the APA to
challenge whether the Secretary acted arbitrarily and capriciously in
preparing the biological opinion by failing to follow section 7's requirement
that an agency "use the best scientific and commercial data available. "542
Under the APA, a plaintiff may seek redress for an irUury allegedly caused by
an agency's failure to comply with a statute's primary or secondary
requirements unless there is evidence Congress intended to preclude such a
suit. 543
If the Fabricant Memorandum is correct that Congress specifically
intended to preclude EPA from regulating GHGs under the CAA, then any
global warming suit seeking such regulation must fail, because it would be
outside the statute's zone of interests for standing.544 If the reasoning in the
Fabricant Memorandum is valid, a plaintiff could not sue the agency under
the CAA's citizen suit provision, which allows "any person" to sue if the EPA
Administrator fails to perfonn "any act or duty under this chapter which is
not discretionary with the Administrator," because EPA would not have a
mandatory duty to regulate GHGS.545 Nor could a plaintiff sue under the APA
to compel EPA to regulate GHGs, because Congress did not want EPA to
have authority to regulate pollutants contributing to global warming, and
therefore, such a suit would not be "arguably within the zone of interests to
be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in
question. "546 In Bennett, the Court stated that a plaintiff may not bring a suit
under the APA to enforce a statutory provision if Congress specifically
intends to preclude all suits based on that provision. 547
If the Foote analysis is correct, however, EPA or state permitting
authorities must consider GHGs as unregulated pollutants during an NSR
permit review even if the Fabricant Memorandum is correct that EPA cannot
regulate GHGs directly. If Foote is correct that EPA and state permitting
agencies have a duty to consider unregulated pollutants such as GHGs, then
a plaintiff raising such issues would be within the statute's zone of interests
and could sue under the CAA's citizen suit provision if that duty is
mandatory,548 such as meeting a statutory deadline, or under the APA if
exercise of the duty involves discretion. 549 Following Bennett's reasoning,
542 See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 172-79 (holding that plaintiffs had standing under the APA to
challenge whether agencies violated ESA § 7, 16 U.S.C. § 1536, which requires, inter alia, that
each agency "use the best scientific and commercial data available").
543 See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 175--77 (concluding that in enacting the ESA, Congress did not
intend to preclude APA-based causes of action).
544 See infra notes 531-43 and accompanying text.
545 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(2) (2000) (authorizing citizen suits against the Administrator "where
there is alleged a failure of the Administrator to perform any act or duty under this chapter
which is not discretionary with the Administrator").
546 Data Processing, 397 U.S. 150, 153-54 (1970).
547 Bennett, 520 U.S. at 175--77.
548 See 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(2) (2000) (authorizing citizen suits against the Administrator
"where there is alleged a failure of the Administrator to perform any act or duty under this
chapter which is not discretionary with the Administrator").
549 See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2000) ("A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or
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the consideration of GHGs would be a valid secondary purpose within the
NSR's zone of interests if Foote's substantive analysis is correct. 550
As Bennett demonstrates, even if an issue does not come within a
statute's citizen suit provisions, the APA may provide an alternate avenue for
a suit against an agency.551 Even if the CAA's citizen suit provisions do not
apply because EPA or a state permitting agency must exercise discretion in
determining which GHGs are relevant unregulated pollutants for the NSR
review process, a plaintiff who is "adversely affected or aggrieved by agency
action within the meaning of the relevant statute"552 could challenge the EPA
or state permitting agency's discretionary decision not to consider GHGs
during an NSR permit review under the APA's arbitrary and capricious
standard553 because there would be "no other adequate remedy in a court. "554
Under Foote's analysis, if EPA or a state permitting authority fails to
respond to commenters who propose alternative technologies to reduce
GHGs, then a plaintiff could sue the agency under the APA alleging that the
agency's failure to consider GHGs was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."555 It arguably would be
arbitrary and capricious under the APA for a permitting agency during an
NSR permit review not to consider the environmental consequences of the
large amounts of unregulated GHGs that would be emitted by a coal-burning
plant that could have a life expectancy of over 50 years. 556
2.

Jf110 is JIjjured?

Even if GHGs are within the NSR provisions' zone of interests, a
plaintiff must demonstrate an injury in fact. The evidence of harm from
global warming has grown stronger each time IPCC has reviewed the issue
every few years. 557 Nevertheless, an Alaska Native already harmed by global
warming would have a much stronger case for injury than a plaintiff who can
allege only general and common injuries from global warming. Because the
greatest impacts of global warming are occurring in arctic regions, an Alaska
Native whose village or home is destroyed by melting permafrost or coastal

adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is
entitled to judicial review thereoF); id. § 706(2)(A) (establishing the arbitrary and capricious
standard of review); Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 153--54 (stating a plaintiff suing under APA
must show his suit is "arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the
statute or constitutional guarantee in question"); see also Bennett, 520 U.S. at 160, 174.
550 See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 164-72 (allowing standing where plaintiffs relied on secondary
provisions in statute).
551 Seeid. at 161--63, 172-79 (discussing plaintiffs APA cause of action).
552 5 U.S.C. 702 (2000); Buzbee, supra note 146, at 782-84 (discussing Bennett's analysis of
APA cause of action).
553 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000).
554 Id. § 704; Bennett, 520 U.s. at 161--62, 175.
555 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000).
556 Seeid
557 See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text (citing IPCC report showing evidence of
global warming).
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flooding could allege very specific injuries. 558 Conversely, a citizen who can
allege merely general injuries from global warming raises Justice Scalia's
concern that such injuries are better addressed by the political branches.
What about a plaintiff in the contiguous 48 states who challenges an EPA or
a state failure to consider GHGs during a NSR permit review? Based on
prudential considerations, a court might limit such suits to those who are
suffering concrete injuries from regulated pollutants, e.g., sulfur dioxide and
mercury, emitted by a power plant.
Even if no one has standing to raise global warming issues directly
during the NSR permit process, a plaintiff who is injured by regulated
pollutants and has standing might use the NSR process to require states and
EPA to reduce GHGs indirectly by forcing EPA or states to consider
technologies that reduce both GHGs and regulated pollutants. Because
power plants produce immense amounts of regulated pollutants, including
mercury and S02,559 plaintiffs who live near a proposed new coal plant would
have standing to sue EPA or a state if it fails to consider appropriate
alternative technologies when it conducts an NSR review in deciding
whether to approve a permit for the plant, especially if a commenter has
suggested such a technology during the public comment period. 560 Thus, a
plaintiff who has standing to challenge the regulation of pollutants in an NSR
permit should also be able to raise the related issue of GHGs because the
statute requires consideration of all the environmental impacts of a
proposed plant, including unregulated pollutants such as CO2, and alternative
technologies such as coal gasification that can reduce both regulated
pollutants, such as mercury, as well as unregulated ones including CO2,561
Because some alternative technologies such as coal gasification could
reduce both GHGs and regulated pollutants, a plaintiff who is injured by
regulated pollutants would have standing to compel EPA or permitting
states to consider such advanced technologies even if a court did not allow
them standing to consider GHGs alone. 562

E Amending the eAA to Include GHGs
In the future, Congress should amend the CAA to include regulation of
GHGs. An amended CAA should include citizen suit provisions that
authorize any person to sue the EPA Administrator if the Agency fails to
558 See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text (citing sources identifying specific hann in
Alaska caused by global wanning).
559 Robert Melnbardis, Power Plants Top Canada-U.S. Air Polluters, Watchdog Says,
REUTERS, June 2, 2004 (reporting that a Commission for Environmental Cooperation study
found the top air polluters in the United States and Canada to be coal- and oil-fIred power
plants, producing 45% of the 755,502 tons of toxic air releases in 2001, including hydrochloric
and sulfuric acids, and coal-burning power plants were responsible for 64% of all mercury air
emissions).
560 See Foote, supra note 50, at 10,654.
561 See generally Foote, supra note 50, at 10,659-60 (discussing the ability of !GCC coal
gasifIcation technology to remove most CO, and 90 to 95% of mercury from coal).
562 See Foote, supra note 50, at 10,671-72 (discussing bases for APA challenges to NSR
permit decisions).
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comply with any mandatory duties to regulate GHGs in the revised CAA.
Congress should also authorize citizen suits against firms that exceed
statutory limits on GHGs and provide for civil penalties and injunctive relief
for such violations.
A statute that explicitly regulates GHGs and specifically authorizes
citizen suits would solve many of the vexing standing issues in climate
change cases. If Congress in the proposed statute clearly defines what is a
concrete injury, such as flood damage from rising sea level or weather
damage that is more likely than not from warming, it is likely that the
Supreme Court would recognize such suits provide the requisite ir\jury-infact for standing despite the fact that many Americans may suffer relatively
similar irtiuries. Additionally, the use of civil penalties against sources that
violate GHG limits would minimize the vexing problems of causation and
redressability that would arise if courts sought to measure the actual
damages caused by a particular GHG source. Even if all penalties are paid to
the government, the Supreme Court in Laidlawrecognized that the deterrent
effect of civil penalties may benefit a plaintiff sufficiently to justify standing
for a citizen suit even if a plaintiff does not receive any direct compensation
and even if the court declines to impose an injunction against the
defendant. 563
VlI. CONCLUSION: STANDING FOR CLIMATE CHANGE PLAINTIFFS UNDER
NEPA AND THE CAA
A climate change plaintiff must meet standing requirements. Although
an Alaska Native might soon be able to show such clear injuries from global
warming to satisfy even Justice Scalia's definition of "concrete injuries, "564
the average U.S. citizen currently only experiences minor and general harms
from global warming. 565 Can a citizen with only relatively minor injuries from
global warming obtain standing?
Because NEPA is a purely procedural statute, Justice Scalia's analysis
in footnote seven of Defenders, which addresses standing for procedural
rights plaintiffs who have or may suffer a concrete injury, suggests that
courts should apply a relaxed standing analysis. 566 The "reasonable
possibility" standard in the Ninth and Tenth Circuits is closer to footnote
seven's spirit and congressional intent for NEPA.567 The demonstrable and
substantial probability parts of the four-part Florida Audubon decision are
inconsistent with at least the spirit of footnote seven in Defenders, as well as
congressional intent for NEPA, which requires an agency to prepare an
environmental impact statement whenever its actions could reasonably lead
563

Laidlaw, 528 U.S. 167, 183-86 (2000).

564

See supra Part m.B.2.d.

565 It is a legitimate argument, however, that potentially severe future harms should not be
discounted simply because their full severity is not yet apparent. While agencies implementing
NEPA must follow a regulation to deal with uncertainty, see 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 (2004), it is
unclear whether courts would imply a similar requirement under the CAA.
566
567

See supra Part m.B.2.e.
See supra Part V.E.
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to significant environmental impacts. 568 A "reasonable possibility" standard
would appropriately allow NEPA plaintiffs to gain standing to challenge
agency environmental assessments that fail to address plausible
environmental impacts or reasonable alternatives, including relevant cases
where an agency should examine how its actions will increase GHGs and
contribute to global warming trends. 569 A plaintiff who might reasonably be
harmed by a government action affecting GHGs should be able to obtain
standing to force a government agency to consider climate change when it
prepares an environmental assessment on such issues as fuel mileage,
incentives for alternative fuels, or connecting Mexican power plants to the
American power grid. 57o In each of those examples, a plaintiff who lives near
where the greatest impacts of such proposed actions would occur should
have standing.
Because the Fabricant Memorandum and EPA's September 8, 2003
denial of the petition to regulate GHGs raise significant questions about
whether Congress intended EPA to regulate GHGs, courts may conclude that
the CAA does not allow EPA to regulate GHGs directly.571 The NSR process
for approving permits for new power plants, however, may authorize EPA
and state permitting agencies to consider unregulated pollutants such as
GHGs. If the courts accept Foote's thesis that EPA and state permitting
agencies have a duty to consider unregulated pollutants such as GHGs when
they review proposed permits for new coal-burning plants under the NSR
process, a plaintiff could sue the agency under the APA alleging that the
agency's failure to consider the environmental impacts of GHGs emitted by a
proposed plant or to evaluate alternative technologies that could reduce
GHGs was "arbitrary and capricious" under the APA.572
Foote's article, however, does not address who would have standing in
an NSR case to raise GHG issues. 573 Judge Gould's concurring opinion in
Covington specifically addressed standing issues raised by global injuries
from CFCs, but his analysis is also helpful for potential suits involving the
NSR process. 574 For prudential reasons, Judge Gould suggested that a court
could limit global injury suits to those who suffer relatively direct local
injuries from CFCs.575 Similarly, in the NSR process, a court might limit GHG
challenges to those who suffer direct injuries from regulated pollutants.
Such prudential limitations would insure that suits involving global warming
are limited to a reasonable number of plaintiffs, but the use of a "direct"
injury limitation on plaintiffs would still enable some to sue EPA or states to
demand consideration of GHGs as a secondary factor in the NSR permit
process. 576
568 See sup.rn Part V.C.
569 See sup.rn Part V.D.
570 See supra Part VI.D.l.

571
572
573
574
575
576

See supra notes 45S-77 and accompanying text.
See supra Part VI.C.
See supra Part VI.D.
See Covington, 358 F.3d 626, 650-55 (9th Cir. 2004) (Gould. J, concurring).
See sup.rn notes 305-09 and accompanying text.
See sup.rn Part VI.D.2.
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In the near future, Congress could resolve many of the standing issues

concerning global wanning by enacting a statute defining which types of
ir\iuries from global wanning are cognizable in the federal courts and
authorizing specific remedies for such ir\iuries. 577 As Justice Kennedy argued
in his Defenders concurrence, Congress has considerable latitude in defining
which ir\iuries are sufficient for standing. 578 By specifically authorizing
citizen suits against either government agencies or polluters who exceed
proposed GHG limits, and by defining specific remedies, Congress could
avoid many of the vexing causation and redressability issues that are
inherent when numerous sources around the world contribute in complex
and not fully understood ways to a global pollution problem.

577 See Part VI.E, supra.
578

See supra notes 234-38 and accompanying text.
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